Daily NK (DNK): Why do you think North Korea rolled back the closure of the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC)?

Dr. Daniel Pinkston (DP): They may have underestimated the impact it would have. Chinese and South Korean investors are cautious, prudent businessmen who do cost-benefit analysis when their money is at stake, just like anyone else. I think the developments in the KIC had a chilling effect on those who had been contemplating expanding their businesses, or others who might have been contemplating joint ventures with North Korea at Rasun. A number of firms slowed or reconsidered plans as a direct result of the Kaesong closure.

I have no way of getting into the heads of businesspeople to see what they are thinking and what factors they are evaluating, but I do think that the reputational effects, such as the possibility of being held up or hijacked by the North Korean side, as well as the possibility of escalation on the peninsula, had a real effect on economic transactions with China.

DNK: Does that imply that the KIC restart was driven by the realization that this was happening?

DP: It could be so, yes. We can¡¯t know for sure, but it is one possible explanation or contributing factor. The North Korean government may well have thought they could simply send more laborers to China or get greater investment from Chinese firms, but this did not happen. In fact, many Chinese firms have been waiting to see what happens.

I also hear that China is evaluating whether to expand the guest worker program (under which North Korean labor is employed in China). This could be a form of leverage the Chinese wish to hold over the North Koreans. The Chinese are well known for being clever and calculating, and using whatever they can to achieve their strategic goals.

DNK: In a recent Daily NK interview, Professor Andrei Lankov was very bullish on the reopening of the KIC, saying that he thought it would lead to the restarting of Mt. Geumgang tourism and hopefully the opening of a second SEZ similar to Kaesong. However, Daily NK also published an interview with Professor Stephan Haggard recently, during which he raised the point that the way in which Kaesong is reopened is as important as the fact that it is reopened at all, at least in terms of its benefit to the Korean Peninsula. Where do you stand on this?

DP: Somewhere in the middle. I do agree with Stephan Haggard that the way in which the KIC is reopened matters a lot. However, if those obstacles are cleared and a method and process is put in place, I think that template can be used for reopening Mt . Geumgang and Kaesong tourism or any other kinds of project, since many of the problems are similar: frozen assets, security guarantees, protection of property rights, and so on. So that could move forward quite rapidly, but we must wait and see how the KIC pans out first.

We should not forget that it could all go in a very negative direction. There are other indicators that show North Korea has not retreated from its overall strategy, doctrine or ideology. They remain motivated by power and force, and seek power asymmetries. They are clearly wedded to the Byungjin Line of nuclear technology and economic development. The recent ¡°Day of Songun¡± celebrations showed a very clear commitment to these goals and objectives. There has been no real change in thinking.

I think a series of events could occur soon that could have a very negative impact on these engagement projects. The three generations of leadership have frequently demonstrated a willingness to take very big risks and engage in brinksmanship, and I can see them engaging in dangerous actions once again. I think an attempted satellite launch is only a matter of time, and once these inter-Korean engagement projects are restarted it forces the hand of the South Korean government. Will the ROK government continue inter-Korean economic projects in the shadow of satellite launches and nuclear development? Or will Seoul explicitly link economic cooperation with progress on denuclearization? It¡¯s a high-risk strategy for Pyongyang, but the leadership frequently has demonstrated its willingness to accept high risks.

Once there is international condemnation of a North Korean satellite launch, the standard North Korean reaction will be forthcoming, and any subsequent action to ratchet up sanctions would pave the way for a fourth nuclear test. Pyongyang can then present a stark choice to Seoul: we¡¯re a nuclear power, and you will have to get used to it. So Pyongyang will present two choices: A normal economic relationship, with family reunions and tourism, etc., or you can have high tensions, close all the projects down, and we will exert efforts to make things worse for you. I think it would be a mistake by North Korea because I don¡¯t think that strategy is sustainable in the long term, but I don¡¯t think that will stop them doing it.

The other problem is that even without some kind of North Korean action such as a satellite launch, they can still manipulate the reestablishment of these ties as part of their so-called ¡°salami tactics¡± to get acceptance of their nuclear status. Their ideal status is the one India has. ¡°Normalized¡± economic relations and inter-Korean projects are a valuable propaganda instrument for North Korea, which could use normalized North-South economic ties as evidence of their ¡°responsible nature.¡± Pyongyang could then say, ¡°Look we have a normal economic relationship with South Korea, and if anyone should feel threatened by our nuclear status it is South Korea. But they trust us. So you have nothing to worry about.¡± I think this is a bogus argument, but I can see them going forward with it, trying to peel off nations wherever they can be found and whittle down the international coalition on sanctions.

There¡¯s another issue they can manipulate--the light water reactor (LWR) now under construction at Yongbyon. Many people in the region are concerned about nuclear safety, especially with the recent problems at Fukushima. People are nervous about the reactor going online; we don¡¯t know about the reactor technology and the risks of a nuclear accident. I suspect the North Koreans might play off those concerns by accepting IAEA inspectors to provide some sort of oversight for safety purposes, to ensure that it is being operated in a safe manner with the aim of reassuring everyone in the region. People will see this as an improvement in safety, but it could be manipulated and used to create some form of India-type exceptionalism for North Korea, too. They could announce a willingness to accept oversight of their civilian program but keep the military program secret and separate. This sets a very bad precedent, one that forces the international community into a very hard decision. And all the while the North Koreans can play the long game. It doesn¡¯t matter to them whether it takes five or fifty years, they think the world¡¯s resolve will collapse and eventually it will accept them as a ¡°nuclear state.¡± I think this is the vision or strategy they currently have.

So, just because inter-Korean projects are normalized does not mean that there will be a rosy outcome; it could go in a very negative direction indeed.

DNK: How does one push back against the idea that the Byungjin Line is a very positive change in the North Korean approach to politics?

DP: I suppose that if you buy the Kenneth Waltz argument that nuclear weapons are stabilizing, then we don¡¯t have much to worry about. But I don¡¯t buy those arguments at all. If North Korea is able to implement this strategy successfully it will be very dangerous and destabilizing, both regionally and globally. The international community has an absolute obligation to do what it can to obstruct, deny and falsify the Byungjin Line strategy and do everything it can to ensure that it fails and that the North Koreans are unable to achieve their goals.

The international community should pressure and encourage North Korea to reassess and abandon that militant, uncooperative and dangerous strategy, and to replace it with one that is more cooperative and more peaceful. We should help Pyongyang realize there are other strategies that would be better in helping them achieve their economic development goals.

DNK: How does the international community bring that about?

DP: It requires a multi-disciplinary, multi-faceted, multi-national effort that includes export controls, non-proliferation and counter-proliferation, coordination and cooperation on sanctions, deterrence, and containment. All of it needs to be integrated and structured to maximize effectiveness, and that is what makes it so difficult.

The only choice is robust deterrence and containment, and doing what we can to falsify and obstruct the Byungjin Line so as to ensure that it fails, while working with North Korea at the same time so that when it abandons the Byungjn Line and alters or abandons its Songun ideology we are there to work with them to improve the situation in their country.

DNK: What do you say to people who think that Songun, like Juche before it, is just a smokescreen that they don¡¯t actually follow?

DP: I suppose we could also say that in places like the United States or the United Kingdom, liberal democracy is just a smokescreen too. Or maybe we could say that for Christians, believing in Jesus for salvation and eternal life is just a smokescreen.

People can think what they want, but I argue that if you read and understand the literature, the media, and the statements that come from North Korea, and if you understand what Songun is about and then you compare it with the state¡¯s behavior then you will see that state behavior is quite consistent with the ideology. My view is that people who say North Korea is irrational and unpredictable are wrong. If you understand their state ideology then North Korea appears to be very predictable. I cannot think of any other state that is more predictable than North Korea.

DNK: In that case, what drives North Korea?

DP: According to Songun, everything is about power balancing, and everything is viewed through that prism both at home and abroad. Power determines all outcomes. There is no such thing as cooperation; read the literature and you will find that they describe diplomacy or efforts at mutual cooperation as complete fallacies that always end in disaster. The only way to achieve one¡¯s goals is through force. There is no parliamentary system or democratic system where you have to build coalitions: if one side is weak you just eliminate them completely. This is Leninist democratic centralism taken to an extreme.

If you read the Songun literature it states that Kim Jong Il made this great discovery of the value of militarism. On the one hand I find this funny, but on the other I worry that they might actually believe it. There are many historical figures who utilized militarism; Kim Jong Il was not the first. But North Korea says that since they discovered and implemented this militarism idea it has made them invincible. That could lead to serious miscalculations by those who have not been out of the country or seen the rest of the world, and therefore overestimate North Korean capabilities.

Luckily, that militant militarism is mitigated by the focus of the government on the balance of power. They know where the balance is, and they focus on it interminably. You can see it in the state media: when the U.S. deploys any serious military hardware to the area, the North Koreans light up on it. They list the ships, the names of the submarines, the locations of the air bases; they are just obsessed with it. So the North Korean military is aware of the power asymmetry.