[imText1]
Kim Jong Il is playing a dead-end game of missile and nuclear weapon with international society. His decision to launch missile against the will of his most friendly, and the most powerful, ally China represents how unpredictable and dangerous his mentality is.
Some scholars misinterpret that current brinkmanship diplomacy of North Korea is led by hardliners in military. However, North Korea is a country run by, and only by, Kim Jong Il himself.
Then the focus is on how Kim Jong Il decides the major policy of his country.
Hyun Sung Il, a former North Korean diplomat and researcher at South Korea’s National Security and Reunification Policy Institute, argued, in his recent article ‘Study on Changes of North Korea’s National Strategy and Policy on Party Membership,’ that the main force of stabilization of his regime is nepotism, or ‘crony politics.’
Kim Jong Il organizes his most trusted and loyal cronies, and executes a nepotic policy making process on both domestic and foreign subjects. “Such bizarre policy making structure centered around National Defense Commission,” Hyun argues, “represents Kim Jong Il’s unwillingness to build a normal leadership.”
Hyun graduated from Kim Il Sung University, majored in English, and taught at the university for 8 years. Since 1989, he had worked for North Korean Foreign Ministry until he defected to South Korea in 1996.
An excerpt from his article is presented below.
1. Who are Kim Jong Il’s cronies?
Kim’s cronies can be classified into two groups depending on; 1) the way their relationship with Kim developed, 2) and the conditions of their rise to power.
People who had already been close to Kim Jong Il even before Kim being an heir to the throne
First of all, Kim Jong Il’s relatives are elevated to the leading posts in the party and government, although not all of them are able to enter into the core of Kim’s circle. Hur Dam (the late Kim Il Sung’s cousin-in-law), Lee Yong Mu (Kim Jong Il’s cousin-in-law), Kang Kwan Ju (Kim’s nephew), Kim Kyung Hee (Kim’s sister) and her husband Jang Sung Taek and Jang Sung Taek’s brother Jang Sung Woo are those who turned into the backbone of the Kim Jong Il regime as Kim’s succession of power became obvious.
After Kim’s graduation of college and entrance into the party in 1964, the party officials who had worked with Kim Jong Il since then in Korean Workers’ Party’s Organization and Guidance Department and Propaganda and Agitation Department, along with other key-post holders in the party, army and government who were close to Kim, became Kim’s supporters.
Kim Jong Il also made his best effort to win the favor of the influential ex-partisans, especially those who were close to Kim’s mother Kim Jong Suk, such as Kim Il, Choi Hyun, and Oh Jin Woo. Above all, Oh Jin Woo sponsored Kim Jong Il and became the third most powerful man in North Korea after Kim Il Sung-Kim Jong Il and the only elder among Kim’s aides.
People who befriended Kim Jong Il after Kim being officially declared as his father’s successor.
As it turned to be clear that Kim Jong Il would inherit the country, North Korea’s best and brightest gathered around him. The process of employing aides for Kim Jong Il became more transparent and formal.
Throughout Kim’s journey toward absolute power, the new elite group proved its loyalty and competence in every aspect and worked for formation and management of massive slush funds of Kim Jong Il.
2. North Korea’s national policy decided during entourage party
During the late Kim Il Sung era, most of the national policy was decided in the formal policy making organs in the KWP politburo, and responsible party officials had to attend the meeting. Also, related party officials always accompanied Kim Il Sung in either his official visit to other countries or field supervision activities. Thus it was easy to expect the policy course of North Korea by examining who escorted the late Kim.
However, as Kim Jong Il inherited much portion of his father’s power and authority, the open and public policymaking process disappeared and was replaced by ‘report politics’ and ‘crony politics.’ For example, in foreign affairs policy making, Kim Jong Il often passed his order to the 1st vice minister Kang Suk Ju during his entourage party or via telephone, and Kang’s boss received the same order later.
Parties with alcohol and entertainment were the occasion where the topics usually talked in situation room were brought in and discussed. Atmosphere of the party place made the attendants easier to be forthright in expressing their opinion to Kim Jong Il.
Such backroom politics provided Kim Jong Il’s cronies a great opportunity to communicate with him about policy issues and Kim’s aides took the leading role over the members and candidate members of the KWP’s politburo.
3. Common destiny with Kim Jong Il- Kim’s generous benevolence toward his entourage
Kim managed his cronies to be loyal to him by encouraging competition and check-and-balance among them.
The ‘crony party’ is one of the most typical ways that Kim Jong Il manages his aides. Originally crony party was designed to make intimate relationship with high raking party officials before Kim’s rise to power. After Kim Jong Il consolidated his position as successor, crony party has been used as a management tool of his closest aides.
Thanks to Kim’s ‘benevolence politics,’ his aides received tremendous amount of ‘gifts’ that are purchased by Kim’s secretaries, Office #39 of KWP (responsible for Kim’s private slush funds) and North Korean embassies abroad from Japan, Europe and Southeast Asia.
Until 1990s, Kim’s cronies dwelled in apartments that were allotted according to their posts in the party with other non-crony party officials. However, as other party members felt alienated when the reality of crony party was disclosed to other residents, a new extravagant town for Kim’s entourage was built in 1994.
Various types of benevolence bestowed upon Kim’s cronies ensure not only their loyalty but also their families’ and children’s. And if the reality of their lavish lifestyle is revealed to the North Korean public, it would ignite popular hatred against them. Therefore Kim’s cohort considers itself as having a common fate with Kim Jong Il.
4. No cronies forever, no non-cronies forever- Kim’s loyalty maximization tactics
In Kim Jong Il’s crony politics, he repeatedly makes sure that there is no everlasting friend or enemy, and requires incessant loyalty. So the aides always have to prove their loyalty to their ‘Dear Leader.’
There are countless cases of downfall of Kim Jong Il’s close aides; To name a few, Kim’s schoolmate and also sponsor of Kim’s accession to the KWP, Lee Dong Ho, was executed because of a minor slip; Kim Si Hak, known as the ‘oldest crony of Kim,’ was ousted for disobeying the authority of KWP’s Organization and Guidance Department; Kim Yong Soon, foreign secretary of KWP was relegated to a mine worker because of being ‘haughty.’
In other words, Kim Jong Il disciplines his men neither to be arrogant nor to abuse their power which is bestowed on them by himself through harsh ‘show punishments.’
Those who get punished and then pardoned are given an opportunity of ‘revival.’ Thus ousted party officials, hoping to win Kim’s favor again, endeavor to prove their loyalty.
5. Understanding Kim Jong Il’s policy through activities of his cronies
‘Crony politics’ is a unique form of administration during the special period when the political power was shared between Kim Jong Il and his father Kim Il Sung. Therefore such bizarre way of ruling should have disappeared since Kim Il Sung’s death and Kim Jong Il’s complete succession of power.
Nonetheless, after Kim Jong Il’s accession of power, normal socialist country’s administration structure is not yet restored. The party presidium, the party conference and even Kim Jong Il regime’s most significant administrative body, the National Defense Commission, are not held. The fact shows that crony politics and report politics have become stable and fixed in the Kim Jong Il regime.
The abnormal structure of government centered on the National Defense Commission is itself evidence that Kim Jong Il has no will to appear on the public stage and reinstate regular political process.
And Kim Jong Il’s crony politics shows us the direction and characteristics of the Kim Jong Il regime.
Establishment of Su-Ryeong Absolutism and Single Leadership System, which had been the most urgent priorities during Kim Jong Il’s succession period, enabled the Propaganda and Agitation Department and the Organization and Guidance Department to become the most crucial party organs in North Korea. Also, rise of militarism and restructure of government around the National Defense Commission in the 90s elevated status of the armed forces as well.
Promotion of key players in munitions part, such as Jeon Byung Ho, Park Song Bong, Joo Kyu Chang, starting from early 1990s, proves Kim’s focus on nuclear weapon program in that time period. And continued confidence on four major party officials on South Korean affairs, Kang Kwan Ju (chief of KWP Overseas Liaison Department), Oh Keuk Ryul (KPA Operation Department chief), Lim Dong Ok (head of KWP United Front Department), Huh Myung Wook (deputy chief of KWP Office #35) means that still reunification strategy is significant part of North Korea’s national strategy.
Appointment of Lim Dong Ok as successor of Kim Yong Soon, former head of the United Front Department, is a proof that Kim Jong Il’s South Korean strategy will continue to be depending on inter-Korean cooperation. Another Kim’s close aide, Lim Sang Jong’s promotion to head of the KWP Office #38, which is responsible for economic cooperation with South Korea, reveals Kim’s view on inter-Korean economic cooperation as a source of his slush funds.
Deputy chief of OGD and Secretariat Office, Lee Soo Young (or Lee Chul), has been North Korea’s Ambassador for about 20 years and Kang Sang Choon, deputy chief of the Secretariat Office, showed up in Macao when the United States sanctioned a Macanese Banco Delta Asia for cooperating with North Korea in illegal money laundering activities. Such incidents are the result of Kim Jong Il’s interest in regime sustenance cost.
Kang Suk Joo, the 1st vice minister of foreign affairs, also has kept his job for a long time because of his significant role in North Korea’s nuclear diplomacy.
