[imText1]The Grand National Party (GNP), the leading opposition in South Korea proposed a new North Korea policy, “Vision of Peace on the Korean Peninsula.”
The proposal suggested that bilateral talks would be opened between the North and South if necessary and that an investigation would be made into signing a “declaration of termination of war” to ensure a peace system. The GNP’s North Korea policy has finally shown a different and new form.
The proposal contained measures to invigorate economic cooperation between North and South Korea by establishing economic missions both in Seoul and Pyongyang, instigating FTA between the North and South, and receiving 30,000 North Koreans annually to South Korea to be trained on manufacturing and business. This proposal is much more proactive compared to the exchange cooperation policy toward North Korea proposed by the Uri Party.
Enlightening aspects of the policy include opening the doorway for free travel between the North and South, to open North Korea’s broadcasts and newspapers and provide free rice to North Korea’s poor.
Excluding the GNP’s former North Korea policy of “strict reciprocity,” there has never been a policy made like the new one. There were never any clear aims or detailed plans in former proposals. However, some positive assets to the “Vision of Peace on the Korean Peninsula” is that it does clearly state a purpose in line with North Korean reform and opening.
The new North Korea policy aims to expand North Korea’s market economy and liberal democracy through collaboration between the North and South. Though it is still a rough outline, the policy does consider a variety of ways to instigate reform and open in North Korea.
As the reciprocity policy ebbs away, there is a tendency to follow the exchange and collaboration of the Sunshine policy as the new policy fails to address the issue of human rights and North Korea’s issue of nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, whatever the outcome, the fact that the North Korea policy attempted to provide detailed political measures is rather significant.
Before the new North Policy is instigated further, first the denuclearization of North Korea must be deliberated. Further, the way of denuclearization, advantages and disadvantages of North Korea reform and opening on South-North economic collaboration must be considered. A lukewarm stance where this is good and that is good must not be tolerated.
In addition, a lesson must be learned from the “Sunshine” policy which had been instigated for the past 10 years by the DJ-Roh Moo Hyung government in that it failed to convince North Korea to reform, develop and disable its nuclear weapons.
Until now, the Kim Jong Il government has continued to gather “money” offered by South Korea and has fiercely blocked all policies that may instigate fundamental change. Irrelevant of how good the new policy proposed by the GNP may be, nothing will be achieved if the Kim Jong Il government receives “money” prior to reform.
Even if South Korea receives all of North Korea’s broadcasts and newspapers, no advancements will be made unless North Korea receives all of South Korea’s broadcasts and newspapers. Even if South Korea states that they will receive North Korean students, there will be no outcome unless North Korea first sends the students.
What is to happen if North Korea does not accept South Korea’s request for free inter-country travel. If this policy does not provide a strategic basis for the Kim Jong Il government to accept reform, the GNP’s new North Korea policy will hastily degrade to another comprehensive policy as an election tool and the comprehensive policy will reach further limitations and mistakes.
In order to solve this problem, a situation must be created where the Kim Jong Il government does not have a choice but to implement “reform,” if he wants to receive the “money.”
All supports and collaboration targeted towards North Korea must take on a form of specific “action” for North Korea’s reform and open economy. Simply put, if North Korea refuses to reform and open then a “reform reciprocity” policy must be taken where aid and support will not be given.
In one sense, after arranging North Korea’s external reform measures and then arranging South Korea’s agenda of aid and collaboration, each agenda must be connected according to preference, tying all items together in a specific manner.
This should be conducted on the basis of negotiations with North Korea so that the Kim Jong Il government will have no choice but to implement ‘action’ in return for ‘money.’
At first, the Kim Jong Il government may act out in opposition. Then, we must assert the “action for action” notion. It is not South Korea that is urgently in strife but the Kim Jong Il government. The Kim Jong Il government may act out spontaneously, however, they cannot refuse South Korea’s aid and support for long.
If South Korea waits patiently, the Kim Jong Il government will request talks first and in one way or another display “action.” This is because the government’s existence is dependent on foreign ‘aid.’
The future is more important, if the GNP’s new North Korea policy is to become a “living policy” and instigate change in North Korea. The policy’s aims and basis needs to be refined and specific actions, plans and strategies must be embodied.
If the proposal “Vision of Peace on the Korean Peninsula” with its grand title walks away negligently, the policy will have much difficulty in avoiding criticisms that may suddenly outbreak from the public.
