[imText1]Our belief must be based on fact. There are two facts left after North Korea’s nuclear test.
One is that North Korea being the eighth unofficial nuclear state. This is the reality. Explosion capacity less than 1kt, obscurity over whether missile could carry the warheads and analyses of the test’s failure are all mere substitute.
It turned out to be obvious that North Korea did test its nuclear weapons, and Zeno, a material usually found after nuclear test, was detected, and most importantly, North Korean authority proudly announced the test. What we must depend on is the proven fact of North Korean nuclear test.
The other is enactment of UN Security Council Resolution 1718. Chinese special envoy Tang Jiaxuan’s testimony of Kim Jong Il’s unwillingness of second nuclear test, Kim’s desire to comeback to the six-party talks (only if the U.S. revokes financial sanction) and his commitment to the denuclearized Korean Peninsula are all futile unless Kim materializes his ‘promises’; otherwise, there is no need to trust Kim.
So out mission now is to observe South Korean and Chinese governments’ fulfillment of the UN Resolution 1718.
Until North Korea returns to the Nonproliferation Treaty system and accepts IAEA inspectors to confirm its abandonment of nukes, it is hardly possible to believe Kim Jong Il.
What did we do wrong?
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What have we done wrong so far? We believed ‘words’ and ‘promises’ that were totally unreliable and disbelieved ‘reality.’
The Clinton Administration made mistake what it trusted the late Kim Il Sung’s commitment to denuclearization; Kim told ‘North Korea has no reason to own nuclear weapon’ to Jimmy Carter, who was visiting Pyongyang at that time in 1994.
A similar blunder started the second NK nuclear crisis in Oct. 2002. South Korea’s former president Kim Dae Jung has long advocated North Korean nukes to be a mere tool of negotiation and Kim Jong Il’s genuineness in normalization of NK-US relationship. And Kim DJ has been criticizing the U.S. for hawkish stance against Pyongyang. Kim DJ might have believed Kim Jong Il’s words and arguments. DJ still works hard as Kim Jong Il’s spokesperson and it is pointless to analyze the viewpoints of Roh Administration officials, who are blind followers of Kim DJ in North Korean policy.
North Korea has been developing nuclear weapons since the late 50s, in disguise of building nuclear power plant. As what was really going on in NK nuclear facilities was revealed in the early 90s, Pyongyang changed to the so-called ‘brinkmanship policy’ and reached the infamous 1994 Geneva Agreed-Framework, which temporarily terminated ‘official’ nuclear weapons development of NK. Since then, NK has been clandestinely focusing on highly-enriched Uranium program, which is an apparent violation of the Agreed Framework. The program was disclosed in October 2002 by James Kelly, US envoy to Pyongyang, and has been masked as for negotiation until October 9, 2006. So far is a brief summary of how Kim Jong Il has deceived the international society from peaceful nuke program to nuclear weapons development for negotiation purpose to, finally, nuclear test.
Scrutinizing the history of North Korea’s ambitious journey toward nuclear test assures anyone that the regime’s ultimate goal has always been being a nuclear state.
Throughout the two decades, South Korean leadership has made policy decisions based on North Korea’s words rather than its activities and on stereotyped hopes instead of palpable facts. Intelligence is useful and only useful without any subjectivity. Stupidity of the South Korean leaders since Kim Dae Jung has now inflicted substantial damage on peace and security of the whole Korean Peninsula.
Sixty years of modern North Korea and the nuclear test
On Kim Jong Il’s perspective, the nuclear test marks a significant turning point in sixty years of North Korea history. Even though in and outside of the regime is so tumultuous and, to some extent, the nuke test is caused by domestic reason, the test is an important event in inter-Korean relationship. Why?
North Korean regime was established as one of the Stalinist subsidiaries in Pyongyang. In addition to the communist base, extreme militarist culture was added through the Second Korean Workers’ Party conference’s decision in 1966 and the Unilateral Ideology System and Kim Il Sung’s personal cult.
A proletarian dictatorship cannot sustain without the enemy of the people, which are former land owners, capitalists, dissidents and Christians. Since most of them were obliterated by the 60s, their children substituted as the ‘enemy of the people.’
There is another critical object of ‘class struggle,’ the United States. When domestic ‘enemies’ were completely expelled, the American imperialism became the main objective of class struggle in North Korea. Or, the U.S. started to provide ground of the regime’s survival. If Washington normalizes diplomatic relationship with Pyongyang, Kim Jong Il would lose his basis of power, or the enemy of the people. However ironically it might sound, Kim Jongl is depending on ‘the U.S. imperialism.’
Therefore, I do not believe in feasibility of Kim Dae Jung’s statement ‘Kim Jong Il sincerely desires normal relationship with the U.S.’
Then what is the real ‘condition’ of normalization of US-NK relationship?
That is evacuation of the US forces from South Korea. Only then, Kim Jong Il would decide to have a diplomatic relationship with the U.S.
To Kim, the end of US-South Korean military alliance could also be a chance to terminate ‘transition period.’ The transition period is, in North Korean theory of revolution, a gap between revolution in the North and that in the South. Only if the alliance with American imperialism ends in South Korea, the Peninsula-wide (communist) revolution could be achieved.
Of course, it is needless to reiterate that current Kim Jong Il dictatorship is not relevant to almost any facet of socialism, not even communism. North Korea is a gangster country with extreme militarist ideology. And ‘destroy the US-SK alliance’ is an inherent part of the militarism.
The meaning of North Korean nuclear test must be understood in this regard. Pyongyang has deceived the international society for fifty years to acquire nukes, and it will destroy the US-ROK relationship, afterward.
Kim’s next step?
Thus, Kim Jong Il’s future strategy is twfold;
First, he will continue on encouraging his followers in Seoul to destroy the alliance, namely ‘peaceful strategy.’ As seen in the latest spy controversy in South Korea, Kim will produce spy network and anti-American organizations, continuously.
And those who blame the U.S. as responsible for North Korean nuclear test, such as Kim Dae Jung, are very useful to Kim Jong Il. As the number of them increase, the end of the US-SK alliance nears, as cancer cells replace normal cells in human body.
Second, Kim Jong Il would intensify the level of military tension, and in so doing South Korean society falls into chaos between war and peace. Proponents of the military alliance with the United States, eventually, will be forced to be depicted as pro-war faction. And those who fear possibility of nuclear warfare will ask for negotiation with nuclear-North Korea, no matter what the price is. And in reality, Washington cannot take punitive action against the nuclear-armed North Korea.
Such strategy would enable Kim to be both dangerous and pacifist, at the same time. Kim Jong Il might personally think a new phase of revolution in South Korea has begun.
Forced open and reform by Kim Jong Il
Then what is South Korean people’s reaction to be?
First of all, the population must realize truth of Kim Jong Il, regardless of what he promises in words. If Kim provokes a small-scale confrontation on the border, the armed forces must respond according to the combat manual. Kim will never launce nuclear missile first, because he knows the consequence well; it would be the end of his regime. Dictators care their own interests more than anything, including those of their subjects. So is significant not to believe in the dictator’s words.
Secondly, we must punish those who are involved in North Korea’s nuclear ownership, either politically or legally. Specifically, in the next presidential election in 2007, South Korean voters must call the current administration to account.
Thirdly, people must comprehend the necessity of removing Kim Jong Il from power as a precondition of peaceful solution of the nuclear crisis. And also, this is part of the comprehensive solution of North Korean problem.
Lastly, we must enforce Kim Jong Il to choose between denuclearization and forced-regime change through international cooperation, because Kim is unlikely to give up the nuclear weapons voluntarily.
