January 8th
marks Kim Jong Eun’s third birthday since he took over as leader of North Korea
in 2011. However, the date has not yet been designated as a national holiday,
and the North Korean people spent it like any other.
This lack of a national holiday had been anticipated, and can be attributed to the need for Kim to demonstrate filial respect for Kim Jong Il during a customary three-year period of mourning. This period doesn’t end until December 2014, after which January 8th may well be so-designated.
Conversely, however, in other arenas the idolization of Kim Jong Eun is developing much more rapidly, arguably outstripping the fortification of the personality cults of both Kim Il Sung and
Kim Jong Il in their respective eras.
The adulation
of Kim Jong Il occurred at a particularly gradual rate, overseen in large part by Kim himself, a master political strategist. As is well known, Kim emerged
as a leading figure in the regime of his father in the 1960s, and was designated his father’s successor
in the mid 1970s. Yet he was only officially promoted to the pinnacle of state power 1997 at the end of three years of mourning for Kim Il Sung, who died in July 1994. The “succession process” thus ran its course over approximately thirty years.
Conversely, the “12.12” execution
of Jang Song Taek last December signaled the end of the
guardianship system created by Kim Jong Il to pilot his son into untrammelled
power, a system that has lasted less than three years. Analysts anticipate that historical creation and revision for the purpose of idolizing Kim Jong Eun will thus be further stepped up in 2014. Kim’s legitimacy over the last two years may have been reliant on the reflected glories of grandfather (and, in the military sphere, father); the upcoming years will need to be driven by Kim’s own history.
The decision to have Kim initially follow in the
footsteps of his grandfather was intended to arouse nostalgia and prompt
loyalty from ordinary North Koreans. In 2012 and 2013, he made 65 and 26 references respectively to his
grandfather, father and/or the “Suryeong,” “General” and/or “Generalissimos” in his New Year’s Address. This year he made just eight such references.
After the passing of Kim Il Sung in 1994, Kim Jong
Il stressed unwavering adherence to his father’s teachings. Though still leaning on “legacy politics,” the Kim Jong Eun system has seen accentuated Kim Jong Eun idolization, particularly over the last six months. Songs such as “Cannot Live Without Him” have been published via Rodong
Sinmun, and the title “Great” has been appended to his name.
Commenting on the scaled
down references to Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il in Kim’s recent New Year’s
address, Ahn Chan Il of The World Institute for North Korea Studies told Daily
NK, “Kim Jong Eun initially walked in the footsteps of Kim Il Sung so as
to raise his popularity among the people, but we can see that he is now aggressively
erasing the influence of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il.”
In 2013, Kim focused on producing results
via construction projects for the purpose of idolization. Under his leadership,
approximately forty different recreational facilities were built to completion
in a short period of time, including Masikryong Ski Resort in Gangwon Province,
and Mirim Riding Club, Munsu Water Park, and Rungra Amusement Park in Pyongyang.
These formed the bedrock of the self-aggrandizing sections of his New
Year’s Address, which focused generally on three sectors: agriculture,
construction, and science and technology.
Analyzing these
steps, Professor Lee Ji Su of Myongji University commented, “Although Kim
Jong Eun worked hard on the construction of Masikryong Ski Resort and Munsu
Water Park, they were not projects done with the long view in mind at all.”
Rather, “They were done rather arbitrarily to heighten the worship of Kim Jong
Eun and give him some achievements [to point to].”
“In Kim Jong Il’s case, he received ample humanitarian aid from the
outside during the Sunshine Policy era; however, in Kim Jong Eun’s case there has
been markedly less external aid,” Professor Lee added. “Resources are essential to maintain the Kim
Jong Eun system, but there have been few opportunities to secure those
resources.”
Given more limited
inflows of potential gifts for reallocation to loyalists and the citizenry, the Kim regime has focused
primarily on idolization (and, more recently, coercion). Yet since many ordinary North Koreans are now able to
access external sources of information, it is unclear whether idolization and propaganda are any longer an effective strategy for inducing allegiance.
Ahn posited, “With the exceptional spread
of cell phones and the way he talked about the partial opening of the Internet,
[Kim] is showing the image of a young leader meeting the needs and desires of North
Koreans […] They are betting on halting the inflow of external information, but in
the end they cannot stop it getting in completely.”
