A source from South Korea has asserted that the operatives who used an armed vessel to seize three Chinese fishing boats in the West Sea on May 8th came from West Sea Base No. 2, which is operated by the General Bureau of Reconnaissance.
The claim was made by Choi, a defector who spent 20 years as an infiltration operations instructor with what is now the General Bureau prior to his defection. According to Choi, the testimony of one Chinese vessel captain, added to his own knowledge of North Korea’s West Sea defenses, makes it clear that this was the work of the General Bureau.
The captain of Liaodanyu No. 23527, which was fishing alongside the boats that were seized, testified that the North Korean vessel which took the Liaodanyu No. 23528 was a fast moving military speedboat, and that there were four to five people on board wearing blue uniforms and hats.
On this, Choi said, “Secretly entering international waters or those of another country for a brief spell and capturing a boat is the kind of special mission intrinsic to the maritime bases of the Special Bureau of Reconnaissance.”
“General Bureau maritime bases which conduct infiltration missions against South Korea exist both in the East and West Sea, and the West Sea base is at Nampo,” he went on. “The base has around ten combat speedboats disguised as mid-size fishing vessels, and they perform operations like seizing fishing boats and maritime infiltrations.”
A normal fishing vessel is equipped with a single engine; however, Choi said that the high-speed vessels of the type at the base have four Russian made M-400 engines. The average speed of the vessels is 45 knots, though they are able to reach 50 knots.
A person present at the time of the attack has testified that the group of captors included Chinese people; however, Choi believes that this probably means the operation was actually carried out by operatives from the General Bureau who are able to speak excellent Chinese. According to Choi, “The General Bureau’s West Sea unit taught staff Chinese to prepare for situations including fleeing into Chinese waters in the course of operations.” Operatives stationed at East Sea Base No.1 are required to speak excellent Japanese.
Therefore, Choi concludes that it is actually unlikely that reports of direct Chinese involvement in the operation are correct.
Similarly, Choi believes it is highly unlikely that the General Bureau of Reconnaissance suddenly decided upon the capture of Chinese trawlers as a way to earn money. He said, “They knew very well that capturing a Chinese trawler without the approval of the authorities would create a diplomatic problem, so I don’t believe they did it independently. While conniving with the authorities to demand monies, they are intending to express discontent at something.”
