May 24th marked the fifth anniversary since South Korea
imposed the “May 24th Measures,” a response to the North Korean sinking of the
South Korean navy corvette Cheonan. The rigorous set of sanctions bans, among
other things, all manner of trade between North and South Korea—save those
within the Kaesong Industrial Complex [KIC], the last vestige of inter-Korean
economic collaboration.
Kim Dae Jung, the South Korean President from 1998 to 2003,
initiated the Sunshine Policy, which fostered an unprecedented amount of
exchange and interaction between the Koreas since their division. It was during
his administration that the KIC was established.
His successor, Roh Moo Hyun, followed suit and continued an
active level of exchange with the North. Such rapprochement, however, ended
with his successor, Lee Myung Bak, who enacted the May 24 Measures in 2010
during his time in office.
David Straub, the Associate Director of Korean
Studies Program at Stanford University, offers invaluable insight into these
issues, specifically the inconsistent policies South Korea has incorporated in its approach to the North.
Straub contends that a consistent policy toward North
Korea is the vital component to brokering exchange and warming up the frosty relations gripping the Korean Peninsula. During a recent seminar in Seoul aimed at shedding light on these issues, Straub addressed concerns posed by many in the field that North Korea’s
mercurial tendencies render South Korea’s attempts at a consistent approach to
tackling inter-Korean issues unfeasible.
“Without a
consistent policy, South Korea’s influence over the North will remain quite
limited. Pyongyang’s capriciousness is a given. South Korea should adopt a
policy that takes that into account,” he explained, adding that currently,
each of South Korea’s dominant parties has adopted policies on the North that pander to
the center of each party.
What is needed, he maintained, is a South Korean
policy that appeals to the middle two-thirds or three-quarters of all South
Korean voters. “Achieving a
long-term consensus will be very difficult but it is not impossible,” he noted at the conference.
Persistent inter-Korean tension induced Straub to co-author the
book Tailored Engagement with Shin Ki Wook and Joyce Lee; all of the book’s contributors are
members of the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) at
Stanford University. In the book, the three authors assert that overcoming the
stalemate besetting the Korean Peninsula, cooperation and engagement between the
two Koreas is paramount.
Despite the severe malnutrition still plaguing much of North
Korea’s population, food aid to the North has declined in recent years due to deteriorating relations between the Koreas, a host of sanctions, and donor
fatigue. While Tailored Engagement’s authors maintain that it is crucial for South Korea to provide
humanitarian aid to its brethren just above the border, they propose that said aid should incorporate a range of elements, rather than the longstanding support packages of rice and fertilizer.
The authors point out that long-term untied food assistance
harbors potential to generate a moral hazard, whereby the recipient country
becomes increasingly dependent on the donor countries. “Food and nutritional
assistance should encompass technical assistance and training to boost and
diversify agricultural output,” they state, citing the example of increased
assistance to the North in implementing sloping land management.
Support of this
exact nature was suggested and carried out by the Swiss government in the past
with extremely positive effects, resulting in higher production yields and
curtailed flooding in North Korea’s agricultural endeavors.
In addition to humanitarian aid, the authors call for more establishments
and institutions akin to PUST, Pyongyang University of Science and
Technology–North Korea’s first private international university, founded,
jointly funded, and operated by entities in both Koreas. The school even
maintains academic exchanges with a number of universities in North America, such
as Syracuse University and University of British Columbia.
Unfortunately,
however, the authors note that “PUST is not an officially recognized
institution by the ROK Ministry of Unification,” and propose that South Korea
approve PUST’s activities on a government level and make efforts to facilitate South
Korean faculty exchange trips.
Despite the fact that PUST receives most of its funding from
South Korean organizations, there has been no faculty or student exchange between PUST and South Korean universities with memoranda of understanding
(MOU), such as Korea University and Dankook University. “The South Korean
government should encourage educational institutions to expand academic,
student, and faculty exchanges with the North,” the book’s authors assert.
Economic engagement also features heavily in the work,
described as a facet of “key importance to vitalize the North Korean economy
through inter-Korean as well as multilateral economic engagement.” South
Koreans tend to view business ventures in North Korea as a grand national
project for economic cooperation and integration. It is for similar reasons
that the South Korean government provides support, including tax breaks and insurance benefits, to South Korean investors at
Kaesong.
On the other hand, foreign firms lack these advantages as
their governments are unlikely to provide any special incentives. South Korea should work with third countries to decide what incentives and conditions are needed to attract foreign investment. Among other things, South
Korea needs to focus on reducing political risks that face potential foreign firms looking to invest in the isolated nation.
In turn, this would likely make it harder for North Korea to
unilaterally make decisions or act capriciously if there are foreign firms
other than South Korean counterparts involved in a joint business venture. If
North Korea again decides to rehash past incidents, such as its sudden decision to shut down KIC in 2013, South Korea and the international community should ensure that North Korea incurs greater losses than simply its share of workers’ income, according to the
team of experts collaborating on the book.
And last, but not at all least—and the issue most relevant since the passing of another year sees these sanctions firmly in place–is the “May 24th Measures,” which the book’s
authors condemn as detrimental to inter-Koreans relations and a continued
obstacle to positive developments on the peninsula, namely due the fact that they have essentially stamped out all trade between the Koreas.
According to the authors, the measures “not only prohibit
new South Korean investment in Kaesong, but also greatly limit the project’s
ability to attract international firms.” They justifiably note that it would
not be feasible for the South Korean government to encourage international
investment in Kaesong—or broader North Korea– when South Korea is deterring
its own businesses from investing in the venture.
Moreover, the measures have given way to a major boost in
Sino-North Korea trade, patently reflecting how these sanctions did little to deal a
blow to the North Korean economy, the authors state. Instead, the measures have produced deleterious effects for existing South Korean companies operating within the confines of the Kaesong
Industrial Complex, as well as preventing any hope for new ones to create inroads into North Korea —a
significant step that the authors of Tailored Engagement argue would both
tangibly and symbolically begin to bridge the ever-widening chasm between the
North and South.
