Attention Turns to January 1st Statement

As the Kim Jong Eun regime enters its third year following a
tumultuous end to 2013, international attention now focuses on the “New Year’s Statement,” the state’s annual January 1st propaganda explication
of priorities for the coming year.

The New Year’s Statement is based on core content agreed
between the Chosun Workers’ Party leadership and the Party Propaganda and
Agitation Department, written up by Rodong Sinmun editorial writers and
then passed to the Supreme Leader for review and acceptance.
Although it is pure public propaganda and, as such, does not accurately reflect the aims of the regime, there is still plenty that can be learned from it.

It is widely anticipated that the 2014 statement will strongly
emphasize matters of ideological import, specifically targetting the firm
establishment of monolithic rule under the public leadership of Kim Jong Eun. The statement will act as the postscript to a year in which the North Korean authorities
revised the “Ten Principles for the Establishment of the One-ideology System” for
the first time in 39 years, and then removed Jang Song Taek, who was both high in the regime hierarchy and the husband of Kim Jong Eun’s
aunt.

The logical way to achieve this goal is to propagate the heroic
achievements of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, and then explicitly link them to
Kim Jong Eun via the ubiquitous “Mt. Baekdu bloodline.”

Elsewhere, Kim Jong Eun is now starting to acquire some
tangible “achievements” of his own, specifically in the field of construction.
This year the regime made Pyongyang “University of Architecture” into a “General
University,” just the fourth such university in North Korea. It also
constructed Masik Pass Skiing Grounds, which then coined a mass mobilization
catchphrase, “Masikryeong Speed,” as well as Mirim Riding Club, Munsu Water
Park and a range of smaller entertainment and popular culture facilities, all
of which were heavily featured in the state-run mass media.

It can thus be seen, as it could in 2012, that architectural
awareness and construction are central to the creation of the “Kim Jong Eun
myth,” and the New Year’s Statement is likely to feature general instructions
from Kim to this sector.

Of course, entertainment and cultural construction is just
part of the propaganda narrative surrounding architecture, which includes new
apartment complexes built for scientists and educators in the capital. This can
be added to the hosting of a conference of scientists and technicians from
across the country in Pyongyang to show a country whose policy is one of “focusing
on science.” This is logical for Kim, who also took the undeserved credit
for North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and successful long-range
missile tests. His regime is currently propagating the notion that science will
help it lead the nation into a new era; in other words, having achieved
strength through science, prosperity will follow the same way.

Economic steps such as the establishment of 13 new economic
development zones, the public rationale for which is also improving the
People’s Economy, are also likely to be discussed. There are those who believe that
with the regime seeking a driver for its economic policy and knowing that this
can only come from China or, to a lesser extent, Russia and South Korea at this
time, the statement may take a soft line toward the outside world. However,
with many predicting an impending provocation of some sort in 2014 and with the
current media narrative in North Korea dominated by open, vitriolic criticism
of the administration of President Park Geun Hye, this is surely an area of uncertainty
and interest.

Cheong Seong Chang of the Sejong Institute told Daily NK
today, “Given that they have amended the Ten Principles and executed Jang Song
Taek after making a big issue of his counter-revolutionary actions, it is
highly likely that the statement will reveal their desire to step up the political
control.”

“In the area of economic problems, they could opt to
generalize and broaden those experiments begun in accordance with the June 28th
Policy,” he went on to speculate.

“It appears that they will emphasize the need to completely
alter the social atmosphere  so as to tighten the discipline that remains
following the execution of Jang Sung Taek,” Lee Soo Seok of the Institute for National
Security Strategy added. Making mention of so-called “legacy politics,” they
will “raise an atmosphere of loyalty,” he concluded.