North Korea attempts to incite disorder in South with coastal live fire exercise

North Korean state media has recently reported that ruler Kim Jong Un conducted an inspection of the country’s West Sea defense units as they held live fire training drills. The units are located on a frontline position approximately 15 km from Baengnyeongdo Island. KCNA, North Korea’s central news agency, reported that as soon as Kim Jong Un issued the fire command, “the entire front line erupted with the clamorous sound of cannon fire. Shells pierced through the atmosphere and landed accurately on their targets.”  

Reading the article, one gets the impression that a large scale training exercise was conducted. Furthermore, North Korean ruler Kim Jong Un’s direct participation in the live-fire exercise can be interpreted as a provocative gesture. 

However, upon closer analysis, the actual extent of the exercise was relatively limited, with only one or two coastal batteries used. This suggests that the exercises were virtually meaningless in terms of military deterrence. The event may therefore have been part of an impromptu decision by the Korean People’s Army Supreme Commander to improve troop morale, with the direct participation of the country’s ruler adding a deeper political significance. 

So just what kind of message was Kim Jong Un trying to send? 

First of all, we have to think about who the message was intended for. I believe that it is fair to say that the message is intended more for South Korea than for America. Messages intended for America usually involve nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches. Messages aimed at South Korea usually involve provocations in the West Sea or the DMZ. 

If an armed clash breaks out in the DMZ or the West Sea, the need to solve the problem through the armistice system is emphasized. A small provocation like this is not significant enough to draw America’s prolonged attention. Furthermore, in the aftermath of America’s latest presidential election, everyone is focused on internal matters. There are few calls for America to pay heed to such a small scale provocation.  

Now that we have established that the message is indeed intended for South Korea, it is time to consider what the content of the message is. 

As President Park Geun Hye and the Blue House deal with domestic turmoil, North Korea is taking advantage of South Korea’s political situation by raising bilateral tensions. There are two potential reactions to this in South Korea. Some will say that despite the President’s plummeting ratings, a military threat makes the need for centralized leadership obvious. On the other hand, other people might look at the same situation and say that the President’s situation is exposing the country to significant danger. 

However, is it conceivable that North Korea would conduct the exercises in an attempt to help Park consolidate power?  

North Korea has sharply criticized President Park’s assertive North Korea policies. Ever since the Choi Soon Sil scandal emerged, North Korea has voiced support for the clamoring of the South Korean public for her resignation. In light of this, it is very unlikely that North Korea would do anything to help President Park consolidate power, and is likely hoping for her resignation. That being said, what message was North Korea trying to send? 

If we think a little more deeply, we can discern North Korea’s true intentions. As the trouble with North Korea grows, President Park, the Blue House, and the conservative establishment will be forced to reconsider their security-first strategy in favor of alternatives. If the president resigns, great uncertainty and instability may result. With this in mind, people may end up deciding that maintaining the current power structure is preferable to the instability that comes with sudden change. 

However, it is always difficult for the opposition party and the citizenry to automatically side with the President in such instances. They know that it’s possible for the President to use national security threats as a justification to reassert power. In this type of scenario, it is possible to muddle through on ambiguous terms for quite some time. For South Korea, the worst possible scenario would be for Park to remain in such dire straits for the rest of her time in office – one year and four months.  

Viewed from this perspective, the training exercise has very different ramifications in the long run. It’s a concerted effort to fan the flames of uncertainty and instability while President Park is on the defensive and off balance. It is likely that this sort of provocation will continue in order to exacerbate uncertainty surrounding Park’s leadership. The need for South Korea to quickly resolve the current leadership problem is made all the more apparent by North Korea’s provocations.