No responsible West German political parties or politicians
actively opposed unification: simply, the preamble to the country’s constitution
(Basic Law) stated that unification and freedom ought to come about through
self-determination. In public opinion polls conducted between 1973 and 1988,
69~77% of respondents agreed that this reunification provision must remain.
Nevertheless, right up to the fall
of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the will and desire of West Germans for
unification was very low. Citizens had resigned themselves to the idea that
unification in the near future was impossible. For some it had grown into a
taboo subject; in German society, such talk brought up nationalistic attitudes
and was seen as likely to impede unification itself. After the wall came down,
opinion polls may have shown that half of West German citizens felt a strong sense
of kinship with their brothers to the east, but there weren’t so many that truly
welcomed unification. Many feared that unification might jeopardize their secure
welfare system.
The attitudes of politicians during the divide
40 years after the governments
of East and West Germany were established, the Cold War system persisted and
many believed the chances of unification remained slim. There weren’t many
people who regarded unification as possible, much less a plausible policy goal.
The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) of
West Germany both thought along these lines. The conservative CDU emphasized
the unification provision in the constitution, but did not regard unification
as a realistic end game. The progressive SPD did not deny unification as a
desirable goal, but saw it as impossible in the near future. Rather, the SPD
regarded “peaceful management of division” as the top priority. They emphasized
exchanges and cooperation with East Germany, and turned away from contact with
East German dissidents in favor of pouring their energies into exchanges through
the leadership of the communist regime.
Civilian attitudes during the division
Intellectuals also had little
interest. Well-known existentialist philosopher Karl Jaspers created a stir
when he argued in 1960 that freedom in East Germany and integration with
Western Europe were more important than German reunification. Leftist
intellectuals claimed that the division of Germany was a natural result of Nazi
crimes and that reunification shouldn’t occur for the sake of world peace. Other
intellectuals, like Gunter Grass, who held onto the dream of a socialist utopia,
equated the cooperation of the U.S. with Western Europe with Soviet repressive
domination of Eastern Europe. These thinkers sided with East Germany, claiming
that at least East Germany remained a “humane society.”
Most citizens did not think very
differently. Opinion polls showed a stable 80% harboring hopes of unification,
but those who believed unification was a pressing issue was falling, from 45%
in 1965 to only 0.5% in 1988. Moreover, only 3% believed in the real possibility
of unification. In 1970, 68% of West Germans thought of East German citizens as
fellow countrymen, but by 1987 this number had dropped to 52%. Interestingly,
in 1987, 40% of people between the ages of 16 and 29 thought of East Germans as
akin to Austrians, while just 39% thought of them as fellow countrymen.
Attitudes on the brink of unification
When the Berlin Wall came
tumbling down, the people of West Germany celebrated. But just a few weeks
later, this passion had dissipated. Most West Germans had not thought of
unification as important or necessary; just half had agreed with the sentiment
that “We are one people” when it appeared at the Monday demonstration in
Leipzig.
Partly in reflection of Nazi
crimes, citizens had been educated to the effect that freedom and European
integration were more important than German unification. Some intellectuals had
been against unification because they were worried that a strong Germany could
commit crimes similar to those of Nazi Germany and that surrounding countries
would fear a unified state. Citizens feared that the flow of East Germans to
the west and the costs of unification would destabilize their welfare system.
And yet, as the communist regime
fell and unification became an observable phenomenon, citizens in West Germany
began to accept it as inevitable. They came to believe the promise by politicians
that “no one will lose.” The words of Willy Brandt eventually spoke for the
majority of West Germans: “What was one should be one.”
