Until the moment the Berlin Wall collapsed
on November 9th, 1989, nobody believed that East Germany would disappear and
the two German states would be unified. The reasons for this perception were
both that the USSR apparently had no desire to allow it, and that East Germany
had given the impression of being a stable socialist state, one with the most generous
welfare system in the Eastern Bloc.
East Germans themselves were even more
confident of this, not only because their state had the most advanced and
generous welfare system of all, but also because it was thought it could not
collapse for as long as the Soviet Union endured. Not one single major politician from East or
even West Germany was active in pushing for reunification.
Erich Honecker’s Stable East
German Regime
The mid 1980s were a time of unrest for the
Eastern Bloc communist states of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, whose
citizens demanded ever-greater liberalization. East Germany, by contrast, seemed
exceedingly stable as leader Erich Honecker began his 19th year in
power.
There were some demonstrations; however,
they were modest and happened only occasionally. Moreover, the demands were
limited to freedom of travel and protection of human rights and the environment;
issues unconnected with regime change. May 1989 local elections produced
landslide results for the ruling party. Honecker, who had come to power in
1971, was seen as a relatively liberal leader, one who raised wages, extended
vacations, granted greater freedom of movement, and increased supplies of housing.
Nobody could even imagine that this was about to end.
False Impressions: Strong Industry and Fine Socialist
Welfare
Among the socialist states, East Germany
was known for its generous welfare and advanced technological know-how.
According to official statistics for 1989, GDP was $9703, and the average
economic growth rate over the last 5 years had been 3.02%, surpassing West
Germany’s 2.66%. Encyclopaedia Britannica recorded that East Germany had the
most developed economy in Eastern Europe, and that its manufacturing industry
was among the largest in the world.
It only became clear only after
reunification that the East German economy had actually been in dire straits.
Despite assertions that no foreign loans had been received, the country owed
more than $20bn dollars to foreign creditors, and spent 62% of annual foreign
currency earnings on servicing its debts. After 1990, East Germany required
annual transfers of $5.5 to $6.5bn dollars per annum; otherwise, standards of
living would have dropped by 30%. The value of the East German economy amounted
to just 30% that of West Germany, and its average productivity was only 25%
that of the West.
The basic cause of East Germany’s
subsequent collapse was distortions inherent to socialist economic systems the
world over, but the specific cause was failed 1980s investments in chemical and
electronics industries. The generous welfare system also stunted the economy
badly. The two German states were in competition to provide the best welfare
for their people, and in East Germany annual economic growth was dwarfed by
welfare payments growth.
In March 1990, after the fall of the
Berline Wall, the first free elections in East German history produced a
government led by Lothar de Maiziere, which pressed for swift reunification. De
Maiziere’s Alliance for Germany did this in part because the people desired it,
of course, but more importantly because East Germany’s survival could not be
guaranteed.
National Security and Security Systems
East Germany occupied a more secure
position than its neighbours. Its regular soldiers numbered 95,000, and
reserves 180,000. The Stasi (secret police) had one Stasi agent for every 62
civilians. By comparison, the Nazi equivalent, the Gestapo, had just 32,000
agents managing 80mn civilians. Moreover, because East Germany was on the front
line against Western Europe, an additional 540,000 Soviet service personnel
were stationed on its soil. It was difficult to imagine the collapse of East
German communism.
Maintaining Status on the World Stage
East Germany had a solid international presence.
Although it had diplomatic relations with 134 states, lagging behind West
Germany with 162, East Germany nonetheless had relations with important states such
as the United States, France, and the UK. Both East and West joined the UN
after signing the 1972 Grundlagenvertrag,
or Basic Treaty, which governed their relations. In addition, the two held
seven summits and signed thirteen agreements establishing cooperation in
diverse areas. Hence, efforts to establish a socialist East Germany distinct
from West Germany were clearly successful.
In order for German reunification to take
place, it needed the acquiescence of the four major powers and the persuasion
of neighbouring countries. These requirements made it seemingly impossible for
reunification to happen. Therefore, East Germans did not believe that
reunification was possible, and did not expect or particularly desire it to
take place.
Lessons from East Germany
Outwardly, East Germany appeared stable,
but reunification took place mere months after the collapse of communism. This
sudden turn of events offers several important lessons. Firstly, that it is very
hard to judge the opinions of people living under an oppressive regime. The
East German regime believed that its popular support was high; they did not
know what lay beneath the surface.
Secondly, that official statistics released
by communist states are not reliable. East Germany did try to assemble accurate
statistics, and scholars from both Germanys collaborated and exchanged
documents. Nonetheless, administrative bodies fabricated data, to the extent
that even the government did not have an accurate understanding of its economy.
Thirdly, that the awareness and aggregate
thinking of a people living under an oppressive regime can change radically
once a revolutionary spark is ignited. East Germans believed that as long as
the USSR kept hold of East Germany, political change would be difficult, and so
held back from expressing anti-regime sentiment. However, once they realized
that the USSR no longer wished to buttress the East German communists led by
Honecker, they began expressing their sentiment openly, and because West
Germany stood next door as a model, they threw off the shackles of the regime
in a surprisingly brief moment.
