Why the Kim Regime Agreed to Talk…

It’s been a long time since I wrote a column like this. It is a story about the recent high-level inter-Korean talks, the first for seven
years.

North Korea, which had hooked up family
reunions to calls for U.S./Korea military drills to cease, emerged satisfied with
a halt to mutual slander, and sought to emphasize that it
was making an “extremely big
concession.” The South Korean government resumed modest humanitarian aid,
which could proceed to infrastructure, and, on the basis of the confidence that comes from such things,
is also talking about resolving the North Korean nuclear issue.

In the background to these high-level talks,
the media and North Korea experts said that with our help North Korea could
break out of the political, economic, and diplomatic crises faced by Kim Jong
Eun following the purge of Jang Song Taek. Naturally, that’s what the North
wants.

Does this mean that, as usual, the side that got the
most out of the interactions was North Korea
?

In 2013, it was my opinion that North Korea
would
get on board with
the trust process. However, even before the Park Geun Hye administration came
to power the North went ballistic, conducted a missile launch and its third
nuclear test. Even worse, they threatened South Korea and the U.S. with a
nuclear conflagration. Thereafter, Kim Jong Eun murdered his uncle, Jang Song
Taek, at the end of the year. Simply put, Kim’s actions were bizarre enough to
raise questions about whether he was putting any thought whatsoever into his
rule. Even the Jang judgement in Rodong Sinmun managed to make the leader look silly.

Over a number of years, Jang ruined swathes
of the economy, it declared. He sold off valuable subterranean resources,
including coal,
for private gain, it noted. He sold land leases in Rason, it opined. In 2009,
he egged on “eternal traitor” Park Nam Ki to issue an exorbitant amount of money, which
resulted in great economic confusion, and the very person who pulled the
strings to destroy popular sentiment was Jang himself, it asserted.

According to Kim Kwang Jin, writing in a
recent edition of Zeitgeist, “This part of the sentencing was an acknowledgement
that North Korean construction, foreign trade, and special economic zone
operations are in a parlous state. Also, it pointed outs the unfairness of current
North Korea-China trade, as well as the fact that the currency redenomination, which
was said to have occurred under Kim Jong Eun’s 
direction, failed, causing an extreme crisis of public opinion. This is
also an announcement that anti-Kim Jong Il, anti-Kim Jong Eun, anti-socialist,
and anti-China sentiment all exist.”

In sum, then, there is
persuasive strength in the idea that North Korea is
 yet again trying to use South Korean goodwill to get over its financial difficulties. However, that is not sufficient to fully interpret the nature of the North-South high-level contacts. Either way you cut it, the Kim Jong Eun regime was getting on board with the peninsula trust building process; mostly because it is advantageous to them to do so. 

(To be continued…)

* This is the first part of an abridged Guest
Column that appeared in Korean on February 17th. The views expressed in Guest
Columns are not necessarily those of Daily NK.