Suppose the North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il died today. What might happen tomorrow? Among the various scenarios that might play out, it is imaginable that one of his sons might inherit his throne and successfully consolidate his hereditary regime as Kim Jong Il did after his own father’s death.
However, this is an unrealistic supposition, considering the fact that Kim, himself, did not inherit the presidency automatically. After defeating his uncle and archrival, Kim Yong Ju, in the 1970s, it took more than 20 years for him to solidify his power as heir to his father. Additionally, the sons of Kim Jong Il have done little to prepare for the passing of their father.
Still, most importantly, Kim Jong Il has no interest in sharing his power monopoly with his sons, fearing that the power sharing might lead to an internal power struggle.
Some insist that a more brutal general than Kim might show up to take power and threaten South Korea with WMDs. In reality, that is not a persuasive or likely hypothesis. The secret to the success of North Korea’s military generals, who have survived the harsh purges of Kim throughout his reign, lies in their constant and inveterate flattery of Kim Jong Il. Even if one of these men had an opportunity to seize power, how could such a submissive man risk causing the end of the regime? Furthermore, it is extremely unlikely that any subsequent Pyongyang government could become more brutal domestically than the current one, which has starved more than three million of its own people to the point of death and has imprisoned about 200,000 more in gulags.
Regardless of the potential sources of future leadership, the end of Kim’s rule could be followed by a chaotic struggle for power. North Korea has no second or third ranking power man. The Worker’s Party is almost dead, surviving presently with little moral and political authority. They have not had a plenary congress since 1980, despite the mandate in their constitution that they hold congress every five years. The last central committee meeting was in 1993. Central committee meetings are stipulated to be held at least once every six months. It is evident that the power was taken from the party by the military under Kim’s “military-first” policies. Yet, unlike the military structure of other nations, the North Korean army does not have a collective decision making process. Preventing a potential coup, Kim permits no parallel decision-making mechanisms in the military. Instead, Kim prefers to oversee about 200 generals personally—according to the former secretary of The Workers’ Party, Hwang Jang Yop. Therefore, those with the authority to directly report to Kim may consider themselves to be potentially in line to become the new figurehead in their country after Kim’s death.
Without peace-keeping intervention from regional actors and the international community, a power struggle after the demise of the current regime might undergo significantly violent phases. This suggestion is derived from three potential sources of violence: armed internal power disputes in Pyongyang and other local communities, rampant armed robbery by former soldiers, and popular revenge against the privileged class under Kim’s reign.
Considering the excessive military force of one million soldiers in the North presently under Kim’s command, the side effects of Kim’s collapse could be enormous if it is not managed effectively by the international community. In this regard, the fears of China and South Korea of what will come with the end of the regime are legitimate and should be addressed, not criticized. Without an effective oversight and control of the transitional period, millions of North Korean citizens may take flight as refugees and boat-people to escape the violent chaos. In Iraq, it has taken about 170,000 foreign soldiers to disarm the country and maintain some semblance of public security. How many peace-keepers will be needed to disarm the combined regular military army and paramilitary forces, which together include some seven million soldiers, in the North? Certainly, we should have a variety of contingency plans to help rebuild the whole nation and promote democracy as we see now in Iraq. Considering all the various hostile scenarios, is it too early to talk about how to prepare for the interregnum period between the end of Kim and a Korean reunification?
