[imText1]The fifth round of Six Party talks ended with a joint-agreement.
The core of the agreement is 1) to shut down North Korea’s Yongbyon nuclear facilities in 60 days, 2) to provide NK fifty thousand tons of fuel oil out of a million total by South Korea right after the first is completed, 3) to give the remaining fuel, evenly divided among the other five nations to North Korea as the country “disables” the nuke facilities. And also, five working groups, each assigned to a single task including US-NK normalization of diplomatic relations, are scheduled to be created.
The agreement seems to have a lot of loopholes, however.
The six party talk’s final destination is denuclearization of Korean peninsula. The mission is accomplished when North Korea gives up its nukes completely. And when talking about North Korea’s denuclearization, the objective includes nuclear facilities, nuclear programs (those of both Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium), and nuclear warheads. If and only if the three are destroyed, “denuclearization of North Korea” is complete.
The Yongbyon facilities, which are the main objective of disablement in the agreement, have been producing weapon-level plutonium for North Korea. Researchers and authorities agree that North Korea should have produced 40 to 50kg of plutonium, enough to transform to 5 to 10 nuclear weapons.
The reason I see the agreement over disablement of the Yongbyon facilities as almost meaningless is that the facilities have done their job and there is no need to keep them running. Production of plutonium costs much more that that of highly enriched uranium. Thus, HEU is always preferred.
And the problem is the HEU program, which North Korea has been denying since accusation by the US in October 2002. Pyongyang’s official stance on HEU is “negotiable if Washington provides evidence.” Of course the 9.19 Joint Declaration of 2005 requires the North to report every nuclear program with sincerity. Nevertheless, it is hard to expect Kim Jong Il voluntarily declare possession of HEU unless the US or International Atomic Energy Agency finds credible evidence.
Scholars presume the HEU program in North Korea obtained from Pakistan around 1996 in exchange of missile technology. This is confirmed by Pakistani “father of nuclear technology” Abdul Kadir Khan and Hwang Jang Yop, former KWP international affairs secretary.
Hwang testified for several times that Jeon Byung Ho, then secretary of arms industry, told him about highly-enriched uranium technology transfer from Pakistan in 1996.
The statement signed by six party delegates this week says “North Korea will consult with other countries about list of all nuclear programs.” Pyongyang regime is unlikely to admit HEU program without hard evidence presented. Then the issue of HEU would go nowhere from then on.
In terms of evidence, James Kelly, the US delegate to North Korea in 2002, presented one to Kang Seok Ju, then Vice Foreign Minister of NK. Specialists suggest Kelly’s evidence to be receipts with purchase of special type of aluminum that is crucial to make a centrifugal separator. In addition to that, there are Dr. Khan and former secretary Hwang’s testimonies.
However, the joint statement does not clearly mention those evidences. The loophole proves the Bush administration’s somewhat hasty attitude in dealing with North Korea.
The sixth round of six party talks will be held 19th of next month. But end of road toward complete denuclearization of North Korea seems too far away. All other five nations must work hard and with patience. Otherwise, the talks would produce nothing better outcome than the 1994 Geneva Accord.
