[imText1]North Korea’s Foreign Ministry vowed to confront with the US financial sanction.
In a statement released last Saturday, Foreign Ministry reaffirmed six-party talks joint-communiqué in Sep. 2005, in which North Korea declared abandonment of nuclear program and the US promised peaceful coexistence with the country. The Ministry, however, added that North Korea cannot continue to talk because of the United States’ financial sanction.
The statement is particularly interesting since there are rumors that Pyongyang might test its nuclear weapon soon and Kim Jong Il would visit Beijing.
In the statement, the Ministry mentions the possibility of returning to the six-party talks because the joint-communiqué, if substantiated, would be beneficial to North Korea. Thus, some experts expect North Korea is trying to return to the talks.
On the same day, a South Korean official said that North Korea’s positive comment on the six-party talks and carrying out the joint-communiqué was unprecedented. According to the Yonhap News report, the official anticipated North Korea would try to break a deadlock through conversation.
However, the interpretation is too hasty. Rather, the condition of retrieval of conversation, ‘but the US is impeding us from conversation by the financial sanction,’ which is stated after North Korea’s desire to come back to the six-way talks, is must noted. In other words, North Korea is not returning to the talks unless the US finishes its financial sanction. In sum, North Korea’s argument for ‘first revocation of financial sanction, and then six-party talks’ is not changed at all.
Therefore, such cozy analysis on DPRK Foreign Ministry’s statement that the country would come back to the round table is mere hope.
Moreover, the statement reiterated North Korea’s perspective on financial sanction as a ‘political matter.’
In its statement, Foreign Ministry argues that revocation of financial restraint is not a mere administrative work to retrieve some money but a political one that represents the United States’ determination to follow the joint-communiqué. Nonetheless, Washington has been firm that since the financial sanction is a legal punishment on North Korea’s illegal financial activities, revocation of financial sanction cannot be a condition to resuming negotiation. In conclusion, the Foreign Ministry statement is not helpful at all in resolving the stalemate between the two countries.
Thus, the content of the statement bears little significance; rather, the purpose and timing do.
Kim Jong Il is expected to visit China by late August or early September. In his visit to Beijing, it seems obvious that Kim would consult on financial sanction and ask for economic assistance. Since Pyongyang considers financial sanction as a political matter, Kim would definitely request China once more to help solving the problem. On the other hand, for China, avoiding North Korea’s nuclear test is most crucial topic.
From that perspective, Kim Jong Il is threatening the world that he will do every ‘necessary measure’ through Foreign Ministry statement, while asking Beijing for help in revocation of financial sanction on him. Thus, the Foreign Ministry statement on last Saturday aimed at Beijing, first, and then Washington and Seoul.
To Seoul, the statement indirectly sends two messages; one is a blackmail to test nuclear bomb, and the other one is to urge South Korean government to participate in revocation of financial sanction since the North is willing to come back to the six-party talks if the financial restraint is repealed. To Washington, Pyongyang declared, in its statement, that their stance is not changed.
Most of all, the statement, which is made at the same time when Kim Jong Il is expected to visit Beijing soon, seems focusing on China that Pyongyang is asking the Chinese leadership to meddle in the US-North Korean relationship by telling President Bush to rescind the financial sanction, or otherwise, the North is inevitable to test its nuclear bomb.
China, however, hardly can accept Pyongyang’s request while investigating Chinese banks’ North Korean accounts compliant with the United States government.
Considering all the facts above, the core of the Foreign Ministry statement is Pyongyang’s assertion to ‘do every necessary means to fight against the financial sanction by the US.’ At this point, North Korea’s last option of brinkmanship strategy is nuclear test. It is suspected that North Korea already tested its nuclear weapon in Pakistan. Thus if Pyongyang conducts a nuclear test now, it would be with political purpose.
North Korea’s nuclear test would throw the current Northeast Asia’s security regime into disorder. Beijing, which desperately seeks maintenance of Northeast Asian security, would in no way welcome that situation. Kim Jong Il is trying to take advantage of that weak point of Chinese foreign policy.
Also, Kim Jong Il might be calculating North Korea’s position as a ‘nuclear state’ in the six-party talks to be more advantageous. In the early phase of the six-party talks, North Korea actually has demanded its nuclear state status.
Of course, if North Korea enforces nuclear test, then some will argue for futility of the six-party talks. Nonetheless, the six-party talks is a comprehensive security regime in the Korean Peninsula, so it cannot be dissolved easily. .
In that sense, it is most interesting what kind of conversation is going on between Beijing and Pyongyang. South Korean government faces difficulty in gathering intelligence on Sino-North Korean negotiation, and the government often used the US intelligence agencies as a source of information about Chinese-North Korean relationship. However, since Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administration, it has become hard to ask Washington what is going between Beijing and Pyongyang.
At the most critical moment in our history, such incapable government is menacing the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula.
