[imText1]It has been 100 days since the members of the six party talks gathered and signed the February 13 Agreement, yet not a single step forward has been made.
In January, the U.S. refused to engage in bilateral talks with North Korea but promised to meet in Berlin to solve the BDA issue. Following, the six party talks embarked a rapid wave to sign the February 13 Agreement.
Once the February 13 Agreement was settled, participating member states argue that they followed the right procedures and paved the way for North Korea to disable its nuclear facilities. However, a ditch has been created by the BDA issue completely unrelated to the agreement, producing a laughing stock of a performance.
Immediately following the February 13 Agreement, members of the six party talks including the U.S. expected North Korea’s $25mn caught in BDA to be easily transferred into North Korean accounts through the a bank in the third world countries like the Bank Of China (BOC). If not, at the least, North Korean authorities were expected to collect the money in cash. Even until that time, concerns focused on how many of the 50 or so accounts in BDA would be accessible.
However, an unexpected trap lay waiting. The U.S. State Department officially designated BDA as a “primary money laundering concern” and on April 15, U.S. banks were prohibited from making any financial transactions under Section 311 of the U.S.A. Patriot Act.
Once the U.S. labeled BDA as a “primary money laundering concern,” it became increasingly difficult to find a bank that would act as the intermediary of North Korea’s funds. Meanwhile, North Korea continues to persist with resolving BDA first. As a result, the U.S. asked it’s the fourth largest bank holding company Wachovia Bank to act as the mediator of North Korea’s funds.
However, the situation is not as easy as it seems. According to U.S. law, a person may be charged for interfering or remitting funds exceeding $10,000 related to crime. In addition, under Section 311 of the U.S.A. Patriot Act, there are limitations to the president’s involvement in dismissing charges made.
Due to these reasons, it seems that Wachovia Bank is in an awkward situation even though the request was made by the U.S. State Department.
Spokesperson Christy Phillips-Brown of Wachovia Bank said that though officials were discussing the matter with the government, she was unsure what specific requests would be made as this depended on the Treasury and the State Department. With the clashes in opinion by the U.S. Treasury, State Department and public affairs, it seems that officials are in heated turmoil over the debate of BDA.
On the one hand, it seems that Wachovia Bank may be connected to suspicions of fraud considering the substantial banks fees, reported Foreign Policy on the 21st. Further, there are speculations as to what effect will be incurred after the BDA issue is finally resolved.
The Foreign Policy mentioned in the same report that Wachovia Bank may just risk trust and confidence for permitting transfers of illegal funds, though one has to remember that the bank is merely accepting a favor by the U.S. government.
Whether it was North Korea’s intentions or not, by simply observing the February 13 Agreement status today, it seems that the case is flowing favorably in North Korea’s direction. Even if the initial actions of the February 13 Agreement are implemented, from North Korea’s position, it seems that they do not mind the fact that there may not be any significant changes made during the Bush Administration’s term or that the February 13 Agreement is crawling at a slow pace.
Undoubtedly, North Korea would like to resolve the BDA issue and hence re-enter the international financial market, but then again, there is no rush. On the contrary, there is evidence to show that the U.S. is caught floundering around in a mesh it created, slowly being drawn into North Korea’s negotiating strategy.
As Gary Samore, Vice President of the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations once revealed, as long as there is interest in the BDA issue, there will always be a way to find a resolution. Rather it is only a matter of time, since the Bush Administration has such a strong desire to solve the issue.
Nevertheless, Mr. Samore admitted that though North Korea may implement the 1st stages of the February 13 Agreement’s initial actions, the forecast looks dim for the implementation of the 2nd stage. Furthermore, it will be even more difficult for the actions to be implemented with President Bush’s term.
At this current point in the game, the U.S. will have to somehow escape the BDA net it got itself caught in to advance the February 13 Agreement. However, even if the BDA issue is resolved it seems that the member states of the six party talks will have to be patient for the accomplishment of the 2nd stage. Nonetheless, there is no guarantee that the saying “patience bears more fruit” can be applied to the February 13 Agreement.
