Negative Effect of Speeding in Inter-KOR Talks

[imText1]Suspicion of abrupt aid to NK from South Korean government even though the outcome of the 2/13 Agreement is yet to formalize.

According to the agreement, six parties must create five working groups in thirty days to deal with separate issues. Results of the working group consultation will be reported to head delegates of the six countries before the beginning of next six party talks (in March 19).

South Korean government is preparing to provide fifty thousand tons of fuel oil, which costs fifteen million US dollars, as soon as the North fulfills the first phase of denuclearization. Also the government planned to hold energy-economic cooperation working group in Seoul by March 10.

By the way, inter-Korean ministerial talks, which has been suspended since last July’s missile launch by North Korea, is scheduled to resume next Tuesday in Pyongyang. The meeting was called by Seoul on February 12, the day before the official agreement was signed.

Reason for such fast move was explained by Shin Un Sang, South Korean deputy unification minister; “We expected a certain progress in the six party talks. And even if we would’ve not got one, we couldn’t keep the stalemate in inter-Korean relationship any longer.”
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Shin added that positive outcome in inter-Korean talks would influence the six party talks.

The comment can be interpreted as that it was coincident to reach an agreement in the six party talks while the government was planning aid to North Korea anyway.

The South Korean Ministry of Unification released its plan for 2007 in which the government agency vowed to separate political issues with ‘humanitarian aid.’ And since the South Korean government’s humanitarian aid is rarely differentiated from economic aid, the statement means economic aid to Pyongyang regardless of denuclearization.

Such unilateral reward to North Korea without any progress in denuclearization would inevitably weaken South Korea’s bargaining power, some suggest. Critics point out that President Roh’s comment “we always profit even if we give everything North Korea asks” during his visit to Europe on February 15 increased the value of North Korea’s nukes and decreased Pyongyang’s possibility to abandon it.

Moreover, highly-enriched uranium program was never even mentioned in the agreement of February 13. While South Korea and the United States maintain a position that HEU is part of ‘all nuclear programs’ that was obliged by North Korea to report by April, North Korea has not acknowledged the program’s presence.

Although the HEU issue will be negotiated in one of the working groups, if no deal is reached over the controversy the 2/13 Agreement would lose its validity.

And if economic aid to North Korea by the South continues apart from progress in the six party talks, it would give Pyongyang an incentive not to focus on denuclearization and the six party talks.