[imText1]The 3rd phase of the 5th round of six-party talks commences on the 8th. Previously on the 6th, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill said that “if North Korea consented to dismantling its nukes at the next six-party talks, then the agreement would be enforced within 3 months.”
On his way to Beijing from Japan, Assistant Secretary Hill said to the press that “if a negotiation was made at the upcoming talks, a single-digit week structure would be implemented,” implying that North Korea’s nuclear issue would be resolved in a short amount of time.
Also, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice revealed on the 5th in the “International Relations Budget of Fiscal Year 2008” report, that negotiations regarding the surrender of North Korea’s nukes would be discussed until early next year at which the elimination of nuclear armaments would be initiated. She made it clear that pressures to human rights and finance would be imposed.
When viewing the issues discussed in the 2007 fiscal report to the more recent report made by Secretary Rice, one can see some significant changes. In the last report she revealed that the aim was to prolong the basic principles, the “complete, verifiable, irreversible, dismantlement (CVID)” of North Korea’s nuclear activity.
However, the recent report suggests that the North’s nuke negotiations would be given a timeframe of one year and made complete within the remainder of the Bush Administration’s term in government. In an interview with the Agence France-Presse (AFP) on the 12th, Secretary Rice stressed that the U.S.’ aim was for North Korea to finalize its nuclear program within the next 2 years.
Nonetheless, contrasting former motives, the recent report has failed to include the fundamentals of CVID, suggesting that the idea to convince North Korea to completely surrender its nukes has been forfeited. Since the defeat in the mid-elections last November, more people argue that the new focus if on short-term goals.
Undoubtedly, the report aims to finalize negotiations with North Korea within the year and make North Korea suspend its nuclear weapons and programs. The report revealed that a plan will be introduced mid-next year with the purpose of dismantling all of North Korea’s mid to long-range missiles.
The more the Bush Administration focuses on short-term goals, the more the Kim Jong Il regime may be secretly applauding. The more blithely the U.S. is on achieving its result, the more it looses its cards and the more North Korea’s determination grows.
The U.S. has spent a substantial amount of time investing in a resolution regarding the North Korean nuke issue and North Korea has also been expected to follow these plans. However, the problem is that the U.S. and North Korea have differing views.
Though the U.S. hopes to settle a resolution within Bush’s term of office, Kim Jong Il seems to be thinking that he could drag the time. Further, if he found the negotiation proposal to be unsatisfactory, it is possible that he will toss another card, a second nuclear experiment. Simply put, the U.S. and North Korea are only justifying their different ideas on the concept of a timetable.
There is a high chance that the proposed preliminary measures regarding a suitable approach to dismantling the North’s nukes in return for releasing financial sanctions and providing petroleum will be discussed at the six-party talks. Then again, it is not an issue that can be easily fixed. Even if North Korea met such a request and froze its nuclear facilities, beginning with the 5MW nuclear reactor in Yongbyun, it will not be easy for North Korea to convince the remaining members of the six-party talks it is sincere.
Moreover, even if the issues of oil provisions and financial sanctions were resolved, there is a likely chance that North Korea will make a threat with its reactor key at that precise moment. However, former experts that were once in charge of reactor enterprises analyze that the construction of the reactor terminated in 2002 will resume operations and that the power to operate the facility will come at a time after the Bush Administration is out of office.
For the definite obliteration of North Korea’s nukes, a clear roadmap will need to be established. However, if an imitation of the Geneva Conference results from the Bush Administration’s efforts to gain a fast track result, then it would only be passing on more of North Korea’s nuclear armaments onto the next U.S. administration.
