In the early morning hours of August 25th
[KST], following days of marathon talks, the two Koreas reached an agreement to
scale back escalating tensions. At the forefront of the accord was North
Korea’s expression of regret over injuries sustained by two South Korean
soldiers in landmine blasts in the DMZ and Seoul’s concession to cease
loudspeaker broadcasts with messages targeting North Korean soldiers on the border.
In addition to these two provisions,
Pyongyang and Seoul found four other points of common ground: agreement to hold
talks in the near future to improve inter-Korean ties; the North will
lift its declaration of a “quasi state of war”; both Koreas agreed to
reunions for families separated during the division of the Korean Peninsula
during the upcoming Chuseok holiday and to continue to hold such events in the
future; and, the North and the South consented to fostering greater civil
exchanges across various fields.
Opinions on the outcome among North Korean
scholars and pundits remains divided, with some viewing the results as favorable
for both Koreas and others expressing misgivings on North Korea’s plans to follow through on its end of the deal.
Particularly problematic among many has
been the use of the term “regret” rather than a direct apology undertaking culpability
for the landmine blast. The problem here, they say, dates back to past
admissions of “regret” by North Korea and their subsequent failure to lock Pyongyang
into ultimately adhering to corresponding inter-Korean agreements.
Maintaining that North Korea’s steadfast
dedication to bilateral dialogue with South Korea in the latest crisis had
North Korea’s fears over the influence of propaganda messages blasting from the
cross-border loudspeakers, particularly on the military, at its core, many
argue that Seoul has made it exceedingly difficult to resume the broadcasts
short of an instance of grave military provocation by the North.
Following this logic, those taking up a
more skeptical position posit that North Korea could choose to take up a more
passive stance on its intentions to push ahead with inter-Korean exchanges and
the aforementioned family reunions. Those on the opposite side argue that only
time will tell what this agreement is to bring to inter-Korean relations.
“North Korea has always interpreted
inter-Korean agreements arbitrarily; we’ll have to watch to see what kind of response
this expression of ‘regret’ translates into internally in North Korea,”
said Kim Young Soo, a North Korean studies professor at Sogang University, told
Daily NK today.
“Of particular importance will be what
additional measures North Korea will take around the Workers’ Party Foundation
Day events in October. It’s important that South Korea not leap to hasty judgments
in terms of evaluating North Korea’s sincerity regarding these fresh
inter-Korean agreements.”
One North Korea expert who spoke to Daily
NK on the condition of anonymity was the least sanguine in his outlook,
asserting that the latest agreement only came into being because of Kim Jong
Un’s desperation to stop the anti-Pyongyang messages pouring out of the
loudspeakers at the border. “Now that North Korea has gotten what it wants, it
can renege on the agreement at any time,” he said.
Cho Bong Hyun, a senior researcher at IBK
Economic Research Institute, also weighed in, noting that in the past, respective
interpretations of the circumstances outlined within inter-Korean agreements
has caused them to breakdown and progress to deteriorate.
“However, if North Korea fully forges ahead
with the latest agreement it would go a long way to rebuild trust between the
two Koreas,” he noted. “The latest inter-Korean agreement should be utilized as
a chance to galvanize change and improve bilateral ties between the two
Koreas.”
