[imText1]The tide of the western Pacific turned.
Chinese Foreign Ministry, through its website, announced agreement of the heads of delegates of the U.S., China and North Korea to resume the a-year-dormant six-party talks.
According to the Chinese statement, thanks to Beijing’s invitation, Christopher Hill of the U.S. and Kim Kye Gwan of North Korea met and had an informal meeting in the Chinese capital, and reached an agreement to resume the talks “as soon and convenient as possible.”
AFP reported that Hill, Assistant Secretary of State, said “North Korea did not have any precondition in returning to negotiation.”
Hill believed the six-party talks to restart by November, or December at the latest, and told reporters “North Korea reconfirmed the agreement on Sept. 19, 2005,” which summarized participants’ commitment to nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.
The expression in Chinese Foreign Ministry’s official website is comprehensive. The core is that three members of the negotiation frame agreed on recommencement of the talks. And there added, “deep and candid opinions were exchanged.”
Let’s start with simple facts.
First, it is not strange at all that only the U.S., China, and North Korea decided resumption of the talks that included South Korea, Russia and Japan. Beijing chairs the Six-Party Talks, and it is North Korea that has been refusing to enter the negotiation room since last November. This time, NK announced to comeback and the U.S. accepted. There is nothing wrong in procedure.
Second, why North Korea decided to return to the talks at this point? Here, we need to pay attention to Hill’s comment. The Assistant Secretary said “North Korea reaffirmed the 9.19 Joint Declaration, in which nuclear-free Korean Peninsula and renouncement of (North Korean) nuclear weapons were assured.”
In September 2005, the six members of the negotiation frame jointly approved “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” and light water reactors to be constructed as NK follow, appropriately, the process to give up nukes. Along with it, South Korea promised to provide 2 million KW of electricity annually, until the reactors are built.
However, the process is only subordinate. Kim Jong Il already did a nuclear test in October, and, as a result, the circumstances completely changed. Last year’s 9.19 Joint Declaration included “nuclear weapons and related program” to be dismantled, so NK’s current nuclear warheads must be abandoned as well. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that North Korea would comply easily.
Also, interpretation of “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” might imply controversy. If the talks resume, North Korea, exploiting the phrase, would definitely argue for revocation of the U.S. nuclear umbrella over South Korea, which is a precondition of ultimate withdrawal of the US Forces in Korea, in exchange of its own “denuclearization.”
Therefore, since North Korea is not committed to give up its nukes first, even if the talks restart, the negotiation would fall into stalemate; NK would rather ask for light-water reactors (or compensation in general) first, nuke abandonment second.
Of course, as Hill confirmed, North Korea seemed not asking “retraction of financial sanction first,” as a prerequisite. And North Korea even looks like being subdued by the recent UN sanction. Such speculation, however, is a bit away from reality.
North Korea is now a nuclear state, whether or not the international community acknowledges. If the talks resume, North Korea will bring the issue of denuclearization as a nuclear power equivalent to the U.S. Thus, the second round of the six-party talks is doomed to drag.
And more urgent subject for NK is to find out “compensation” for the damage inflicted by international sanction. What is the “compensation” in Kim Jong Il’s mind?
Liu Jianchao, Chinese Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson, said on Tuesday that Sino-(North) Korean trade was “normal” and there would be no change in policy of aid to Pyongyang. The statement implies China’s decision to provide the compensation to North Korea for the economic loss due to the UN sanction.
Meanwhile, in Washington, it might be advantageous for the current administration, which is soon to face a midterm election, to treat the North Korean nuclear crisis through negotiation, at least for a while.
The problem is that South Korean politicians’ taking advantage of the “temporary resumption” of negotiation to defend their pacifist policy toward Kim Jong Il. Nevertheless, it must be made sure that North Korea’s “promises,” rather than manifest act of denuclearization, are mere playing upon words.
