With the recently publicized defections of North Korean
workers from restaurants in China, concern for the possibility of retaliatory
abductions of South Korean citizens has been rising. This comes amidst reports
that Kim Jong Un, infuriated by reports from North Korean officials that
Seoul’s spy agency kidnapped its workers, ordered retaliatory measures to be
taken.
Recent incidents near the Sino-North Korean border have
raised alarm, including the murder of a Chinese pastor of South Korean descent,
and the sudden disappearance of North Korean defectors with South Korean
citizenship. The fact that numerous abduction teams from Pyongyang’s State Security Department and General Reconnaissance Bureau have been dispatched to
China adds to the possibility of similar incidents unfolding.
With the murder of one of its citizens, Chinese public
security authorities are now on high alert, and Seoul has asked South Koreans
to refrain from visiting the tense border region. Under such circumstances,
stronger vigilance is warranted for incidents of abduction or murder
perpetrated by the North Korean regime.
With the international community now more heavily resolved
in its opposition to terrorism, launching a terror attack on South Korean
citizens would likely lead to extensive negative repercussions for the North.
However, if the North is determined to carry out an act of aggression against
South Koreans, numerous possibilities must be considered and not just within
the Chinese border regions of Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning. With intense
scrutiny focused on China and other countries, the General Reconnaissance
Bureau may conclude that it would be more advantageous to act within South
Korea.
Reports suggest that Kim Jong Un issued directives to both
the state security agency and the reconnaissance bureau with specific
references to terror and abduction. The possibility of an incident occurring
within South Korea at the hands of reconnaissance agents must therefore be
considered.
Although the State Security Department recently dispatched
agents in large groups to China, a significant obstacle is the presence of
local intelligence agencies. While North Korean agents may be able to abduct a
few individuals after meticulous planning, easier results may be achieved by
reconnaissance teams in other areas.
North Korea’s marine espionage teams have for decades
succeeded in boarding fishing boats at sea and abducting South Korean
fishermen. With a team of ten or more, dozens of fisherman can be abducted with
relative ease. The possibility of such an incident occurring now appears
increasingly likely, as the period between May and October is when the fishing
industry is at its peak.
Prime targets include South Korean squid fishermen working
at night, whose vulnerability is well known to the maritime operations team
within the General Reconnaissance Bureau. With their bright lights constantly
switched on to attract squid, they inevitably end up advertising their location
for tens of kilometers in all directions. They are also heavily limited in
their ability to spot approaching vessels that quietly advance toward them with
their lights out, enabling a relatively easy abduction.
After carrying out such an operation, the North will
typically claim that the South Korean vessel crossed the maritime border and
may demand a swap between the fishermen and the 12 female restaurant workers
that defected to the South in April.
It should therefore be considered that attacks by North
Korea would not be limited to the Chinese border region, but may also occur
within South Korea’s borders. Provocations are likely to occur at unexpected
times and locations, and more vigilance is warranted for the protection of
South Korean citizens.
