A Visit to North Korea Based on Goodwill?

[imText1]With 10 days remaining, close attention has been placed on the U.S. figures and their actions towards North Korea.

While the U.S. did release North Korea’s frozen funds in the BDA accounts, a predicament occurred when the funds temporarily stored in the Bank of China failed to transfer the money over to North Korea. In response, U.S. Assistant Secretary Daniel Glaser was directly sent to China to solve the issue.

Meanwhile, with North Korea having left the six party talks on a bad note once again, it continues to argue that it would put the negotiations on hold until the funds from BDA are transferred into it’s account. North Korea’s attitude is never consistent nor trustworthy and Assistant Secretary Glaser continues his efforts for the transfer of North Korea’s funds even prolonging his stay.

Further, for the first time in President Bush’s term, the White House plans to send affiliates on a nongovernmental mission to North Korea.

On the 3rd, the White House announced that a group of members including New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson and former Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Anthony Principi would visit North Korea between the 8~11th and that the visit aimed to return missing U.S. troops of the Korean War.

Though the White House strongly argues that the scheduled visit to North Korea is based on a nongovernmental stance, it is unusual for the Bush Administration to have included former Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Anthony Principi and current Democrats politician to join in on the visit.

In particular, with Victor Cha, the Director for Asian Affairs of the National Security Council to also visit North Korea, many argue that this trip is not merely for nongovernmental issues. In retrospect, the visit is an important administrative tactic in negotiating the North’s nuclear issue.

Some argue that this group to visit North Korea is indeed nonpartisans and that with ministers from the White House’s national defense even joining the trip, that the visit can be considered as an unofficial goodwill mission.

Nonetheless, the thought that the U.S.’ preliminary response regarding the disarmament of nuclear weapons and the Feb 13 Agreement may just have been rash, also cannot be discarded.

In reality, North Korea’s obstinate behavior regarding the BDA issue is nothing new. Rather, without any more progress, the more North Korea’s tactics are adjusted, the more the world will be consumed by North Korea’s own negotiating pace.