The premise for a
potential reunification requires close examination and informed analysis. Firstly, reunification will be inconceivable if the current
regime in North Korea does not change. Secondly, a regime change will take the form of
either a hard landing [abrupt] or a soft landing [gradual or incremental]; in
brief, the former is more likely to occur. The authors will also examine the chances
of success a program of liberalization undertaken by Kim’s regime will have,
and the internal and external conditions that are requisite for a successful
regime change. This analysis will be followed by a survey of the advantages and disadvantages of a
soft landing.
The most ideal scenario of reunification
would be for North Korea’s regime to achieve a soft landing of gradual liberalization.
As North Korea adopts democracy and the free market, a reunification by mutual consent or
agreement will become more likely. Unfortunately, it is uncertain whether Kim’s
regime will be able to achieve a soft landing, and even then, a soft landing is
no guarantee of reunification. However, compared to the chaos and aftermath
that is sure to follow a hard landing, a soft landing is most certainly the
ideal for both the residents of North Korea and reunification of the two Koreas.
The authors fully recognize that the following arguments
have some room for criticism: the regime has already
begun a program of liberalization, that the chance of a soft landing should not
be ignored however remote it appears, that gradual regime change will be the
most ideal for the Korean Peninsula and reunification, and that it is ambiguous
whether a gradual change will inevitably lead to
reunification.
Reunification will remain nonviable as
long as the current regime does not change
To begin with, what comprises regime
change? Although various examples of regime change can be listed, regime change
in this report will mean the transition from socialism to the free market. A
further distinction is needed. One type of regime change, the soft-landing
type, is seen in Vietnam or China, where liberalization was state-driven. The
other hard-landing type is seen in the former communist states of the USSR and
Eastern Europe, where liberalization was circumstance-driven as an aftermath of
political collapse. Keep these two categories of regime change in mind as regime change is further discussed here.
Any agreement where North Korea is allowed to keep
its dictatorship will almost certainly not lead to reunification. Only when the
current regime changes, however it happens, will there be any likelihood of reunification.
Therefore, that is why we need to examine the possibility of regime change, and
to prepare for two potential scenarios leading to reunification where regime
change has either been successful or unsuccessful. Let’s first examine why
reunification will remain unlikely as long as North Korea’s dictatorship remains as it
is.
Why is reunification impossible as long as
North Korea insists on dictatorship?
Firstly, reunification consists of two or
more sovereign states irrevocably merging into a single sovereign state. The
dictatorial system concentrates all powers in the dictator, unlike democracy
where political powers are separated. These differences make a reunification between
the two systems impossible. North Korea’s dictatorship is
characterized by a cult of personality established on total control of all
information flows, the use of fear tactics to block all dissent and criticism,
and the linking of isolationism with ethnocentrism. Therefore, it is very difficult to
envision a reunification of two states with drastically different political
systems, unless one or both parties make significant concessions. To be clear, we are not claiming that Kim Jong Eun will not change, but that a reunification
where North Korea retains its dictatorship is impossible.
Secondly, when the reunification process
reaches an advanced level, there will be little possibility that the
dictatorship will have retained its current form. As mentioned, dictatorship
concentrates all power in the dictator, and the liberalization and
decentralization of power requisite for reunification means that the
process of reunification will not have reached an advanced state if the
dictatorship has stayed in its present shape. Without a political conversion,
the opening of doors, cooperation on multiple fronts, and division of powers will
not be possible. It is possible for Kim Jong Eun to stay in power–and for both
Koreas to attain a high level of bilateral cooperation–only the dictatorship
will not be in its present shape. Hence, if North Korea chooses the path of
reunification, at some point, they will have to choose between reunification
and dictatorship.
Thirdly, no two sovereign states have ever
achieved a lasting reunification through mutual agreement. Federation of Arab
Republics [FAR], Vietnam, Yemen, and Germany are all fitting examples.
Let’s examine FAR
first. FAR was an ambitious political project of Libya’s
Gaddafi to merge Egypt, Syria, and Libya into a single federation. It was
founded in September 1971 and disestablished in July 1977. FAR was not composed
of once united, now divided countries seeking reunification, but a pan-Arabic
political construct built for the sole purpose of countering Israel. Although
the merger was implemented through mutual agreement, its inability to formulate
a uniform Israel policy led to its disbandment.
The history of Vietnam is well known; Vietnam became reunified when North Vietnam militarily subjugated its southern
counterpart in 1975.
Yemen at one time carried the most
expectation of being a stable reunified country whose reunification was
achieved by mutual agreement. North Yemen gained independence from the Ottoman
Empire, while South Yemen gained independence from the UK. While Yemen formed a
united government in 1990, the southern part invaded the north in 1993,
alleging that the government focused on the development of the north at the
south’s expense. The conflict became a full civil war
in May 1994, the north won the war by July.
German reunification took place following
the collapse of the Berlin Wall and with the overwhelming support of East
Germans. Although German reunification outwardly seems to be a reunification by
mutual agreement, it is actually one of assimilation.
In this way, world history shows no example
of a successful reunification by mutual agreement among sovereign countries.
The same is true even for the Three Kingdoms of Korea.
It would be very difficult to have a
federation of both North Korea’s dictatorship and South Korea’s democracy. Even if initial steps were
taken, greater progress will be virtually impossible. In short, the first step
toward unification will be the liberalization of the regime to the current
level of Vietnam or China. In the near future, North Korea will undergo either a soft or
hard landing–this analysis focuses primarily on the former track.
