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<\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/span><\/p>\n \n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n What will become of the Kim Jong Eun regime?<\/span> How will circumstances in the North change I believe the situation will probably not be In the short term, Kim Jong Eun\u2019s \u201cpolitics of But what will be the shape of the power Three years before his passing, Kim Jong Il The survival of the stable regime that Kim Aside from sister Kyong Hui and her husband And yet, in spite of all this legwork and In 2014, the power of Kim Jong Eun\u2019s (To be continued\u2026)<\/span><\/p>\n * The viewpoints expressed in Guest Columns do not necessarily reflect those of Daily NK.<\/span><\/p>\n \n \n
\nover the course of the onrushing 2014? Will the internal situation remain
\nstable, or not? Will Kim Jong Eun raise a solution to the nuclear issue in
\ndiscussion with China, and will Xi Jinping and Kim Jong Eun have their first
\nsummit? Alternatively, will Pyongyang ignore the unified denuclearization
\ndemands of South Korea, Japan and the United States, moving instead toward a
\nfourth nuclear test, a long-range missile test, or further provocations against
\nthe South?<\/span>
\nclear and precise, and in the midst of the fog it will be tricky to find a
\nfoothold.<\/span>
\nfear\u201d will yield results. A new power elite featuring Choe Ryong Hae, Jo Yon
\nJun and Hwang Pyong Seo has reached the pinnacle of state power, and will obey
\nwithout question. <\/ins><\/span><\/span>
\nstructure the longer this policy continues? Some things are obvious. First, the
\nonly ones who are free of fear are the Kim family; Jong Cheol, Yeo Jong, and
\nSeol Song. These people have hidden influence; and will soon emerge into the
\npower structure. Who else can Kim Jong Eun trust? Lest we should forget, he has
\nalready killed his uncle. There is nobody left outside his immediate family,
\nand doubts will forever linger, even over the new power elite. Kim will have
\nthem under surveillance, and will grant only a limited degree of trust.<\/span>
\nbegan to lay the physical groundwork for the secure succession of power to the
\nnext generation. In 2010 and 2011 he visited China three times, dragging his
\nailing self all the way to Yangzhou to try and reconfirm the \u201cbond of blood\u201d
\nbetween China and North Korea through an audience with former Chinese leader
\nJiang Zemin. <\/span>The
\nexecution of Jang Song Taek thus marks a stark deviation from the foundations
\nset during Kim\u2019s lifetime.
\nJong Il maneuvered into place at that time was based upon maximizing the value
\nof Pyongyang\u2019s relationship with China. To improve those relations, Kim Jong Il
\nbegan to shift away from the military-first line that had been maintained for
\nthe previous 15 years, and onto a line that put the Party first. This fact is
\nevidenced by the results of the 3rd Party Delegates\u2019 Conference, held on
\nSeptember 28th, 2010. <\/span>
\nJang Song Taek, who<\/span> <\/span>were to look after <\/span>the young Kim Jong Eun, Kim Jong Il brought in Choe Ryong Hae to
\nsteward the Kim household and control the power of the military. Meanwhile,
\ntechnocrats and professional bureaucrats who would not dare to covet the power
\nof the Kim family were positioned to loyally assist Kim Jong Eun; people such
\nas Kim Yong Nam, Pak Pong Ju, Pak To Chun, Kim Ki Nam, Choe Tae Bok and Kim
\nYang Gon.<\/span>
\npower structure craftsmanship, Kim Jong Eun simply killed Jang Song Taek, the
\nbedrock of his power [\u2026], after just two years. Much as Kim Jong Il may have
\nwarned his son against placing excessive trust in Jang, if the elder Kim were
\nalive today what would he have to say about his son\u2019s foolish move? Like Kim
\nJong Il getting himself needlessly bogged down in the mire of the 2009 currency
\nredenomination, so Kim Jong Eun has recklessly sliced open the artery of his
\nown power.<\/span>
\n\u201cfearpolitik\u201d will become all the more evident. The psychological pressure on
\nthe Party, military and people will persist. As, of course, will the
\ninvestigation, detention and closed-door execution of the so-called Jang Song Taek
\nfaction. <\/span>