The sudden visit to South Korea by three so-called heavweights of North Korea, the director of the General Political
Department of the Chosun People’s Army, Hwang Pyong So, Secretary Choe
Ryong Hae of the Chosun Workers’ Party, and the director of the United Front
Department of the Party, Kim Yang Geon, sparked nearly a hundred different
analyses regarding their intentions and goals. Of course, such guesses are
founded on numerous truths and traditions, but among defectors and North Korea
specialists, contradicting claims are arising based on identical facts. This is
particularly a situation where rumors of Kim Jong Eun’s overthrow spread
following his nearly month-long absence from official events and public
recognition of his health issues by North Korea. In such a situation, it is
natural for various guesses to be offered as “scenarios,” but ultimately, it is
not wise to approach an important matter such as North and South Korea
relations with mere presumptions.
While ruling out all suppositions arising
in the style of “where there’s smoke, there’s fire”, this piece follows the
prerequisite that when the North Korean government acts is a manner where it is
difficult to conclude its intent, the characteristics of the act, the results,
and the structure of the North and South Korea relations in which the act takes
place holds the greatest significance in reaching a conclusion. North Korea and
its state in the world, such as relations between America and North Korea, and
China and North Korea, can be added here as well.
First, the visit to South Korea by the three high-ranking officials from North Korea was in fact scheduled and notified to South
Korea. Although South Korea had formally agreed to the visit, we must
truthfully focus on the fact that they in were in a situation in which they
could not help but to agree. The most important characteristic of this visit is
that regardless of whether North Korea used the closing ceremony of the Asian
Games or any other reason as an excuse, South Korea had no choice but to accept
North Korea’s offer for dialogue while under the keynote of the Park Geun Hye
administration’s policy toward North Korea, the “Korean Peninsula Trust
Process,” under any of the other government policies to North Korea that
affirmed the improvement of collaboration and exchange with North Korea, or more
importantly, under a situation where the North Korean nuclear weapon crisis is
becoming increasingly more threatening.
Many specialists and media outlets are
interpreting the fact that Hwang Pyong So had private bodyguards and that his
party used Kim Jong Eun’s private jet as a symbolic gesture of sorts, but those
are irrelevant details. In other words, the most defining aspect of Hwang Pyong
So and his party’s visit to South Korea, is that North Korea holds the upper
hand or starting point of North and South Korea relations. To be blunt, we are
getting a preview of the attitude with which the nuclear government power North
Korea addresses South Korea.
The next point that was clarified was that
South Korean media and politics have been heavily conditioned. New Politics
Alliance for Democracy and leftist media, supporters of the Sunshine Policy,
are arguing for providing immediate large scale support to North Korea’s offer
for talks or connections to so-called “party talks” in order to relieve
strained North and South Korea relations. However, claims that high-level
meetings with North Korea as a prerequisite or opportunity for thawing of North
and South Korea relations have been made repeatedly during the past 20 years.
We were even able to observe a period of freezing and thawing in North and
South Korea relations during the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations.
In other words, after the spring when large scale fertilizer or food aid is
given to North Korea through North and South Korea high- level talks or for
reunions of separated families, come several months of quiet, strain, or
provocations like the battle of Yeonpyeong. Then after the harvest season, aid
to North Korea begins again for more reasons such as talks in order to somehow
further North and South Korea relations. In the winter, North and South Korea
relations enter hibernation and the periodic cycle repeats itself once more in
the spring.
A noteworthy point is the fact that South
Korean politics and media claim “a breakthrough in North and South relations”
every single time in a nearly Pavlovian conditioned manner. This is not merely
the amnesia of the political and media world. The phenomenon is founded on a
background of ideological conflicts about the modern history of South Korea,
differences in perspective on North Korea, and a situation where normal North
and South Korea relations have become synonymous with “the revitalization of
events between North and South Korea”. And the following result is such: North
Korea knows all too well what responses their offers for talks will arouse in
South Korea and they also know how to manipulate them very well. To be extreme,
a situation now exists where North Korea can play South Korea like puppets.
Thankfully, the Park Geun Hye administration called the visit a “small
success”, an evaluation that is neither overly negative nor overly positive.
And this is the appropriate attitude.
Third, one must understand the South Korean
government’s structural weaknesses in North and South Korea relations. Under a
five year term presidential system, all administrations including that of Park
Geun Hye have presented policies toward North Korea based on long-term vision
of North and South Korea relations. However, the left and right hold
fundamentally different perspectives on policies toward North Korea, and
therefore long-term visions of North and South Korea relations have no choice
but to change based on the ideological direction of the administration. The
Park Geun Hye administration emphasizes the continuity of policy toward North
Korea while claiming they will succeed policies that stress security such as
the success of the Sunshine Policy and Lee Myung Bak’s strengthening of the
U.S.-ROK alliance but they also hold a perspective on the North Korean nuclear
weapon crisis that fundamentally differs from that of the opposition party.
Specifically, President Park emphasized the resolution of the North Korean
nuclear crisis by stating, “We cannot live with nukes hanging over our
heads,” but in 2012, presidential candidate Moon Jae In presented the
development of a North and South Korea economic union, restructuring of the
status of the U.S. – ROK alliance, and the start of a North and South Korea
federation as a policy toward North Korea in his October 4th joint declaration,
calling the North Korean nuclear crisis an “exit strategy” and refusing to
acknowledge it as a priority. That is to say that Moon makes assumptions that
if North and South Korea take serious steps towards unification, the North Korean
nuclear crisis will naturally become resolved or disappear. However, candidate
Moon’s policy toward North Korea is reminiscent of Bernard Shaw’s answer to
Isadora Duncan’s proposal. She stated, “A combination of my beauty and your
brains would startle the world,” to which he replied, “I must decline your
offer with thanks, for the child might have my beauty and your brains.”
In other words, the South Korean
administration’s policy toward North Korea is always at odds with the period of
its term. On the other hand, North Korea has maintained the keystone condition
in its policy towards South Korea of a long-term plan that refuses to lose the
integrity of its ruling system or the upper hand in inter-Korean relations. Such condition fits perfectly with the political succession system
of the “Kim Il Sung family Baekdu bloodline.” Therefore, the South Korean
government that declares a long-term policy toward North Korea becomes pressed
for time to produce tangible results of grand discourse in North and South
Korea relations once it passes the midpoint of its term. A representative
example is the October 4th joint declaration [during the Roh administration] in 2007 that was enacted under agreement and with
claims that it would drive in the nails to block any alternatives for the next
administration.
Fourth, the only cards that South Korea has
been able to play until now in its policy toward North Korea has been economic
aid and sanctions, and diplomacy with China for increased pressure on
North Korea. However, regardless of the two economic cards, North Korea has
consistently continued armed provocations, nuclear development, and development
of intercontinental ballistic missiles. This does not mean that economic aid and
sanctions are completely meaningless, but it is fact that the economic factors
are not capable of stopping the North Korean nuclear crisis and missile
development. Additionally, until now, China’s pressure on North Korea following
nuclear tests or missiles launches has not had any actual effects and after
several months, North Korea – China trade has continued to grow. In such
situation, North Korea’s choice is to either wait for the arrival of a
friendlier South Korean administration or indirectly interfere in the South
Korean elections process. In other words, it is only natural for North Korea to
prefer the coming of a leftist government that promises “heavy-handed aid” over
conditional aid, the trust process, or any other policy of the rightist
government. This is a structural reason why the Park Geun Hye administration’s
policy toward North Korea has been difficult to realistically actualize during
the latter end of the term.
When considering the structural facts of
North and South Korea relations, the visit to South Korea by North Korea’s trio
first clarifies that North Korea holds the upper hand in relations between the
Koreas was able to incapacitate the U.S. and Park Geun Hye administration’s
attempt to pose human rights of North Korea as a problem, and will most
definitely be used to push for talks between the Koreas or aid to North Korea.
And after time has passed, North Korea will use the U.S.- ROK military
exercises as an excuse to revert back to a face off or like in times past,
execute intercontinental missile launches covered up as an independent nation’s
satellite launches. Furthermore, chances of a fourth nuclear test committed
with the excuse of UN sanctions are high. Honestly, the Park Geun Hye
administration’s policy toward North Korea will then be deemed a return to
failure and in particular, failure to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis
will not just be a problem for the South Korean government but be considered a
joint failure for those of the six party talks, the U.S., China, Japan, and
Russia. It is clear as day that the opposition party will then once again
attempt to push forward the creation of an economic union and reconciliation
between North and South Korea through large scale aid, and the start of a North
and South Korea federation while arguing that an “exit strategy” is the only
alternative.
After the visit to South Korea by North
Korea’s trio, North Korean reports about the three were non-existent then
resumed crude criticism of President Park on October 5th. This is of course,
North Korea’s long-standing experience that “the South Korean government has no
choice but to agree to talks even while suffering insults” in action. So
how should the Park Geun Hye administration react in such a situation? The
solution is not the current administration’s position of strong sanctions after
a fourth nuclear test or any other launches of intercontinental missiles. The
solution is to clearly inform North Korea of strong sanctions that it will not
be able to recover from when there are definite signs of a nuclear test or
during the preparation stages of an intercontinental missile launch.
Figuratively speaking, South Korea must have a “strategic dagger” that is
intimidating enough to force North Korea to denounce nuclear tests and missile
launches on their own accord. Only in this case can the South Korean
government endure North Korea’s crude attitude and seize at least equal status
if not the upper hand in North and South Korea relations. The Blue House’s duo
of security, Kim Kwan Jin and Kim Gyu Hyun must use the heart of a lion and
resourcefulness of a fox to create such a strategic dagger, and President Park
must display said dagger to North Korea with her characteristically
unrestrained vehemence. This way, at least a foundation for the peninsula trust
process will be formed.
*Views expressed in Guest Columns do not
necessarily reflect those of Daily NK.
