After the second inter-Korean summit, aid to North Korea has become a heated issue once again.
Like it or not, aid to North Korea would be inevitable financial burden for South Korea. South Korean taxpayers, of course, do not like it. According to a recent Ministry of Unification poll, 51.3% of South Koreans “are not willing to pay financial burden as a result of investment to North Korea.” Ironically, while South Korean people support aid to North Korea in general, they are reluctant to actually pay the price.
Even though it is totally understandable, history often ignores individual opinion. It is impossible to avoid paying for reconstruction of North Korean economy or at least making it cheap.
South Korean government’s “reunification expense” would be tremendous amount. If such expenditure is not well regulated, the money will be lost. Only smart, planned aid to North Korea can prevent waste of huge money.
Money and resources spent in North Korea for last decade can neither defined as a 100% waste or complete success. Aid to the North actually saved a lot of lives. But at the same time, the aid failed to persuade North Korea into market-friendly reform.
In contrast, North Korean regime, given unconditional economic aid from China and South Korea, did not need such reform. And as a result, it revitalized totalitarian structure and hindered emergence of market economy as harshly as it could. In 2002 and 2003, food ration was reintroduced, border security was tightened and private markets were persecuted.
These results are not surprising if North Korean regime’s logic is understood. Kim Jong Il knows better than anyone that Chinese-style reform will most likely weaken control over the society. And if information about the outside world spread, North Korean people will prefer unification with South Korea to improve their lifestyle quickly; an option did not exist in mainland China.
To North Korean elites, such reunification is dangerous, and rejects any reform but sustains the regime by accepting flowing economic aid. In North Korean regime’s perspective, unconditional and not-supervised aid is the best.
Kim Jong Il distributes such aid to his most loyal subjects, party officials, Pyongyang residents and army officers. And the remainder goes to the rest of the people. In doing so, food distribution continues and people would consider it as “gift from the Dear Leader.”
This policy is perfectly rational for Kim Jong Il. It is not so for South Korea’s national interest and interest of most of the North Korean people.
Thus, aid to North Korea must not help elongating reactionary dictatorship and rather promote market-oriented reform.
When policymaking on aid to North Korea, two objectives need to be considered.
One is to stimulate change in politics and society in North Korea as soon as possible. The other is to prepare for economic and social reconstruction in post-Kim Jong Il North Korea.
There should be no illusion over post-Kim Jong Il era. It will not be an easy, cheap task to rebuild a too-underdeveloped, oppressed society under dictatorship. A right type of aid, however, could ease the problem.
South Korea needs to inform the North Koreans, who have been isolated for sixty years, about the outside world. And North Koreans must learn technology and other knowledge.
In my opinion, an economic cooperation like Kaesong Industrial Complex is crucial. Therefore, there is no objection over another industrial park in Haeju, South Hwanghae Province. Critics of Kaesong argue that North Korean laborers are exploited by South Korean capitalists and North Korean regime. But their wage is for sure much better than other North Korean workers.
Moreover, even if North Korean authorities are doing its best to keep the employees in Kaesong from outside contacts, workers will certainly learn at least some aspect of outside world.
Kaesong project is more beneficial to both South and North Korea than it is harmful.
Another mission is to improve North Korean people’s education level. Knowledge gap between North and South Korea in post-Kim era will be a source of serious social conflict.
If North Koreans only fulfill the role of cheap labor force even after reunification, it cannot be a complete unification. South Korean government must help North Korean universities by providing up-to-date textbooks, computers and other high-tech education tools.
Also, it is important to give scholarship to North Korean students to study abroad. North Korean regime might not consider sending its students to Europe or Russia too dangerous.
Thirdly, reconstruction of infrastructure in North Korea is critical. It is investment to the future.
Nevertheless, South Korean perspective toward North Korea is still myopic. South Korean mainstream supports strategy to pursue continued aid to North Korea while waiting for North Korean dictatorship voluntarily choosing economic reform.
The strategy cannot solve any problem. It not only delays solution but also makes it more difficult to solve.
