How great was
Kim Jong Eun’s power when he was propelled to the nexus of Party, military
and bureaucracy upon the death of his father? Some commentators
believe it was rather limited. The general
consensus after Kim Jong Il’s death was that either a collective leadership system would form, or that Jang Song Taek would rise to prince regent. A collective leadership would have allowed Kim Jong Il’s power to be dispersed across a number of elite figures. A Jang Song Taek-led regency
would have created a second-in-command with enough power to rival the leader.
The presumption that
Kim’s power was limited is reflected in the claim that the dictatorial
regime was strengthened following the purge of Jang Sung Taek; in other words, that Kim’s power
was enhanced dramatically by Jang’s removal. However, this is to misunderstand the
nature of the North Korean power structure and the way power is allocated within it. After the death of Kim Jong Il, Kim Jong Eun’s power was all but identical to
that of his father. Why? It is the
quintessential feature of a system that concentrates all power in the Suryeong. The main issue now is whether
Kim Jong Eun, who holds absolute power, has the skill set necessary to utilize that
power.
A Kim’s power is greater than the combined influence of the Party, military, and state bureaucracy. As such, it is impossible for a challenge to emanate from the military. A collective leadership
or regency under Jang Song Taek was always impossible. In the North Korean system, it is impossible for political factions
or individuals to challenge the Suryeong.
Kim Jong Eun has absolute authority, and receives systematic protection under a Suryeongist monolithic
regime governed by Party, military and bureaucratic institutions. A device to check the power of the Suryeong
does not exist. Party and state organs protect the power of the leader and act as tools of implementation. They can neither divide the Suryeong’s power nor act as checks upon it. The “Suryeong” is the brain, the Party is the body and the people
are the arms and legs – this is “Suryeongism.”
Organs of power and
surveillance (the Party Secretariat, Organization and Guidance
Department of the Party, State Security Department, Military Defense Command, Escort
Command, and Ministry of People’s Security) systematically oversee Party,
military and bureaucracy to stabilize and protect the power of Kim Jong Eun. Because
of this, no political faction or leader can mount a challenge. Having
thoroughly purged all rival political factions in the period
after 1953, Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il constructed this monolithic Suryeongist regime. By 1974, all competitors had completely
disappeared.
Military and Party
elites can only wield the political influence granted them by Kim Jong Eun;
they cannot forge independent power bases. Therefore, the very
moment Kim Jong Eun withdraws his confidence in an individual member of the elite, that member disappears from the stage. The dismissal of Ri Yong Ho and purge of Jang Sung Taek were results of this logic.
Therefore, we can say that Kim Jong Eun inherited absolute power upon the death of Kim Jong Il. However, North
Korea became more unstable under the novice successor. Why? It was not due to
the fact that Kim Jong Eun’s power was weak, or that there was a powerful rival. Rather, it was because Kim Jong Eun was politically inexperienced, and his ability
as a state leader remained unverified. It was like giving the wheel to someone who
had just received his learner’s license.
The two years of Kim’s rule have
shown that the only source of real instability in the North Korean regime is his own incompetence.
Kim Jong Eun has not proven
that he is capable of resolving the structural instability wrought by a collapsed
planned economy and concomitant marketization. His economic policy not only fails to embrace opening and reform; it serves to obstruct economic
development.
The Byungjin Line of simultaneous
nuclear and economic development squanders scarce resources on nuclear development, and thwarts the introduction of foreign capital and advanced scientific and technical skills.
The closure of the Kaesong
Industrial gave an extremely
negative perception of the North Korean investment climate to would-be foreign investors. Meanwhile,
Kim Jong Eun has been using his limited capital
frivolously: on more luxury imports, recreational facilities, and the
idolization of his father, Kim Jong Il.
Given these facts, it becomes increasingly likely that the Kim regime will grow less stable over the medium to long term. Kim lacks the ability to solve North
Korea’s structural crises. With Kim Jong Eun as incompetent as he is, the
elite cadre class is going to grow dissatisfied, and this will create cracks
in the system. Thereafter, one cannot expect the power organs and public security
agencies that presently maintain his absolute authority to function well. This is not an issue of power, but one of whether
Kim Jong Eun can start displaying the monarchic discipline he inherited
from his father.
