South Koreans are more concerned than ever
with national security following the North’s fourth nuclear test. From the
implementation of more tolerant policies to the extreme use of preemptive
strike, opinions for how to deal with North Korea are diverse. What is the most
effective way to counter this nuclear threat? To put it simply, South Korea
should seriously consider nuclear armament to protect its sovereign power and
to ensure its very existence.
As expected, North Korea recently conducted
a fourth nuclear test. This comes only three years after their last test on
February 2, 2013. They insist this last iteration was a hydrogen bomb test, but
initial assessments point to a lack of thermonuclear capability.
What’s important here is not the
classification of nuclear test, but rather, the undeniable fact that North
Korea is improving their nuclear capability day by day. The South is exhibiting
their “quick temper” once again in response to the ever-growing military threat
from the North, who has gone all-in on nuclear weapon and long-range missile
development. Just as it was with the last three tests, the entire nation is
restless over security concerns and everyone seems to have an opinion about how
to react. But, within less than a month, we will forget all about the danger
and return to our daily lives, just like we always do. This phenomenon is known
as the “numbness effect.”
This test was different from the previous
three as it was significantly more dangerous and is demanding our full
attention. There are two primary concerns to discuss. First, using a long-range
missile as a delivery vehicle for a nuclear warhead is alarming. The North
already conducted a three-stage Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM)
test last year. There are still many skeptics as to the success of that launch,
but many military experts predict successful SLBM development within one to two
year. The SLBM is a serious threat that can neutralize not only our own kill
chain, but the US’s Korea America Missile Defense (KAMD) system as well. If
they are able to achieve SLBM-based nuclear capability, our security network
will be rendered useless.
Second, considering Kim Jong Un’s
unpredictable nature, we shouldn’t rule out a sudden nuclear attack. Conducting
this latest nuclear test fully aware of the impending harsh sanctions from the
international community, including China, is devoid of all rationale. We cannot
fully dismiss the possibility of a nuclear attack from such a reckless
individual.
What then is our security strategy for the
North’s increasing nuclear threat? It’s the same old game. Whenever the North
conducts a nuclear test, our government runs right to the UN. This time is no
different. The National Security Office reported that, “We fully realize that
under no circumstances will the international community ever permit North Korea
to possess nuclear arms and, in accordance with UN policy, we firmly demand the
complete, verifiable, and irreversible disarmament (CVID) of its nuclear
weapons program.”
Indeed, it appears that we have no choice
but to rely on international regulations given that our lack of nuclear
options. However, we only end up justifying North Korea’s insistence on driving
a wedge between the ROK-US alliance if our government first seeks the
cooperation of the UN or the US every time there is a nuclear-related
provocation.
As a non-nuclear state, South Korea has two
main courses of action to respond to the Northern threat. First is the
reimplementation of US Forces Korea (USFK) tactical nuclear weapons. However,
this is an impractical deterrent measure. This US has little intent to employ
tactical nukes. From their introduction in 1957 until their eventual removal in
1991, even some of the most serious North Korean provocations were unable to
elicit their use. During this time, the following provocations took place: The
Blue House Raid of 1968, the Pueblo Incident, the assassination attempt on
President Park Chung Hee in 1974, the bombing of Nang Gun, Myanmar in 1983, and
the bombing of Korean Airlines (KAL) 858 in 1987. The North was free to decide
when and how they lashed out at the South.
Again, the US never used its deployed
tactical nukes during this time period. This lack of intent to use nuclear
options became a key factor in the subpar North Korean deterrence that we see
today. Even if US nuclear weapons were re-deployed, the fact that operational
control belongs to the US would mar any practical application. Re-deployment of
these weapons is redundant; the US is already committed to providing a nuclear
umbrella. The US reiterated its unwillingness to use nukes to deter Northern
provocation during the sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong-do
incidents, and re-deployment of these weapons is unlikely to change that
intent.
Even if the US government decided to use
nuclear weapons, the operation of the nuclear umbrella is based on the ROK-US
Mutual Defense Treaty, which requires congressional consent. We can’t hedge our
entire survival on the intent of the US. Moreover, the hesitation to deploy
ground forces in both Libya and against ISIS makes one question how long they
will maintain their security pledge to South Korea. In that case, the only
remaining option is nuclear armament, and the government needs to seriously
consider the issue. The South has already pursued modernized conventional
weapons, but it’s crystal clear they provide little utility against nuclear
arms.
South Korea’s nuclear capability has
reached eye-opening levels. Our nuclear technology standard is top 10 in the
world alongside nuclear powers such as Italy, Spain, Canada, and Brazil.
According to Seo Gyun Ryeol, professor in Seoul University’s Nuclear
Engineering Department, as of 2012, there are over 10,000 tons of spent nuclear
material sitting in our plants that could be used to produce dozens of tons of
plutonium, which could create over 1 million nuclear bombs. The problem is not
insufficient technology; it’s more of an international political and diplomatic
issue. Many claim that manufacturing nuclear weapons will only end up causing
huge problems for Korea in the wake of the international community’s sanctions,
but this is an obscure fear over “taking the road untravelled.” Unofficial nuclear
states such as Israel, India, and Pakistan have never been the recipient of
tangible economic sanctions despite possessing these weapons.
On the contrary, the US both provides aid
and overlooks nuclear development in these nations due to their strategic value
in dealing with the terrorist threat in the Middle East and pressuring China.
The US levied economic sanctions against India in 1998 after an underground
nuclear test, but lifted them in 2001. Israel has been receiving 3 billion
dollars a year in US aid since they signed a peace treaty with Egypt in 1979,
while Pakistan has been receiving over 2 billion dollars annually ever since
911. The US decided sanctions would have been ineffective and severely
detrimental to national interests. These nations are not a member of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Article 10, Paragraph 1 of the NPT states
that a nation may withdraw from the treaty in a scenario where national
interests are threatened while exercising sovereignty. Simply, the treaty committee
and UN Security Council are to be notified three months in advance. The reason
the US is playing favorites with these countries is due to their significance
regarding US national interests.
This same kind of relationship applies to
us in a big way. South Korea, who has been faithfully advancing US strategic
interests in Northeast Asia, is in no way beneath Pakistan or India in the eyes
of the US. Could the US really levy economic sanctions on Korea, a country that
is the world’s 7th largest exporter, 8th strongest military force, and 10th
overall economic power? Could the US president, who came out and likened the
ROK-US alliance to a linchpin, really destroy that partnership?
If that were to happen, the majority of
nations in the international community, which have a tightly intertwined trade
relationship with South Korea, would suffer significant loss. This would, of
course, have a boomerang effect and come back to hurt the US enormously. This
is why any worries about economic sanctions or damage to the ROK-US alliance as
a result of South Korean nuclear armament are unfounded. International politics
scholars Lewis Page and Rodric Braithwaite are of the opinion that nuclear
weapon deterrence is normally accomplished through more nuclear weapons. Similarly,
both offensive and defensive realists, such as John Mearsheimer and Kenneth
Waltz, suggest that nukes must be answered with nukes. We need to develop a
slightly more sophisticated understanding about the various problems that could
arise to hinder nuclear armament, but the bottom line is South Korea needs
nuclear capabilities and needs to draw up measures to minimize domestic and
foreign opposition to nuclear arms.
There is no room for flexibility in matters
of national security. If North Korea is seriously threatening our
security with nuclear arms, we have to delve deep and find the most sure-fire
way to assure our own survival. What use is international law to a country that
has been wiped out or taken over by an attack from their enemy? If we think
about the continued existence and security of our nation realistically, we will
realize that we need to build our own strength and be ready for any
possibility.
*Views expressed in Guest Columns do not
necessarily reflect those of Daily NK.
