The waters off the coast of the West Sea
encompass the de facto North-South maritime border referred to as the Northern
Limit Line [NLL]. Here, fresh water from the Han River meets ocean water,
creating a natural estuary with fertile fishing grounds. With blue crab fishing
season in full swing, however, these waters become an area of increasing
tension as South Korean fishermen face off against illegal Chinese fishing
vessels.
Conditions are said to have worsened this
year. Chinese fishing companies, realizing that these waters have remained
relatively untouched for almost seven decades, have been bringing their vessels
in droves. Although the area has a violent history of inter-Korean naval
skirmishes, the Chinese fishing vessels seem determined to get their catch
despite the risks.
Adding further fuel to the fire is that
North Korea appears to be exploring ways to use the tension to its own
advantage. When Chinese fishing vessels are driven away by the South Korean
navy, their modus operandi is to immediately flee into North Korean waters. In
the areas immediately flanking the NLL, Pyongyang appears content to take no
further action against them. This situation may be used as a bargaining chip
for discussions on creating a peaceful inter-Korean fishing zone and laying the
blame on Seoul for not having worked towards one sooner.
The South Korean coast guard officers
pursuing these Chinese vessels do so at serious risk to themselves, and are in
danger of finding themselves drawn into a provocation preplanned by the North.
The North’s General Bureau of Reconnaissance operates dozens of high-speed
boats for military operations disguised as Chinese fishing vessels.
These vessels have the same appearance of
simple fishing boats, but are sufficiently armed to inflict heavy damage during
a potential skirmish. Onboard each clandestine vessel are dozens of special
operations agents that are trained to carry out abductions at sea.
Although these military vessels are
typically equipped with four high-speed engines, they normally only operate on
a single engine (like a regular fishing boat) moving at approximately 18-20
knots. However, once they shift into combat mode, the vessels can reach speeds
of over 45 knots using all four engines.
For confrontations, they possess multiple
rocket launchers, autocannons, and anti-aircraft machine guns hidden on deck
and in the galley. These weapons can be quickly operated at short notice. South
Korean agents who under the belief that they are apprehending illegal Chinese
fishermen are therefore at serious risk during potential boarding attempts.
These North Korean vessels can position
themselves in a fleet of Chinese boats and pretend to fish, only to launch a
sudden attack against South Korean patrol boats. Another potential tactic is to
lure South Korean coast guards to board their vessel, which would make it very
challenging to prove accountability for their actions.
It is also worth noting the current
political climate on the Korean Peninsula. The North may use these
opportunities at sea to express its anger at Seoul for not budging on its
request for the talks that it has proposed, albeit with no sign of addressing the
preconditions for dialogue stipulated by South Korea.
The South Korean authorities must therefore
consider illegal Chinese fishing boats near the NLL to be a threat to national
security. Leniency and complacency may lead to dire consequences.
