Unification Media Group (UMG): This past Tuesday, October 10th, North Korea celebrated the 72nd anniversary of the establishment of the Workers’ Party of Korea. While Kim Jong Un announced a shift away from Songun ideology towards one of simultaneous nuclear and economic development at the 7th Party Congress last year, many party members are feeling discontent, even as Kim tries to elevate the party back to its former glory. Reporter Seol Song Ah joins us to discuss the latest developments.
Seol Song Ah (Seol): The Workers’ Party sees itself as the most powerful organization in the country and supposedly exercises its authority over every aspect of society. In the 1970s, the party laid out its Principles for the Establishment of the One-Ideology System and claims authority over the military, police, security forces, and all other power-wielding organs. But in the 90s when famine began to chip away at the strength of the ideology among the people, the military emerged as the ultimate source of power within the regime.
Now with Kim Jong Un at the helm, the balance of power is shifting again. Kim replaced the National Defense Commission of his father’s era with the State Affairs Commission last year, attempting to once again return the center of power to the party. But while the party wants to focus on foreign currency-earning operations, the companies themselves have been largely refusing to hire Workers’ Party members.
UMG: Can you explain the evolution of the Songun (military-first) ideology and how we got to where we are today?
Seol: As the famine in the 90s began to erode the party ideology, Kim Jong Il saw the military as the key pillar around which he could rally the people, shifting the focus to war and military strength. At that time, people were doing whatever it took to survive, even stealing equipment from factories or risking electrocution to cut away power lines to smuggle out of the country for money, or trade for small amounts of grain or flour.
Theft, murder, prostitution, and crime in general were on the rise. The authorities were losing control and an atmosphere of impending collapse began to permeate the country. This is when Kim Jong Il launched his military-first strategy.
He enlisted the military as the center of his new ideological proclamation, taking advantage of its ubiquitous physical presence and the threat it represented towards those he thought were sowing chaos in society. He directed the military to also take over the management of factories.
UMG: So Kim Jong Il directed the military to seize control of the economy as well?
Seol: Two prominent examples – the Sangwon Cement Complex and the Sunchon Cement Complex – can help explain this process. These ventures were operating at a loss, and though the cement-making process is relatively simple and the materials were acquired domestically, it also requires specialized equipment and resources. Following Kim Jong Il’s decree, the military just came in and seized control of it all.
This meant that those formerly operating the facilities suddenly had an extra layer to deal with, where in order to acquire materials and sell products, bribes had to be paid to military personnel at every step.
The military also began controlling the distribution of rice and other produce from the farms. They even set up stations at all farms and demanded money for licenses from people who just wanted to give a portion of their crops to a family member, for example. Even village officials who used to enjoy enough local power to demand bribes of their own were being superseded by military officials who were now the recipients of the bribes. In this way, the party lost significant ground to the military.
UMG: Can we draw a direct line from that process to the current situation, where many foreign currency-earning companies are run by military officials?
Seol: Yes, with the explosion of oil trade with China in the early 2000s came the real expansion of wealth for who we now call the donjuLiterally "masters of money," donju refers to people who hav... More (newly-affluent middle class). At that time, factory owners who became influential during the aforementioned military transition were able to make huge sums of money through such trade, the opportunities from which stemmed merely from political positioning – not any specific business acumen.
Thus the Songun military-first era was born, and those who supported the military through this time through investments and relationships now belong to the donjuLiterally "masters of money," donju refers to people who hav... More class. As the scope of trade and earning by military-connected enterprises increased, the power of the Workers’ Party declined. But from 2016, with the opening of the 7th Party Congress, Kim Jong Un has been attempting to bring the party back to the center of power.
UMG: Earlier you mentioned, however, that these foreign currency-earning companies are deliberately not hiring party members.
Seol: “Restoration of the party”, “marketization,” and “international sanctions” can all be said to be the keywords of the Kim Jong Un era. But of course the way the party is pursuing profits and collecting taxes through the markets is fundamentally at odds with its founding socialist principles. The money is used to fund the regime’s nuclear and missile programs.
During a meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party on October 7th, Kim Jong Un again emphasized his “Byungjin line” of joint nuclear and economic development. The combination of the North’s familiar strategy of raising tensions with the US and President Trump’s recent veiled threat of a “calm before the storm”- hinting at a military option for North Korea – may be encouraging Kim’s choice to focus on internal solidarity and the strength of the party.
So while it would seem as if the status of party members is rising, the opposite is actually true. If a party member transfers out of their assigned state factory job and into one of these coveted foreign currency-earning operations, they are automatically kicked out of the party. The individual must pay a bribe in order to complete the process of applying for the transfer, but they are still required to forfeit their party membership. This is how the party is becoming isolated from these businesses.
UMG: It seems that party members are essentially stuck in these state-owned factories then, receiving very low wages.
Seol: This wasn’t always the case though. Previously, it was common for party members to pay a bribe to their local party chairman in order to stay on the party rolls while pursuing other work outside the factory. There were a great number of these so-called “August 3rd (8.3 Movement) Party members” working for foreign currency-earning companies, even paying their party dues with this newfound stream of cash.
However, with renewed promotion of the party, these companies are being targeted by the authorities. We are now seeing owners or managers who had been shunning party members be punished for such practices. But this is causing more problems. Bribes are becoming more expensive and company managers are complaining of forced inefficiency as a result of having to hire so many people.
There are conflicting reports about whether companies are still rejecting party members. According to a source in South Pyongan Province who recently spoke with Daily NK, “foreign currency-earning companies are unconditionally refusing party members in favor of non-party members. Just this past week, 3 young former soldiers were hired by a silver smelting company, but were quickly fired when they were discovered to be party members.”
While Kim Jong Un is attempting to reinvigorate the power of the party, the inability of party members themselves to gain a foothold in the most profitable positions would suggest a failure of this endeavor.
