Contrary to expectations, unification might damage the North Korean people’s sense of autonomy and independence. Undoubtedly, North Korea will need to work hard independently and realize its own strength if it hopes to develop economically. That is an important part of taking a proactive approach. However, because the economic gap between North and South is so large, it is inevitable that the North Korean people will come to rely on South Korean economic support. When meetings between economic powerhouses and less developed countries happen, no amount of care and precaution can prevent the larger country from damaging the independence of the smaller.
It would be hard for the stakeholders in both North and South to adjust their approach. For North Korea, reconstruction and social overhead capital are going to be prohibitively expensive. In the South, there will probably be grumblings post-unification about the size of economic assistance necessary. North Korean residents will see this and respond with disappointment. It will be difficult to settle these differences in opinion as the country becomes one. Nothing can safeguard against these conflicts.
Because the development level in North and South is so different, tolerating and understanding one another will be an extraordinarily difficult task. There is a large chance that personal conflicts arising from this difficulty to understand will escalate into large-scale political collisions. Reducing these conflicts will be difficult.
Even if movement is restricted for a period of time after unification, the North and South will have several points of contact. At least 200,000 South Koreans will travel to North Korea for investments, technological support, personnel support, and to visit divided families. Even if the number of people traveling North isn’t very large, the points of contact will need to be extremely wide, owing to the fact that assistance will be needed in the education sector, industry, technology, and so on.
Handling the political pressures and political costs associated with unification will be more difficult than dealing with the bottom line cost. Calculating the bill for unification isn’t hard. On one side, you have costs associated with rebuilding and administrating North Korea. And on the other side, you have political costs and pressures in South Korea based on issues like taxation, economic shocks, reducing the budget, and so on. The actual cost of unification will need to take both of these considerations into account.
The problem is that, over the course of negotiating an amount that appeases both sides, there is a high chance of political collisions. These collisions threaten the delicate balance. In the absence of strong leadership, the process of setting the budget for unification can veer into murky waters, biasing the result to one side or another and kick starting even more severe political tensions.
When observers discuss the costs of unification, some are tempted to argue that the national defense budget can be reduced and those funds can be redirected towards unification efforts. The chance that a united Korea would be able to reduce the military budget is slim. First, opposition to military reductions would be strong. East Asia is rife with arms building in Japan and China, territory disputes, and general unrest. These conditions serve as logical support for those who oppose a post-unification military budget reduction.
Furthermore, even if the military budget is narrowly reduced, it is not clear how the government will recover from a deficit created by reconstruction efforts. If the draft is abolished after unification and a volunteer system is instituted, this would actually increase the defense budget. Most importantly, it is not realistic to think that the defense budget and the cost of rebuilding North Korea are on similar levels. The cost of unification will be much more.
