Although it is widely thought that Kim Jong
Un plans to consolidate North Korea’s dictatorial system through the 7th Party
Congress, as the country’s internal stability grows ever more fragile, analysts
are predicting that in fact the Party Congress will have the opposite effect,
proving to be a misstep that once again reveals Kim Jong Un’s vulnerabilities
to the world.
Following his ascent to power, Kim Jong Un
conducted a large purge of the field army that had defended his father, Kim
Jong Il, and the executive powers, while seeking a full-fledged readjustment of
the organization to to align with his new rule. However, as Kim Jong Il’s death
was unexpected, regime change was also sudden, meaning Kim Jong Un did not have
the proper loyalty of the nation, and among the cadre class, who have become
the targets of his fearpolitik, doubts regarding their young leader are
mounting.
Cho Han Bum (pictured left), Senior Research Fellow, Korea
Institute for National Unification, told Daily NK in a recent interview that
although the generational shift within the Party is the major focus of Kim Jong
Un ahead of the upcoming Party Congress, the excessively radical generational
power change will not spur increased solidarity among Party cadres, but
rather bringing about a situation where Kim Jong Un’s power as the centrifugal
force is cultivated.
“Unlike Kim Jong Il, who had experience
with partisan activities and the founding of the country, and who wore the halo
of Kim Il Sung, who prepared him for his role as successor to the dictatorship,
Kim Jong Un had a relatively short time to prepare,” the expert said.
“In addition, he lacks the
‘pure’ Paektu bloodline, having instead the so-called ‘Fujisan bloodline’ (Kim
Jong Un’s mother, Ko Yong Hui, was born in Japan). In a situation where he
does not have the political justification to draw out spontaneous loyalty from
the elite class, Kim Jong Un’s plan to declare that it is now his generation
through the Party Congress will fail to materialize as he envisions.”
Mr. Cho also discussed Kim Jong Un’s shift
over the last four years from his father’s songun [military-first politics] policy to more Party-centric
one, positing that the Organization and Guidance Department will likely begin
to focus on public order. He predicted more Party cadres moving to whip the
people into compliance with “forced loyalty” by means of surveillance and
inspections, reigning through terror, bloody purges, and other such methods to
control public security and thereby sustain the regime.
In reality, those who have suffered the
nearest injuries under Kim Jong Un’s reign have largely been members of the
Workers’ Party of Korea Organization and Guidance Department, including Jo Yon
Jun,, (first deputy director of the OGD), Kim Won Hong (head of the State
Security Department), Hwang Pyong So (director of the Korean People’s Army
General Political Bureau), and Jo Yong Won (vice director of the OGD). It
would appear that at this Party Congress, there will be a record number of
replacements at all levels of the Guidance Department, with suitable candidates
to control public security coming in.
However, some believe that the role of
public security forces will threaten Kim Jong Un’s regime much in the way that
the defense of his reign of terror has. Mr. Cho agreed, stating, “While Kim
Jong Un’s regime may appear outwardly stable with public security forces held
firmly in hand, these forces are actually extremely threatening because they
lack loyalty to Kim Jong Un. In a situation where internal cracks are already
apparent among the cadres, the elites, who have access to all of the
information about the regime, may come to pose an even bigger threat to Kim
Jong Un’s dictatorship.”
Citing instability within the regime, Mr. Cho pointed out that professional analysts, while varied in
their opinions, cannot completely discount the possibility of a sudden
disruptive incident occurring in North Korea. Considering the economic
difficulties created by the UN sanctions against the country, Kim Jong Un’s
unwavering commitment to nuclear development may falter.
Although it is difficult to say that
organized resistance forces against the regime in North Korea will form, there
is the possibility that the people, under numerous pressures including food
shortages, will erupt in revolt given the opportunity. “Couple this with simultaneous disputes within the leadership and we could see a sudden shift in North Korea; if regime durability is diminished to a great enough degree, collapse from even the slightest provocation is very possible,” Mr. Cho asserted.
Without an organized opposition force
against the North Korean dictatorship, a sudden change in North Korea will
throw the country into chaos and preclude immediate reunification with the
South.
“If we are to prepare for reunification without regard to Kim Jong Un’s
parading about of his nuclear weapons, we must push for total participation from
the North Korean people, and create an atmosphere of trust, friendly
reunification, friendly opening, and protection of human rights in North Korean
society,” said Mr. Cho.
