Reunification is the final objective of policy
on North Korea. Long term stability on the Korean Peninsula, and perhaps Northeast
Asia, will not be possible without reunification; anything else will only bring
temporary stability.
An implicit premise in reunification policy
is that reunification is inevitable regardless of however it comes about.
Nonetheless, even if reunification is inevitable, there is no question that it
will not happen through the communization of the South, despite it being the
North’s preferred choice. The current milieu, which regards reunification as
inevitable, was recently expressed in the recent statement that “reunification
is a jackpot.” It is also manifested in the Presidential Committee for
Unification Preparation.
In 1981, long before the North’s economy
began to wane, the then-president Chun established the Advisory Council on
Democratic and Peaceful Unification (now called National Unification Advisory
Council) with himself as the chairperson. Hence, the current government’s seeming
affixation to reunification is not new. The council’s original name reflects
the ideal reunification as seen by the South.
But in reality, it is difficult for
democracy and communism to coexist. Moreover, because the aim of reunification
policy of the South’s conservative governments is to get rid of the North’s
dictatorial government, reunification policy in reality can only be
antagonistic towards the North despite overtures of friendly relations. Therefore,
the presidencies of Kim DJ and Roh were seminal turning points in North-South
relations. DJ even said outright that “it’s moral for an affluent older brother
to help out a poor younger brother.”
Despite the many citizens who oppose
reunification, it still seems very much inevitable. The reasons for this are as
follows: first, it seems fated that the North’s hereditary rule will eventually
collapse; second, to rescue the people of North from their poverty and
oppression is perceived as an obligation on the part of the South.
The North attempted to boost its national
security by attaining nuclear weapons, and this paradoxically led to the
conservatives believing that coexistence with a nuclear North will be difficult.
These notions were further reflected in recent comments by Jeong Jong Wook,
vice chairman of the Preparatory Committee for Unification, who broached “absorption”
of the North by the South as a possible unification scenario.
Experts on North Korea, during the latter stages of
Kim Jung Il’s rule, discussed a particular scenario very much, in which a
pro-Chinese faction came into power and subjected the North’s economy and
politics under China. At the time, this scenario seemed very likely because the
relations between North Korea and China were much closer than that between
South Korea and the USA. This scenario was put to rest when it was realized
that that the North’s “independence” did not depend very much on its relations
with its northern neighbor.
A certain question must be asked at this
point: will reunification actually take place? Even if North Korea’s regime
collapses, will the two countries still become one as happened in Germany? Who
will make that decision, and how? Will it be done through a referendum of North Korean citizens? If Kim Jung Eun is deposed by a new ruler who is open to liberalization,
will the latter consent to a reunification whose terms are dictated by South Korea?
What about a Chinese-esque political system
where control over the economics and politics is assigned to different levels
of the government? Will the South have the courage to persuade the North to
become a united country? Will North Korea agree to a reunification in which they give up
their powers? What if the premise is all wrong?
There was a time when it was believed that the
only sufficient ingredient for reunification was Kim Il Sung’s fall from power.
This fantasy, in which one dictator is the only barrier to reunification, no
longer exists.
Those in power must seriously consider the assumptions
and uncertainties that exist with regard to our vision of reunification before publicly
promoting reunification as a morally and economically desirable outcome. These
flaws will not be repaired even if the public widely comes to believe that reunification
will be an economic bonanza. Instead, it is like a very difficult strategy game
completed through complex tactics.
The symbolic importance of the Kaesong
Industrial Complex and Geumgang Mountain tourism is how it institutionalized
the cooperation of ordinary citizens from both North and South. Despite the
systemic flaws of the two projects, it nonetheless served as an experiment to
test the possibility and viability of reunification; the May 24 measures, however, showed that
inter-Korean relations could always regress to the past.
Who bears the responsibility of showing the
evidence that reunification will occur through a peaceful and democratic
process? What if reunification is a zero-sum game where it will only become possible
after one side has collapsed and retains no other options but reunification? If
reunification is indeed a zero-sum game, then the assumption behind the
reunification policies of both North and the South is that “My goals become
attainable only by destroying the other side.”
It might even become possible that
reunification will be evaded in order to avoid this zero-sum game. Ironically, China
will reap the most benefits from this line of thinking, and the two Koreas will
struggle to move past this stalemate.
What we choose for the future will
obviously be influenced by our values. Ultimately, the adoption of this or that
value system is a philosophical question for the individual and society. Does
the South have a value system or philosophy to facilitate reunification? Is the
country ready to sacrifice the visible things (both financial and
non-financial) for the invisible philosophy? Suddenly, reunification does not
appear so easy like before.
*Views expressed in Guest Columns do not necessarily reflect those of Daily NK.
