Today marks one year since the implementation of the May 24th Measures, put in place in response to North Korea’s sinking of the Cheonan on March 26th, 2010.
The measure halted North-South economic and educational exchanges, stopping flows of money and, in particular, aid from entering the North.
The South Korean government and experts in the field of North-South relations agree that North Korea has suffered considerably as a result of the measures, although they note that more could have been done.
One year of enforcement shows effect on North Korea
The South Korean government believes it has gotten results from the sanctions that it has applied. One high-ranking South Korean official has claimed, “As a result of the May 24th Measures, North Korea has been deprived of around $300 million in income this year.”
Certainly, the amount of aid sent to North Korea fell rapidly post-May 24th. The total amount of aid given by governmental and private organizations over the course of the year was 30.1 billion won, a 61.2% decrease on the previous year’s 77.5 billion won.
On the other hand, however, that the more than 120 businesses operating in the Kaesong Industrial Complex continue to operate shows its symbolic importance in the history of North-South economic cooperation.
Indeed, employee numbers there are larger now than they were in advance of the Cheonan sinking. According to the Ministry of Unification, the number of North Korean workers in Kaesong at the end of February was 46,420, an 11% increase on February last year.
However, the stop put to direct money transfers, rice and fertilizer aid, is, experts in the field believe, putting pressure on North Korea’s regime.
Experts say that we are at an important time, though, and there needs to be consistent policy on this matter going forward, since a single year is too short to break the custom of ‘provocation by the North-dialogue-restarting of aid’. If the measures are undermined, then policy towards the North may return to its former self, directed at the whim of Pyongyang.
“Were the government to be anticipating that North Korea might change within a year, they would be being very shallow-minded,” Kim Byeong Yeon, a professor with Seoul National University, told the Daily NK. “Changing a dictatorship through outside influence is difficult, but if consistent policy and international cooperation are satisfactory, the pressure can be effective.”
Pressure as the basis of policy towards North Korea
Choi Su Young of the Korea Institute for National Unification says, “So long as Kaesong is maintained, it will be hard to expect any results from economic pressure.”
Currently, the government’s position is that until the North apologizes for the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island, it will maintain its sanctions.
Cheon Hae Sung, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Unification, says that the government’s perspective on the policy for the distribution of aid to North Korea has not changed during the year since May 24th. Humanitarian aid such as the distribution of necessities to the most vulnerable is being offered as an incentive to North Korea to change.
On the 16th, a Ministry of Unification official said, “In terms of making the North realize that they stepped out of line and that they have to pay the price, the May 24th measures are obviously effective.” He further added, “Until North Korea changes its attitude, we will continue with the May 24th measures.”
Government officials suggest that the peace offensive that the North pursued in the beginning of this year was an effect of the May 24th measures.
A high-ranking official in The Blue House explained, “In the past, we were able to engage in dialogue while supplying North Korea with abundant rice and fertilizer aid. Now, however, authority in terms of inter-Korea relations and peace on the peninsula has been put back in our hands.”
Oh Gyeong Seob, a researcher with the Sejong Institute, said, “Strain in the relationship between North and South Korea does not necessarily mean that policy towards North Korea is failing,” further noting, “If the government becomes anxious at every sign of strain in the relationship, the policies and principles of inter-Korea dialogue will all crumble.”
The postponing of loudspeaker broadcasts and the debate surrounding sanctions
Though loudspeakers broadcasts across the DMZ never restarted, there have been expressions of antagonism at other psychological warfare elements of the sanctions. Experts have agreed that North Korea is sensitive enough to psychological warfare that it could be called an Achilles’ heel.
One high-ranking defector said, “Psychological warfare not only provokes a response out of North Korea, but also is a pressing catalyst for change within the regime,” adding, “psychological warfare is a strategic response.”
A researcher for a national policy research institute agreed, saying, “In terms of pressure to induce change in North Korea, we have to put pressure on their Achilles’ heels in terms of both economy and politics,” and added, “The reason why the effects of psychological warfare are limited is because it is not being completely implemented.”
