North Korea recently scrapped its system of preliminary examinations—a legal procedure the country maintained for roughly 70 years since the regime’s founding. This change resulted from revisions to North Korea’s Criminal Procedure Law in 2023, which shortened criminal procedures into a three-stage system: investigations, indictments, and trials. While the revision appears to simplify criminal procedures and protect human rights, it’s actually a politically motivated reform designed to strengthen party control and enable swift punishments.
Abandoning the Soviet-style four-stage system
For decades, North Korea maintained a four-stage criminal procedure inherited from the Soviet Union: investigations, preliminary examinations, indictments, and trials. Preliminary examinations determined the facts before indictment and supplemented prosecutors’ exclusive right to indict. Under the 2023 amendments, however, this preliminary examination stage was eliminated and folded into the investigation stage, creating a streamlined three-stage process.
The overhaul was substantial. The law was condensed from nine chapters and 435 articles to eight chapters and 390 articles, with approximately 250 articles amended or removed. This fundamental revision—the first in about 70 years—appears tied to changes supporting Kim Jong Un’s national strategy, specifically his “strategy for full-scale socialist development” announced at the Eighth Party Congress in 2021 and his “people-first politics.”
Human rights veneer, control underneath
On the surface, the revised Criminal Procedure Law promotes human rights protections. The revision strengthened legal counsel provisions (Article 95 and Articles 99-101), shortened detention periods (Articles 138, 148, and 290), and adopted internationally recognized terminology. But a closer look at the full text reveals that substantive changes concentrate power and intensify party control.
While eliminating preliminary examinations, authorities significantly expanded their powers during investigations. A new article grants prosecutors control over investigations, and critically, the amended law places no time limit on investigations—effectively enabling unlimited custody investigations. This clearly demonstrates the authorities’ political objective: weakening procedural safeguards while tightening party control throughout the investigation, indictment, and trial process.
Rationalization or control legislation?
North Korea’s preliminary investigation system has long been criticized as a major source of human rights abuses. The previous Criminal Procedure Law allowed up to 10 days of confinement during investigations, five months during preliminary examinations, and 15 days during indictment—totaling over five months. A 2012 revision had already extended detention periods by a month from the previous maximum of four months and 25 days.
This system essentially legalized long-term detention, drawing continuous criticism from the international community, including the UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea. The latest revision could be seen as a token response to ease this criticism. But in reality, it’s a criminal procedure reform designed to protect the regime by concentrating investigative power and accelerating punishments. Ultimately, North Korea’s legal system reform prioritizes “regime protection” over “ensuring human rights.”
Tightening party control over law enforcement
The Criminal Procedure Law revision systematically strengthened party control over law enforcement agencies. In recent years, North Korea has elevated the legal system’s political status by reforming the functions of the party’s Central Inspection Commission, the Ministry of Social Security, and the Central Court. Notably, Colonel Kang Myong Chol, head of the criminal investigations bureau at the Ministry of Social Security, was promoted to both the party’s Central Committee and Central Inspection Commission. For a field-grade officer from the Ministry of Social Security to join the Central Committee—a body of only about 130 people from the most powerful positions in the party, government, and military—is extraordinary.
External normalization, internal control
The latest amendment exemplifies the dualistic control strategy of the Kim Jong Un regime. Externally, it responds to international pressure by claiming “human rights improvements” through expanded legal counsel access and shorter detention times. Internally, it streamlines the legal system to more efficiently crack down on “anti-socialist and non-socialist behavior.”
The reform also strengthens legal and security cooperation between North Korea and Russia. In August, Yun Kwang Won, vice director of North Korea’s Supreme Public Prosecutors Office, visited Russia to discuss criminal justice cooperation. In September, Minister of Public Security Pang Tu Sop signed an agreement with Russia’s Ministry of the Interior in Moscow on public safety cooperation. These moves show North Korea is expanding its “legal and security network” despite international sanctions and internal crises.
Conclusion: Regime protection disguised as reform
North Korea’s 2023 Criminal Procedure Law amendment was no simple improvement. It was a politically motivated legal revision aimed at preventing regime threats and intensifying social control under the banner of “full-scale socialist development.” Scrapping the preliminary examination system symbolizes procedural efficiency, but it’s actually a structural reorganization to make regime control more efficient.
Rather than improving human rights, this legal reform typifies the Kim Jong Un regime’s efforts to strengthen “rule through law.” The elimination of preliminary examinations centralized criminal procedure under a single line of control, condensing it into three stages. Under Kim Jong Un, North Korea’s laws have become increasingly political and effective as tools of control. This superficial “legal system strengthening” clearly reflects the totalitarian logic of “control through law.”
The 2023 criminal justice reform is part of a multilayered strategy to more effectively counter threats to the regime—including “anti-socialist and non-socialist behavior”—and expand control. We need to examine the transformation of North Korea’s criminal justice system under Kim Jong Un and evaluate its impact on the human rights situation for the North Korean people.
