North Korean authorities continue to practice “politics of fear” even as Kim Jong Un marks the 10th year of his rule. In particular, authorities are using punishments and personnel transfers to keep cadres even more inline amid the protracted COVID-19 pandemic.
Having long strengthened his base of power through the politics of fear, sacking or even executing high-ranking cadres, Kim has ruled by generating internal tension this year, too, mercilessly replacing top-ranking party, government and military cadres at the apex of power.
In fact, Ri Pyong Chol — who had risen as a central figure with a place on the Presidium of the Politburo of the ruling party’s Central Committee, a key body — lost his position in June due to a “grave case” pertaining to the state’s emergency quarantine efforts.
Officials of all ranks at the Central Emergency Anti-epidemic Headquarters were replaced en masse for lackadaisical handling of quarantine problems or lazy statements and actions. Even to the present day, guidance officers at the very bottom of the administrative totem pole are reportedly being replaced.
Because of this, cadres are apparently telling one another that “they’ve no luck this year, perhaps because it’s been eight years since the execution of Jang Song Thaek.” The source says cadres are complaining that they fear “icy gusts” are coming their way, invoking the death of Jang — which opened the chapter on the “politics of fear” — and the superstition against the number eight, which is considered inauspicious.
With its harsh punishments of cadres, North Korea apparently intends to reestablish lax internal discipline while producing results in COVID-19 quarantine efforts and economic construction, two major current tasks.
Along the same lines, Kim replaced Department of Economic Affairs head Kim Tu Il just a month after appointing him to the post with its crushing duties in the first year of the state’s new five-year economic development plan, punished a series of high-ranking military officials (Ri Pyong Chol, Kim Jong Gwan) for the “grave case” in quarantine efforts, and sacked the head of the Science and Education Department, Choe Sang Gon, who had general oversight over the public health sector.
Kim’s “Cadre Revolution”: Lighting a fire under cadres with ideological efforts
South Korea’s Ministry of Unification recently published its 2021 directory of North Korean government institutions and 2021 report on major North Korean figures. About personnel trends in North Korea over the last year, a Ministry of Unification official said the authorities are focusing more on working-level ability and professionalism, but they are also using transfers as a means to reward or punish officials.
North Korea has long selected people based on professionalism by sector, and a generational change is underway as well. Also characteristic is its use of personnel changes to execute party decisions and orders.
In late June, the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee convened an enlarged meeting “to roundly deal with some leading officials’ dereliction of duty in implementing the major policy tasks of the Party and the state, and to provide a fresh turning point in the personnel administration within the Party.”
According to a Rodong Sinmun report, Kim — presiding over the meeting — said “now is the time to bring about a revolution in personnel administration before solving the acute economic problems,” and that “the revolution in cadre management which has always been regarded as of priority importance by our Party in the whole course of its development, is an important Party-wide task that has to be further intensified and strengthened on a priority basis to suit the current situation of our revolution.”
Subsequently, North Korea has been carrying out an ideological campaign. A July 10 opinion piece in the Rodong Sinmun said the “cadre revolution” is a fundamental means to achieve actual transformation and substantive progress in socialist construction, while an Aug. 2 editorial on the front page of the newspaper called on “all party organizations” to follow the Central Committee’s will to bring about a “cadre revolution” by strengthening guidance over officials and encouraging them to show complete dedication to the people, taking ownership over the people’s well-being.
Achieving party policy linked to skill, loyalty; cadres feel compelled to make fake reports
North Korea has continuously demanded that cadres improve irresponsible work attitudes and correct lax efforts, berating them to fulfill tasks with loyalty to the party and skill. North Korea might intend to produce exceptional results by keeping cadres in line through competency-based appointments, but in reality, there are lots of ill side effects.
A Daily NK source in North Korea said the authorities keep assigning unrealistic plans and tasks out of touch with current circumstances, with imports and exports frozen due to COVID-19. Officials believe they must unconditionally achieve these targets if they are to keep their jobs, so have little choice but to fake the statistics and issue false reports.
Above all else, North Korea is evaluating the skill and loyalty of cadres based on how they execute and achieve policy regarding COVID-19 quarantine efforts, the authorities’ top priority.
The source said cadres were avoiding being chosen to become quarantine guidance officers. He said they get sacked for dereliction of duty if they fail to properly respond to conditions on the ground, make false reports or present the same quarantine plan each quarter. If they are lucky, they are punished and become laborers. If not, they get exiled to the mountains or sent to political prison camps.
Since Kim mentioned the “cadre revolution,” cadres in the party, administration, military, legal bodies and specialized institutions have been taking typing and basic computer competency tests. Older cadres who fail these tests are reportedly admonished that they are “unqualified to guide modernization” and sacked.
The source said older cadres say they are struggling to keep up with younger teachers. Young cadres in their 40s and 50s, meanwhile, take delight in watching old, placekeeping cadres fall, but they already dejectedly realize that what happened to their older colleagues will happen to them.
