Based on the recent tendency of Kim Jong Il to attend artistic and cultural performances, and noting the types of people he has been attending those performances with, it looks like Kim is putting his own personal emphasis on state propaganda promoting his successor.
According to reports carried by North Korea’s state media since January 1 when he attended a New Year’s celebration concert by the Eunhasu Orchestra, Kim has added a definite interest in musical and artistic performances to his other focus, light industrial development.
As of April 19, North Korean domestic media had reported Kim Jong Il’s participation in 51 public events and onsite inspections during 2010. However, among these a mere seven were visits to military units, starkly contrasted against 22 visits to factories and industrial locations and 20 visits to arts performances and cultural events. The remaining two events were diplomatic in nature.
In comparison with last year, when Kim attended just eight art performances from February to April, this is a dramatic increase. Despite the fact that the period of analysis includes February and April, a period during which two big national holidays fall, for Kim to attend 20 cultural performances is still unconventional.
Therefore, it appears he is taking the propaganda reins, aiming to tighten discipline among his government and the people following the currency redenomination debacle.
Of course, we should not forget that propaganda is Kim Jong Il’s specialty.
He distinguished himself in the propaganda field until 1973 (when he was officially designated the successor at the age of 32); he worked at the head of the Propaganda and Agitation Department by age 25; as vice-director of the Propaganda and Agitation Department at 28; and then became the secretary in charge of propaganda in the Secretariat at age 32.
During the 1970s, he modernized North Korea’s film studios, issued the “Immortal Revolution Collection,” which depicts Kim Il Sung’s life, and dramatized five historical revolutionary operas including “The Sea of Blood.”
Therefore, it is also natural for Kim, who had such a big impact on his father’s idolization, to take a keen interest in his son’s succession propaganda.
Additionally, by participating in performances implying the idolization of Kim Jong Eun, Kim can exhibit most clearly to officials and the people his intention to persist with the succession as it stands.
According to reports, the performances Kim Jong Il has watched have all been about idolizing the Kim family and emphasizing the lineage of Mt. Baekdu.
One more noteworthy point is that high officials from across the political spectrum have all attended events with Kim. Officials from the National Defense Commission, the Korean People’s Army, the Workers’ Party and youth organizations have all accompanied him at various times and at various performances.
Taking along core figures from every field of the Kim regime implies that the performances and participation in them are a part of the broader succession project, rather than issues to be dealt with by Kim in consultation with workers from the cultural and artistic field itself.
