Why are North Korea missiles a cause of concern for Japan?
The answer is that the missiles have such a great margin of error in hitting
their targets. There is no guarantee that a missile launched at Tokyo will even
come close to Tokyo.
A missile that has a margin of error greater than 2 km
cannot be officially recognized as viable. However, this uncertainty caused by
the margin of error paradoxically makes North Korea missiles even more
dangerous than they would be if the missiles were accurate. This is due to
Japanese (and Korean) geography, where small land mass gives way to a high
population density. The situation would be different if this was the Middle
East. Although North Korea does not possess UAVs or missiles that are of high
capability, their development of advanced weapons shows their overall military
strategy to be highly calculated and systematic.
Although the capability of North Korea’s own advanced
weapons fall short of international standards by quite a large margin, they are
nonetheless a threat to SK and Japan. The Gulf War showed the military
significance of asymmetrical warfare, in which Iraq’s massive conventional
military could not stand up to American advanced weaponry.
North Korea has diligently developed its nuclear weapon
capabilities for the past 25 years, and now possesses a seminal piece of
nuclear weaponry following its submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM)
experiment.
The missile has arisen to the surface even as international
negotiations over North Korea’s nuclear weaponry have suNorth Korea in a
stalemate. The recent SLBM experiment, which follows upon North Korea’s
successful launch of the ICBM named Unha 3 missile in December 2012, means that
North Korea now possesses almost all pieces of nuclear weaponry.
How are missiles and nuclear weapons related?
Nuclear weaponry comprises two parts: the nuclear warhead
and its delivery system. In the past, warheads were heavy and bulky, so that
bombers and warships were the only available delivery systems. However, the
miniaturization of warheads enabled warheads to be delivered via missiles.
Missiles have become the main means of delivery for WMDs.
During the Iran-Iraq War, Iraqi bombers traveled 650 km in 45 minutes to reach
Tehran, but missiles took only 8 minutes to reach the same target. The drastic
reduction in arrival time meant that the opposing side had very little time to
make any preparations.
What does this signify?
The introduction of missiles into the North Korea arsenal
has changed the meaning of deterrence. Deterrence involves the confidence that
both sides will unfailingly retaliate if one side makes an attack. The reason
that North Korea’s nuclear warheads and missiles pose a threat to Northeast
Asia is that it upsets the balance of military strength between the region’s
neighbors.
However, just because North Korea’s missile capabilities are
now fully developed does not mean the same goes for its warhead manufacture
capabilities as well. The development of warheads and of the delivery system
are parallel, not consecutive. Therefore, a safe estimate of North Korea’s
nuclear warhead manufacturing capability can be rated at 80%.
To develop a superior delivery system, rather than a warhead
with superior destructivity, is strategically more valuable. The reason is that
even a so-called dirty bomb must be capable of being delivered to the
destination if it is to have any effect.
How did North Korea develop its missile capability?
It is widely thought that North Korea received nuclear
technology from Pakistan, and acquired missile technology from Egypt. North
Korea’s Rodong and Daepodong missiles were developed by disassembling and reassembling
Egyptian scud missiles purchased in the ‘80s. Horizontal proliferation refers
to the numerical increase in missile numbers, and vertical proliferation refers
to missile manufacture capability.
North Korea’s recent SLBM experiment shows that North Korea
has surpassed horizontal proliferation, and is on the final stages of vertical
proliferation.
What does all this mean?
The aim of North Korea’s military strategy is to increase
its offensive capabilities. Vertical proliferation fits into this aim by
allowing North Korea missiles to reach farther distances with heavier warheads.
However, there is an inverse proportion between the missile
distance and warhead mass. The heavier the warhead, the less distance can the
missile travel. Consequently, most countries have focused on manufacturing
missiles with lighter warheads that are capable of travelling a longer distance.
The disadvantage of launching ballistic missile from land is
that the missile silos can be detected by radar. Hence, the other side can launch
preemptive strikes if a missile launch is detected. The possession of multiple
forms of delivery prevents the other side from launching a preemptive strike
before the missiles can reach their target. To this end, SLMBs are the best
means of delivery.
SLBMs cannot be detected until the missile breaks the
surface since they are launched from ocean depths. This means that missiles can
be launched from an indeterminate starting point that is much closer to its
destination. Whereas the main danger of North Korea’s land missiles is its low
accuracy, SLBMs pose a danger because their launching point is uNorth Koreanown.
North Korea’s strategists have focused on developing SLBMs
precisely due to the particular danger that they form. The recent SLBM
experiment shows that North Korea’s goal is to achieve complete military
domination, even if its current levels of military technology and science are
lacking.
If missiles and nuclear weapons are so intricately
connected, then is there an international regime to regulate missiles as there
is for nuclear weapons (NPT)?
The basis of the international nuclear non-proliferation
regime is two-fold: 1) to provide the country seeking nuclear power with
alternative solutions to the causes causing the country to seek nuclear power; and 2) to remove or regulate the movement of knowledge of nuclear weapons
production.
Missile regimes do exist, as seen in the form of the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR), or the Hague Code of Conduct against
Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC). However, these regimes only amount to a
gentlemen’s agreement to restrict the proliferation of missile technology.
There is no international regime to reduce the number of missiles or to
restrict the proliferation of missiles itself.
The reason is that international cooperation is difficult to
achieve.
Different countries put different strategic values upon
missiles. The US’s missile defense is a reflection of this, as it seeks to
enhance preventive deterrence. THAAD, which was recently a topic of controversy
in SK, is also a form of missile defense.
The introduction of THAAD was proposed with the goal of
neutralizing North Korea’s ballistic missiles. The logic is that if the
missiles were made redundant by the missile defense system, then North Korea
would no longer be interested in the missiles. The biggest reason that the
SLBMs pose a threat is because it weakens the psychological, military, and
deterrence effects of a missile defense system.
The effectiveness of missile defense depends upon detecting
a missile launch as soon as possible, but because SLBMs can be launched
undetected close to the target, their effectiveness is great. The surprise
launching of SLBMs can neutralize the effectiveness of C4I (Command and
Control).
The US and USSR began to reach a series of mutual agreements
in 1960 with the aim of preventing an even greater arms race. The two states
agreed that the possession of a number of weapons more than sufficient to bomb
the entire world several times over was rather unwise.
The interesting thing is that the focus of negotiations
between the US and USSR was not reducing the number of nuclear warheads, but to
reduce or abolish certain means of delivery, such as bombers, ICBM, and SLBM.
What will be North Korea’s next step?
It will probably be to develop the ability to launch
multiple missiles simultaneously. The usual course with regards to nuclear
warfare is to develop defensive weapons in step with offensive weapons, but
North Korea does not seem interested in developing any mechanisms to protect
its missiles.
North Korea’s next missile experiment will probably be the
simultaneous launch of multiple missiles, thereby enhancing its offensive
capabilities. Such a move fits with the belligerent behaviour that North Korea
has so far exhibited. North Korea’s objective is to destabilize Northeast
Asia’s security situation by any means possible in order to maximize its own
power. A successful experiment will undoubtedly contribute greatly to the
destabilization of the region.
A precedent exists in which North Korea signed a moratorium
on testing missiles for the duration of September 1999 negotiations with the US
at Berlin.
US and North Korea were holding concurrent talks on missiles
and nuclear warheads, but after the nuclear negotiations broke down, so did the
missile negotiations. At that time, North Korea argued that missiles should be
classified as a conventional weapon, and attempted to negotiate a reduction in
the number of missile in exchange for withdrawal of US troops. Now with the
introduction of SLBMs, the playing field just changed completely.
North Korea now possesses nuclear warheads and missiles, and
SLBMs at that. The security situation in Northeast Asia just got a lot more
complicated.
*Views expressed in Guest Columns are not necessarily those of Daily NK.
