Can North Korea and Japan Be Friends?

Signed between North Korea and Japan at the end of May, the “Stockholm Agreement” has reignited forgotten controversy over the possible normalization of diplomatic relations between Pyongyang and Tokyo. However, there is nothing new in the latest agreement: North Korea is still talking about lifting
economic sanctions, while Japan is still talking about the abduction of Japanese
citizens. As many times before, the two issues are among the conditions of the “deal.”

So why are North Korea and Japan going to bat for the
sake of nothing new? Could these negotiations in fact be a turning point for the deadlocked nuclear issue? Has Japan become bolder; is it breaking free of
cooperation with South Korea and the U.S. in a cavalier diplomatic shift? What
are the two countries’ real aims, and what lessons should be taken from the
agreement? There are many questions. However, there is one common
answer: the two nations are looking outwards to find solutions to their internal
difficulties.

In September 1990, Liberal Democratic
Party backroom power broker Kanemaru Shin met Kim Il Sung at Mt. Myohyang to begin preliminary
negotiations between the two governments. In the end it came to nothing: his
actions had been guided by personal ambition and he could not generate sufficient support
in the Japanese political arena. Thus, with the Cold War coming to a
close, South Korea expanding engagement with the communist bloc under the
new policy rubric of “Nordpolitik,” and the normalization of South
Korea-Soviet Union relations imminent (1990.9.30), Kim Il Sung went secretly to
China to meet with Deng Xiaoping and asked
China to give its unwavering support to Kim Jong Il, his 48-year-old successor.

The nuclear issue kept North Korea-Japan relations in
deadlock for a long time, but then in 2002 Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro visited
Pyongyang for a breakthrough summit. The “Pyongyang Declaration” was issued,
and it seemed as if a channel by which to negotiate normalization had opened.
At the time, current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was Chief Cabinet Secretary. Anti-Japanese
radical intellectuals had deep roots in Japan, but their number in government
shrank dramatically in the Koizumi Cabinet. It seemed that an environment of political conciliation was having a positive effect
on Japan’s actions abroad. One wonders what Abe learned from it all.

One can put forward the following hypothesis. It may be the
key to explaining Abe’s political actions today:

First, he learned of the limits to Japan’s Peace Constitution. In
August 1998 when North Korea launched a Taepodong missile from its east coast over Japan,
right-wing Liberal Party lawmaker Nishimura Shingo, a politician given to
making remarks about Japan’s right to develop nuclear arms, convened an
emergency meeting of the security council of the House of Representatives.
However, it was not convened formally. At the time, there were fears that Japan’s
Westminster-style cabinet system, which brings opposing parties together in
times of crisis, would not produce quick results, unlike working around the formal
institutional structure of the Japanese system. This marks the origins of Abe’s
efforts to exercise the right of self-defense by changing the meaning of the
constitution.

Second, he learned how North Korea’s abduction of Japanese
citizens could become a domestic political issue. During eight rounds of negotiations
that took place between the two countries between 1990 and 1992, the issue only
came up once. Only once an organization for abductee families was established in
1997 did it become a problem. In the minds of the people, it is now intricately wound up in Japan’s national identity and what is
perceived to be the role of the state. Abe knows this very well; thus,
negotiating with North Korea is a good strategy for him.

For North Korea, on the other hand, bilateral negotiations
with Japan can undermine security cooperation between South Korea, the United
States, and Japan, and help North Korea change the image of a country perpetually
hamstrung by Juche ideology and subordinate to Chinese influence. Was Kim Jong
Il aware of Japan’s internal conditions? He acted
contrary to the expectations of diplomatic experts and openly acknowledged the
abductions issue during the 2002 talks. After 2006, as North Korea became more
of a security threat in Northeast Asia with its nuclear tests and missile
launches, worldwide pressure on North Korea increased and diplomatic detente
between North Korea and Japan ended. However, eight years later, Koizumi’s political
protege, Shinzo Abe, and Kim Jong Il’s son, Kim Jong Eun, are again taking up
the challenge of their predecessors. The players have
changed but the arena and conditions remain the same.

What would happen if negotiations towards the normalization of North Korea-Japan
diplomatic relations took place? The U.S.-led effort to solve the North Korean
nuclear issue would turn to dust and U.S. deterrent
capacity in the region would weaken. Is this worst-case scenario likely to
occur? The history of diplomatic relations between North Korea and Japan indicate not. The U.S. and South Korea have reacted with indifference to the agreement.

In his book, former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone selected
three virtues that Japanese politicians ought to possess: insight,
decisiveness, and persuasion. Insight means knowing when problems will unfold
and how they will end; decisiveness requires finding competent people and reliable
information; persuasiveness is the ability to explain oneself to both the
citizenry and other nations. These three virtues are not just what Japanese
politicians need; they are what all people need, especially those in positions of leadership.

Will North Korea and Japan become friends? It is possible, and
it must always remain possible. However, reaching out to a nuclear-armed North
Korea is a dangerous thing to do. Japan knows this better than anyone else. That
is why the Stockholm Agreement looks like an internal “political show” for both
sides.

* Views expressed in Guest Columns are not necessarily those of Daily NK. This is an abridged version of a column that appeared in Korean on June 16th.