[imText1]North Korea’s farmland has been severely damaged from the recent flood disaster. Korean aid organizations and experts have strongly warned that North Korea may face another food shortage without foreign assistance and strict monitoring of distributions.
While North Korean authorities continue to publicize footages and reports on the flood damages, concerns from the international community rise. However, there have not been any specific investigations on North Korea’s food situation as yet, and without these figures it will be difficult to assist or provide effective aid to the North Korean people.
According to North Korea’s Chosun Central TV, approx. 9,917.4㎡ of farmland has been damaged from the flood. This is 14% of North Korea’s total farmland.
The U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization estimated a loss of 200,000~300,000ton of granary, whereas some North Korea experts estimate this figure to have reached 400,000tons.
In order to understand North Korea’s food crisis, an estimate of North Korea’s total agricultural harvest and agricultural production needs to be made in addition to an estimate of annual food consumption by North Korean people.
Possibility of re-distributions of annual output equaling 400,000tons
North Korea’s total farmland approximates 1.6 million hectare according to North Korean authorities.
The majority of defectors say that 1 hectare of North Korea’s farmland equals 2.5~3tons of output including rice and corn, though discrepancies are found between each region due to the lack of fertilizer and acidified soil.
This amount of 4mn tons was reached taking into consideration that North Korea’s farmland area equates 1.6mn hectare and each one hectare producing at least 2.5tons of output. Nonetheless, during the mass food shortage in the mid-90s, 1 hectare of farmland was not even able to produce 1 ton of output.
The Korean Rural Development Administration estimated North Korea’s total agricultural production to total 4.48mn tons in 2006, while the World Food Program estimated 4.3mn tons. A North Korea support organization “Good Friends” only estimated 2.8mn tons and even predicted the possibility of a more severe food crisis compared to that of the mid-90s.
In that case, what is the annual food consumption amount by North Korean people?
North Korean policy advisors say that a person can live sufficiently consuming 10,000tons of output per day which equals 3.6mn~4mn tons of output annually.
Simple calculations can give an indication of the amount of food needed. If all persons from the elderly to a child consumed a total of 550g of distributions per day, then this would equal 12,100 tons daily and hence 4,416,500 tons annually.
Limited rations stored since the 80s distributed
North Korea’s population is estimated to be 22mn. On average, authorities distribute 550g of rations to adults and 300g to old and feeble persons. The “World Fact Book” of CIA estimates North Korea population to be 15mn (15~64years, July 2004), or 67.8% of the total population. Even after eliminating 7mn children and elderly, North Korea’s annual food consumption equals 3.77mn~77.5mn tons.
In particular, if 4mn tons of rations is supplied for the military and laborers, a stable distribution system may be implemented.
Since the early 80s, 8 days worth of distributions have been subtracted from monthly rations from average citizens under the policy, “war supplies.” This equates to a loss of 96 days worth of distributions per year, meaning that North Korean citizens have been living on 23 days worth of rations every month.
With 96 days worth of rations subtracted from the year, North Korean people are left to survive on less than 3mn tons of food per year. This has continued since the early 80s.
In that case, the question remains as to why the distribution system has not been restored. This reason lies in the increased quantity of distribution rations entering market systems and self-productive provisions through divided-and allocated-collective farms to each factory and business factions as of 2000.
Rations are assigned to collective farms and then should be redirected to the food policy department for storage and distribution. However, it is difficult for the distribution system to accumulate due to fraud and theft on the layered process of distribution.
The Korea Rural Economic Institute calculated the consumption of one North Korean person to total 1,600 kcal. The total of North Korea’s consumption was calculated to equal 5.2~5.3mn tons of production. Even since 2001, the FAO and the WFP estimated North Korea’s consumption to exceed 5mn tons.
If 22mn of North Korea’s population is calculated to be adults, then 650g of food needs to be distributed. Defectors say that mass starvation would not have occurred in the mid-90s food crisis even if at least half of the 650g of rations had been distributed.
With 220,000 hectare of farmland washed away, less than 1 ton of production was left by the flood, North Korea’s decrement of output will be 550,000 tons. 3.85mn tons of production is left after 550,000tons is subtracted from the 4.4mn estimated by the South Korea Rural Economic Institute last year. However, the problem remains that these estimated figures are not accurate.
Lee Min Bok who worked for North Korea’s Academy of Science for Agriculture said, “The actual quantity of agricultural production may be significantly less that the current estimated figures. There is a food shortage as production does not yield to 4mn tons.” Despite the amount of North Korea’s food production, if 500,000tons of output has been lost due to the flood, a food crisis can be expected in North Korea.
However, North Korea’s agricultural output only would have averaged 3.5~4mn tons last year and yet no dire starvation would occur throughout the nation. Further, assistance from the South Korean government and the international community only estimated a total 550,000tons.
This time round if food assistance is provided in North Korea, what is necessary is strengthening of a monitoring system to ensure that food and medical assistance is distributed to the people in need.
In the end, the critical factor is calculating North Korea’s annual agricultural production and finding out how much food production has been affected by the flood. Nonetheless, it seems tactless to be predicting next years “mass starvation” when figures have not been confirmed.
