Kim Jong Eun, who recently marked the end
of his second year in power, has a handful of accomplishments to point to as his own. These include the construction of leisure facilities, primarily in Pyongyang, and more than a dozen (as yet wholly unfulfilled) special economic development areas around
the country.
2014 looks set to offer the Kim regime a different spectrum of challenge. All the signs suggest that the next year will have to be spent establishing Kim
Jong Il-style “monolithic rule” to shore up domestic cohesion in the
wake of Jang Song Taek’s execution earlier this month. Of course, Kim-led construction projects will continue in 2014, but the post-purge
iron fist will also dominate.
Along with purging Jang’s people on
a significant scale, this will require Kim to generate personal loyalty in the
elite. It is assumed that he will continue replacing Party, military and
administrative cadres as a way of achieving this goal. Over the last two years,
Kim has appointed wave after wave of new military personnel. In the process,
around half of North Korea’s core military officials have been reshuffled, removed and/or replaced.
As a new dictator must, Kim Jong Eun has brought
in new people who owe their success to him personally. Among the eight
elites who walked with Kim Jong Il’s hearse in December 2011, the majority has
been replaced. This includes all four of the military figures who walked on the left flank of the vehicle: Ri Yong Ho, Kim Yong Chun, Kim Jong Gak and Woo Dong Cheuk.
Arguably most oddly, the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces
portfolio has been transferred no fewer than four times in those two
years: from Kim Yong Chun to Kim Jong Gak to Kim Kyok Sik to Jang Jong Nam. By
way of comparison, during Kim Il Sung’s 46-year rule five people held the same
post. In Kim Jong Il’s 17 years there were just three. The process under Kim
Jong Eun has seemed rather impromptu and reactive, though it also acts to stop factional formation. 44% of frontline military cadres have also
been reshuffled.
In the security forces,
Kim Won Hong has emerged at
the head of the Ministry of State Security, as has Kim Chang Sop in
the political section of the same agency. The leadership is no doubt aware
that it will need the unconditional and instant compliance of the security
forces if it is to maintain control over society in the coming year(s) of flux.
Within the Party itself, it is noticeable
that persons affiliated with security matters, such as First-Vice Director of the Party Organization and
Guidance Department Jo Yon Jun and Political Director of the Ministry of Public
Security Ri Pyong Sam, have also seen their status rise. These people are well positioned to transfer Jang Song Taek’s previous domain, the Party Administrative
Department, back under the auspices of the Organization and Guidance Department, thus
recentralizing power and cementing Kim Jong Eun’s domain.
This rapid fire reshuffling process shows
that while Kim Jong Eun may have ridden in on the coattails of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong
Il, he is aware that he must construct his own security. Perhaps inevitably, in contrast
with Kim Jong Il, who seized power in a calm and orderly fashion over many
years, Kim Jong Eun has worked quickly and without finesse, suggesting a measure of internal insecurity.
While fear is an effective tool in regime consolidation
over the short term, it isn’t going to improve Kim’s judgment when
faced with the challenge of balancing competing cadres in 2014. In the wake of the
execution of Jang Song Taek, senior military and Party cadres have been explicitly incentivized to competitively idolize Kim. If the leader cannot restore order
to political affairs, this will have a negative impact on the durability of the regime.
One North Korea expert commented to Daily
NK, “The key questions for the security of the Kim regime in 2014 are its
ability to seize power over the Party, military and Cabinet, and whether this system
can be brought into being harmoniously. Kim Jong Eun will have to focus on the
politics of fear to get complete control over North Korea’s power elite.”
However, Yoo Dong Yeol of the Police Science
Institute warned, “The inducement of loyalty via a reign of terror gives the
appearance of stability over the short term, but it also risks increasing internal dissatisfaction,
and as this internal unrest stacks up over the longer term, his power can weaken.”
