2013 has been contradictory for North Korea.
The regime started the year in bellicose mode, pushing ahead with a third
nuclear test and closing the Kaesong Industrial Complex, but also initiated special economic
development areas and oversaw the construction of assorted leisure facilities,
including an ambitious ski resort at Masik Pass in Gangwon Province. Then the year suddenly closed as violently as it had opened, as the execution of Kim Jong Eun’s uncle Jang Song Taek made
headlines around the world and caused shock at home.
For the general public of North Korea, 2013 was a year of change and flux. Market restrictions and controls were limited all year, and rations increased as well. It
was initially believed that restrictions would be enforced following the
execution of Jang Song Taek, but this did not happen: the authorities opted to cleave to a conciliatory line
instead. Indeed, sources testify that complete loyalty to Kim Jong
Eun is the only thing being actively demanded of people at the time of writing.
The main differences on the ground are tighter border controls, and harsher surveillance of core cadres in the military, Party and administrative agencies. The fact that overly restrictive measures have not been implemented for the general public is arguably significant, as it would appear to indicate that the Kim Jong
Eun regime is not keen to prompt their ire.
In fact, the regime has been working on providing a little more to the people than had previously been the case. Grain supplies stabilized following the release of wartime
rice reserves in spring, and this was accompanied by nationwide distribution of food. Some
agricultural areas are known to have received up to three months worth of potatoes and corn, adding fuel
to declining rice prices in public markets. The aggregate rice price is now below 5000 won/kg, and in Pyongyang it is as low as 4000 won/kg; on average, a 1500 won decrease over
the same time last year. Some people have been stocking up.
However, at the same time things have also been tough. In 2013 the authorities mobilized swathes of the population to participate in an unusually high number of state construction projects and theatrical political events. Such forced
mobilization to projects including Rungra People’s Pleasure Ground, Munsu Water Park, Mirim Riding Club and Masikryeong Ski Resort caused considerable discontent, sources repeatedly testified.
The North Korean media, most publicly Rodong Sinmun and Chosun Central News
Agency (KCNA), continuously broadcast propaganda about these facilities,
praising them as examples of the leader’s “love for the people” and “love for the next generation.” It is
on this pretext that the people have been mobilized to national
construction sites. But it has created predictable annoyance.
Overall, therefore, one can say that 2013 has seen a small rise in quality of life. But perhaps this was essential. A source located
in Sinuiju pointed out to Daily NK, “Since circumstances
have gotten better so they
are actively indoctrinating
people on the need to put Supreme Commander Kim Jong Eun on a pedestal and be
loyal to him […] They are doing both
things since they worry that mobilization to construction sites without
anything to eat would generate discontent.”
A second source from Yangkang Province added, “We
had a hard time from spring until winter because of orders from above (the
authorities). Claiming that it’s ‘all for the
people,’ we have constructed mushroom factories here
and there, and beautified our cities as well.”
However, the source warned that the Kim regime has not won the people over yet. “Among close friends we say that ‘before (meaning ‘during the Kim Jong Il era’) they also said
the state was doing things for the people, but all we got was
work with nothing in return,” he recalled. “Now (meaning ‘during the Kim Jong Eun era’) will
these promises be kept?’”
The second source said that discontent may simply have been forced deep underground, “Prior to
the Jang Song Taek incident, occasionally you would see people expressing their
anger in a People’s Unit meeting or on the mobilization
sites,” he mused. “Now, however, this dissatisfaction can only be seen in expressions
and behavior, not in words.”
