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“北 붕괴 불가피…한미일 안정화 작업 나서야”

브루킹스연구소 오핸런 “핵무기 확보·주민원조 중요”
박진걸 기자  |  2009-06-12 13:10
미국 민주당계 대표적 연구소인 브루킹스 연구소의 마이클 오핸런 연구원이 “북한 붕괴 시나리오”라는 제목의 글을 통해 “북한의 붕괴가 불가피하며 붕괴시 한국과 미국, 중국이 협조해 북한의 안정화 작업에 나서야 한다”고 주장했다.

오핸런 연구원은 9일 브루킹스 연구소 웹사이트에 올린 글에서 이같이 주장하며 한미중 협조로 이뤄져야할 북한 안정화 작업의 세가지 주요 임무로 “북핵 제거, 사회질서 유지, 북한 주민 원조” 등을 들었다.

오핸런 연구원은 글에서 “북한의 레짐 체인지는 불가피하다”고 운을 떼고 “더 인간적인 체제가 안정적이고 점진적인 변화를 통해 들어서는 것이 우리의 희망이지만, 북한의 갑작스런 붕괴 가능성을 외면할 수 없다”고 주장했다.

그는 “이러한 시나리오가 가장 가능성이 큰 것은 아니더라도 북한의 계속적인 핵개발이 체제 붕괴시 발생할 피해를 더 크게 할 것이기 때문에 주변국의 준비가 반드시 필요하다”고 덧붙였다.

브루킹스 연구소는 미국에서 대표적인 중도·진보성향의 싱크탱크로 미국진보센터 (CAP)와 함께 오바마 행정부의 인재풀로 여겨져 왔다.

오핸런 연구원은 지난해 미국 대선 당시 힐러리 클린턴 현 국무장관 캠프에서 정책 조언을 해왔으며 오바마 정부에도 조언을 하고 있는 것으로 알려졌다. 따라서 오핸런 연구원의 이번 글은 오바마 정부의 대북 전략의 중심축이 협상을 통한 비핵화에서 급변사태 대비 쪽으로 전환했을 가능성을 시사하고 있다.

오핸런 연구원은 “북한의 붕괴시 미국은 한국, 중국과 협력해야 한다”며 이들 나라가 집중해야할 세가지 ‘미션’으로 “핵물질의 탐지와 확보, 질서와 안정 유지, 북한 주민 및 난민에게 인도적 지원 제공”을 꼽았다.

그는 “북한의 핵무기가 유출되는 것은 미국으로선 최악의 시나리오이지만 북한 붕괴시 이들 핵물질의 위치를 즉각 알아내는 것은 매우 어려운 임무가 될 것”이라고 예상했다.

그는 질서유지와 관련 “한미연합군이 북한 붕괴시 무정부 상태를 끝내고 사면조치가 미리 협상돼 있지 않는 경우 북한 지도부의 신변을 확보하고 북한군 잔당 축출해야 한다”고 설명했다.

또 “북한 붕괴시 수많은 주민들과 난민들이 식량, 의료 등을 필요로 하게 될 것”이라며 “이를 국제적으로 지원하는 것도 중요하다”고 전망했다.

이어 “이러한 임무들에는 미군의 역할이 중요하지만 미국은 최근들어 한반도에서의 군사력 유지를 줄여오는 정책을 펴고 있다”고 지적했다. “상대는 핵무기를 가진 북한”이라고 말한 그는 “한반도는 미국에게 ‘대단히 중요한’ 곳이며 8개에서 10개의 핵무기를 가진 나라를 안정화 시키는데 실패하는 것은 있을 수 없는 일”이라고 주장했다.

“북한 붕괴시 임무가 북한의 평화유지 및 안정화에 불과하다면 한국군이 독자적으로 이를 맡는 것이 합리적이다. 그러나 붕괴 와중에 북한이 내전에 빠진다면 한국군이 단독으로 단기간에 북한을 안정화 시킬 수 있을 지 의문이며 이 경우 북한의 핵무기를 확보하는 것도 늦어지게 된다.”

그는 “북한 붕괴에 대비한 작전계획 5029 내에서도 시나리오별로 미군의 개입 필요가 달라진다”고 말하고 “미군이 개입할 경우 한미 동맹내에서의 조정 문제 뿐만 아니라 중국과의 관계설정에서도 문제가 생길 것”이라고 전망했다.

그는 “북한의 핵무기를 제외하더라도 한미연합군이 북한에 진주하면 중국과의 마찰을 피할 수 없다”며 “이 경우 중국정부와의 발빠른 정보교류로 중국의 의도를 파악하고 국제법적인 근거 (유엔 안보리 결의 등)를 통해 진주의 명분을 가져야 한다. 또 북한에 진주한 미군이 안정화 이후 곧바로 물러날 것이라는 것을 인지시키는 것도 중요하다”고 전했다.

아래는 브루킹스 연구소 웹사이트에 게재된 원문

North Korea Collapse Scenarios

Regime change in North Korea is inevitable. It is impossible for analysts to know how or when the current leadership will cease to rule the country; a stable and incremental evolution to a more humane regime is hoped for, but we cannot rule out the possibility of a sudden collapse of the North Korean state. Such a scenario is only one of many, and it is probably not even the most likely one, but North Korea’s continued development of nuclear devices makes the cost of mishandling a possible collapse so high that all contingencies must be planned for.

A concept of operations

The United States must be prepared to play a major and direct role in dealing with the effects of a collapse, should one occur. It may be somewhat natural to believe that North Korea collapse scenarios make the relative South Korean role larger than that of the United States. But this is a dangerous assumption and the U.S. must coordinate carefully – in advance – with South Korea, China, and other players to develop a basic concept of operations which should include three major missions:

Locating and securing nuclear materials: loose North Korean nuclear materials and/or weapons would be a nightmare for American security, immediately raising the urgency of this mission above that of the current Iraq and Afghanistan efforts. Locating these materials will be extremely difficult, as outsiders (and most insiders) have an imprecise idea of how many, and little to no idea of where nuclear materials and actual devices may be. This mission could be quite distinct in many ways from other aspects of the effort.
Restoring order and possibly combating remnants of the DPRK military: combined ROK-U.S. forces would need to be able to end a state of anarchy that is likely to exist if the state collapses. They would need to defeat any splinter elements (or even substantial elements) of the DPRK armed forces that were posing local resistance or attacking South Korean territory with long-range strike assets. They would also have to arrest top-level North Korean leadership unless an amnesty had been negotiated.
Providing basic goods and services: the North Korean people, including large numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons, will require food, medical care, and shelter. It is essential that services be delivered as quickly as possible, both on principle and to help ease possible opposition to the presence of foreign forces.
These challenges will be faced primarily by military personnel, especially at the outset. Nevertheless, the United States government is apparently deemphasizing major military scenarios on the Korean peninsula in the current era, relative to previous periods. There are several explanations for this situation. American strategists are already overtaxed by operations, responsibilities, and worries elsewhere. Policymakers are distracted by ongoing and potential military activities throughout the Central Command theater. Commanders of U.S. ground forces can hardly afford to consider another operation emphasizing U.S. Army and Marine Corps contributions when they are already so overextended elsewhere. And with the anticipated transfer of preeminent command responsibilities from U.S. Forces/Korea to the Republic of Korea’s own military in 2012, the United States may feel less obligated to lead allied efforts to prepare for possible contingencies.

A major role for the United States

Yet this thinking is not based on sound premises. The stakes in nuclear-armed North

Korea are enormous for the United States; the notion that somehow we could defer to a single ally of relatively modest means in stabilizing a country holding 8 to 10 nuclear weapons at unknown locations within its territory is illusory and irresponsible. Failing to do proper planning is unacceptable. It might require American forces to enter into North Korean territory at the last minute in an unforeseen manner—risking a tragic repeat of the same kinds of dynamics that led to Chinese involvement in the Korean War in 1950. There are four main challenges associated with scenarios for collapse (or “5029,” in the vernacular of war planners):

Designing a solid overall concept of operations such as described above, with appropriate emphasis on securing North Korea’s nuclear weapons as fast as possible—and limiting all vehicular movement by land, sea, and air out of the country in the meantime, to provide an added layer of defense against nuclear leakage (biological and chemical weapons could pose a parallel concern)

Fashioning an allied plan for sharing the burden of this operation, and for adjusting the plan accordingly as circumstances require—based on respect for Seoul’s leadership role in any such campaign but also on Washington’s need to have substantial influence in how the campaign is conducted

Establishing intensive, ongoing, and high-level coordination with China—both to secure the DPRK/PRC border, and to avoid any mishaps if and when PRC and ROK/US forces come into proximity

Developing shared principles with Beijing and Seoul for how to handle post-conflict foreign military presence on the peninsula, rather than assuming blithely that the understandings will naturally emerge on their own
The notion that the United States could somehow outsource most of this DPRK stabilization mission to its South Korean ally falls apart the minute one begins to consider the immediate stakes and the long-term strategic nature of some of the challenges listed above—and the possible degree of uncertainty, confusion, and violence that could accompany many collapse scenarios.

If the main task were to simply restore order in North Korea, rather than defeat a combined air-armor offensive by DPRK forces, it might seem logical to defer to Seoul as much as possible. South Korea may have the numerical capacity to handle North Korean stabilization. North Korea is a mid-sized country, slightly smaller than Iraq or Afghanistan demographically. Its population is estimated at just under 25 million. That implies a stabilization force of 500,000. South Korea has that many soldiers in its active Army, and eight million more between its reserves and its paramilitary. Such reassuring arithmetic may help explain DoD’s apparent inclination to view this problem as manageable largely by ROK forces themselves.

A complicated tactical and strategic challenge

The problem is more complex than a peacekeeping mission, however. To begin, some significant fraction of North Korea’s million-strong army may fight against South Korea even in an apparent collapse scenario. Collapse is likely to imply a contest for power among multiple North Korean factions rather than a literal, complete, and immediate dissolution of authority nationwide. Some significant amount of the South Korean army could therefore be in effect on war footing, fighting from village to village and city to city.

A calculation based simply on overall force requirements also ignores the dimension of time. How long would it take South Korea to spread out and establish control of the North Korean territory—and how much time can we afford? In fact, and of course, speed would be of the essence in any mission to find and control DPRK nuclear-related assets.

Demands for American forces could vary greatly with the specific scenario, within an overall 5029 war plan framework. If the problem developed very fast, available American main combat forces would of course be limited in number to those already on the peninsula, and perhaps also to some of the Marines on Okinawa. In this situation, South Korea’s activation of its own reservists could likely happen more quickly than any U.S. effort to respond with forces based back home. But even for this scenario, the role of American special forces in helping search for nuclear weapons could be quite significant (assuming they could be flown across the ocean quite quickly). They might team up with not only ROK forces, but even an element of a North Korean unit that had possession of the materials and was under siege by larger parts of the DPRK army; Seoul and Washington might strike a deal with any such DPRK unit holding nuclear weapons if that was the only viable way to secure the dangerous materials. Locating nuclear materials will require a major effort in intelligence collection and analysis.

A variant on the collapse scenario might involve the more gradual descent of North Korea into internal conflict—in which case the United States might well have the option of deploying forces from the U.S. homeland in appreciable numbers on a meaningful and relevant time scale. Explicitly depicting some of these kinds of alternative scenarios would be important in this effort.

Assuming U.S. forces could be deployed in significant numbers fast, the question would then become—what should they do, and where should they go? And it is here that the most nettlesome questions of all arise. There would be major challenges within the U.S.-ROK alliance and even larger challenges in working with China.

Due to the importance of stopping DPRK vehicles that could be carrying nuclear materials, it would be crucial to coordinate U.S. and ROK forces to avoid friendly fire incidents and other tragedies. Otherwise, in attempts to stop North Koreans from moving about, allied forces could wind up firing frequently on each other. Many troops would also have to be transported fast by air to secure borders. This means that they would be flying when the DPRK air force would likely still be functional, and therefore when an active air war was underway. Matters such as identification friend-or-foe (IFF) and careful coordination of the airspace would be more difficult than they probably were in either major Iraq war (since in the first, a long air war preceded any meaningful movement of allied forces by ground or air, and in the second, the United States handled central, western, and northern Iraq essentially on its own).

Even more crucial would be how to handle coordination with China. If the United States could position some forces in the general theater before the North Korean state truly failed, perhaps on Okinawa, it might be better equipped than the ROK to help secure northern North Korea. With its amphibious and air assault capabilities, the United States might be able to handle such deployments more rapidly than South Korea could. But that possibility immediately raises the question of how Beijing would react to U.S. forces again approaching its borders.

Without the nuclear worry, this issue might not have to be faced; northern North Korea could simply be left for last, as allied forces led by the ROK gradually moved up the peninsula securing cities and towns and military facilities. But in the current situation, borders would have to be sealed as fast as possible all around the country. If American forces were to deploy to the Chinese border, however, several major concerns would have to be addressed. We would have to know that China was not itself moving into northern North Korea to create a buffer zone and handle humanitarian issues there rather than on its own territory—requiring rapid and clear communications with Beijing at a minimum. Or, to avoid that potentiality, we might have to develop a legal basis—and if not, a U.N. Security Council resolution—explaining why American forces had the right to occupy part of North Korea while Chinese forces did not. We might also need to quickly promise that American forces would subsequently withdraw from North Korean territory as soon as practical, even if the peninsula was reunified under a Seoul government that wanted to preserve the U.S.-ROK alliance thereafter. Several other issues would arise and require attention as well. All of these matters must be discussed—before a possible crisis or war, since in the event, it will be too late to ensure smooth handling and safe resolution of the hugely delicate matters the scenario would raise.
저작권자 ⓒ데일리NK(www.dailynk.com) 무단전재 배포금지
    본사는 한국신문윤리위원회의 인터넷신문 윤리강령을 준수합니다.
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이모티콘 min님 통역 ㅋ

한반도는 한국사람 소윱니다. 그러니 중국은 침흘리지마시길바람니다. 이것 한가지만 분명하게 해두면 머 중국을 용병으로 잘 굴릴수도 있지요.    | 수정 | X 

이모티콘 비극

한반도의 비극 빨리 빨리 끝장    | 수정 | X 

이모티콘 kys

111이라는자. 바로 요런 자들이 북의 조폭두목 앞잡이 이다. 대만민국 사회 구석구석에 은밀히 박혀서 진보로 위장하여 대한민국을 흠집내고 뒤엎을 려고 하고 자들이 바로 이런자들이다. 에라이놈 청천하늘이 두렵지도 않더냐.    | 수정 | X 

이모티콘 B. J. Min

Hahnbandoneun hahngooksahram soyooibnida.
Geuruhni Joonggookeun chimheulijih mahshigilbahramnida.
Eegut hahngajihmahn boonmyonghahgae haedoomyon muh Joonggookeul yongbyongeuro jahl goolilsoodo itjiyoh.    | 수정 | X 

이모티콘 viva9941

우리 유명한 111 개코맨.울지마라 북한주민학살자 김정일이 북한인민들에게 잡혀 죽어도 울지마라.이제는 그 놈이 죽을 때가 되었지.그러니 울지마라.    | 수정 | X 

이모티콘 111

거짓말쟁이 미국은 일찍 망한다..........국민을 속이면 일찍망한다.    | 수정 | X 

이모티콘 침향

김일성,김정일의 거짓말
김일성은 김정일을 백두산 밀영에서 태어나 키웠다고 주장하고 있다. 헌데 해방후 김일성과 김정숙, 김정일이 조선에 들어온 곳을 보면 김일성은 원산으로, 김정일 김정숙은 선봉으로 들어온것으로 기념하고 그곳에 기념비를 세웠다.
백두산에 있었으면 배타고 원산과 선봉으로 들어올수없다. 이들의 거짓말이 인류의 역사를 아니 북조선의 역사와 사람의 권리를 100년 후퇴시키고 있다.
이런 거짓말과 대량 인권말살의 체제를 부정하지 않는다면 대한민국의 양심적인 지식인들은 심각히 스스로의 가치기준에 대해 성찰해 보아야 한다    | 수정 | X 

이모티콘 침향

북한의 김정일 정권을 타도하는 "애국의 길"에 모두가 나서야 합니다. 북조선 처럼 일반인민들의 인권을 말살하고 당 간부들의 인권은 존중해주는 나라는 사회주의와 상관이 없다. 조선노동당이 당원들에게 3%~5%의 당비를 걷어내고, 국방비를 국가예산에서 책정해 놓고도 모자라 당 사업을 위해 외화벌이한다고 하며, 중앙당 39호실 중심으로 돼지 김정일의 개인재산 축척에 들어가는 막대한 돈은 자본주의 사회에서도 찾아볼수없는 엄청난 것이다.
북한에 사는 진정한 사회주의자라면 조선노동당을 변질시키고 사회주의 본질인 "인본주의"와 상관없는 길로 북한을 이끌며, 사회주의의 노동자당의 "지도자,뇌수,수령"이라는 탈을 뒤집어쓴 채, 인민을 착취하는 승냥이, 악랄한 중앙당 39호실의 돼지자본가를 타도하는 한 길에 남과 북의 온 7천만 온 겨레가 나서야 한다.
배부른 돼지들의 호사병인 당뇨, 뇌출혈을 지병으로 앓고있는 변종 돼지 자본가 김정일은 조금만 눈여겨 보면 누구나 알수 있다.
북한 동포들은 7천만 겨레와 변종 돼지 자본가 김정일중 하나를 선택해야 한다.
   | 수정 | X 

이모티콘 he22247

111아 어떻게 살고 싶은가 얘기해줄래? 미제 때려부수는 이야기 말고.
나는 아침에 일어나면 오늘 하루 뭐부터 해야 하고 오늘 식사는 뭘로 하고 어떤일을 하고 얼마큼 돈도 벌고 싶고 어떤 아내를 가지고 싶고 어떤 아이들을 키우고 싶고 몇살까지 살고 싶고 우리북한이 남한하고 어떻게 지내고 싶고 미국이 북한한테 어떻게 대해주면 좋겠고 우리가 국제사회에서 어떤 존재가 되고 싶고 싶고 ..진지하게 이야기해주면 그렇게 되도록 생각해보께. 아니면 직접만나까 차라도 한잔하면서 이야기하는것은.
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