‘Beyond Parallel’ survey reveals three core trends associated with transition

Although North Koreans are often depicted as an oppressed
yet obedient people, recent survey
data
tells a different story. Political attitudes and economic
activities in the isolated state changed dramatically on the heels of a massive
famine that struck in the mid-1990s. An unprecedented rise in marketization
followed, as common North Korean citizens could no longer rely upon the state
to support their livelihoods. This marketization created opportunities for
North Koreans to experiment with new forms of communication and freedom, but
subsequently precipitated crackdowns and confiscatory policies from the regime.
The first section of the CSIS Beyond Parallel survey reveals three
core trends associated with this transition period. We explore the origin and
implications of these trends below.

Changing Attitudes Toward the Public Distribution System
(PDS)

In 2002, the North Korean government attempted to reform the
budding market economy through measures including the July 1st Economic Reform
Measures. However, this apparent shift toward leniency was short-lived. In a
bid to clamp down on the markets in 2005, the authorities launched concerted
efforts to restore state factories and released propaganda that touted the
return of the (previously defunct) public distribution system.

Accompanying the alleged return of the PDS were strengthened
ideological control measures and increasing pressure on residents to
participate in socialist obligations (mandatory duties associated with various
Party agencies). Rather than inspiring loyalty and admiration from the
residents, however, these efforts to resurrect the PDS actually produced the opposite
effect. The majority of North Koreans quickly came to realize that they were
better off without the PDS and its accompanying state control measures,
reinforcing the understanding that they were better at providing for
themselves through the marketplace
than the government was able
to.     

According to the North Korean government’s nutrition
guidelines, the PDS is responsible for providing each adult with 535 grams of
staple food per day. This allotment does not include side dishes or other
necessities (such as cooking oil). These guidelines fall significantly below
the nutritional standards set by the World Health Organization for both
nutritional quantity and diversity.

Even modest estimates for the average amount that residents
can earn through the marketplace yield an income that is several times larger
than what is supposed to be provided through the PDS. This has evidently not
gone unnoticed by the population. The control
measures and regulations associated with the PDS
limit the amount of
time that residents can spend working in the markets. Therefore, rather than
reinforcing socialist ideals and unifying the populace, the majority of survey
respondents view the PDS as a failed policy.

Frustration With Regime Policies that Extort the Market

The most prominent example of a confiscatory policy is the
nationwide currency redenomination that occurred in 2009. The regime claimed
that the policy was necessary to curb inflation and re-circulate ‘idle
currency.’ However, North Korean residents quickly understood that the move was
a thinly-veiled plunder of their hard-earned savings, and an attempt to assert
control over the marketplaces. The policy became a major source
of frustration and antipathy
, and irreversibly etched itself into
the collective memory of the North Korean people. A phrase spread among the
population to explain these oppressive measures: “They nurtured a pig, only to
eat it when it grew up.”

A number of unfortunate individuals who accumulated
considerable savings and influence through successful market investments were
purged or executed, despite paying the bribes demanded by government agents.
These incidents reinforced a common understanding of the importance of
systematic protections for private property. A common warning permeated
everyday chatter: “Don’t follow politics. Focus on earning money.” The
hypocritical nature of cadres is witnessed on a day-to-day basis, as they
demand both socialist ideals and a bribe from residents in the same
breath.  

Further information on the pervasive use of foreign currency
over domestic
currency
in North Korea following the currency redenomination is
available here.

Rising Dissatisfaction With the Socialist System

Residents are also frustrated with Kim Jong Un’s penchant
for exploitative policies.
The regime is socialist in name, but partially
embraces capitalist practices
. Although North Korea is ostensibly
tax-free, the regime’s survival is dependent on revenue generated from bribes
and mandatory ‘donations’ from the public, with the amount of bribery revenue
generated being directly proportional to the scale of marketization it
permits. 

As the citizens of North Korea retain hope for reform and
liberalization, they are increasingly investing in teaching their children
foreign languages. This implies that they are placing a bet against the
longevity of the socialist system and its isolationist policies. It is also
notable that the motives for defection are changing. An increasing number of defectors
are reporting that their decision to escape North Korea was heavily influenced by a desire to give their
children a better education
and life overseas.