Can THAAD unite China and South Korea on peninsula strategy?

On July 8, the U.S. and Korea released a joint statement
declaring that “the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States made an
Alliance decision to deploy THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) to U.S.
Forces Korea as a defensive measure to ensure the security of the ROK and its
people, and to protect Alliance military forces from North Korea’s weapons of
mass destruction and ballistic missile threats.” [The full
statement is available here.]
 

In further explaining the basis for the defense system’s
deployment, the statement emphasized, “North Korea’s nuclear test and multiple
ballistic missile tests, including the recent intermediate-range ballistic
missile (IRBM) launches, highlight the grave threat that North Korea poses to
the security and stability of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the entire
Asia-Pacific region.” The announcement made clear that the placement of the
THAAD system is a response to North Korea’s continued nuclear tests and the
launching of ballistic missiles such as the Musudan missile.

The statement also addresses China’s opposition to the
system. “When the THAAD system is deployed to the Korean Peninsula, it will be
focused solely on North Korean nuclear and missile threats and would not be
directed towards any third party nations,” it reads.

China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded by releasing
the following statement on its website: “We strongly urge to the United
States and Korea to stop the THAAD deployment process immediately and refrain
from any dangerous behavior to make the regional situation any more complicated
and damage China’s security interest.”

Putting aside questions about whether or not THAAD will be
installed, there are two aspects to China’s current approach to North Korea
that contradict one another and complicate China’s strategy. The first is ‘strategic
value,’ and the second is ‘strategic burden.’ These two factors explain the
complex state of the current relationship between China and North Korea. An
important calculation for measuring the relative value of each of these factors
concerns the development of China’s relationship with South Korea.  
 

To look at things from a different vantage, the closeness of
South Korea and China’s relationship caused China to judge North Korea more skeptically.
However, this didn’t much change China’s strategic approach to the peninsula as
a whole. For example, China has insisted that the time has come to select a
strategy for the Korean peninsula, but it is clear that Beijing remains
attracted to the utility that comes from the ambiguity of not selecting a set
course.

Before the announcement of THAAD’s installation, China
asserted that THAAD would severely hurt its national security interests. The
mainstream opinion was that China would therefore respond by amping up its
national security assets while simultaneously pressuring South Korea. This
author sees the current mood in Beijing following the announcement of THAAD’s
planned installation as “intense emotion aimed at all directions:”  Some
in China are even promoting the idea that China should wholeheartedly support
North Korea. 

The fundamental problem with THAAD’s installation is the
following: although THAAD is essentially a response to North Korea’s nuclear
development and various missile tests, it has repercussions that threaten to
upset the nuclear deterrence balance between China and America. The detecting
range for the radar included in the THAAD system is expansive enough to include
parts of China, which is ruffling feathers in Beijing. It could give the U.S.
early warning about long range missiles targeting America. The radar damages
the value of China’s nuclear deterrent and upsets the balance in America’s
favor. This is the crux of the issue and the source of the tension.  
   

Some of South Korea’s media has been reporting about
retaliatory measures that China might take against Korea, including denying
market access to Korea’s businesses or drafting trade restrictions. It was
later brought to light that these reports were based off of Chinese media.
 Exaggerated pronouncements like this have the ability to distort
relations between South Korea and China. The media has the public’s trust and
considerable influence. That is why, especially during such crucial times, it
is important that the media refrain from creating unrest by broadcasting
reports that stimulate confusion and might lead to an embarrassing accident.
 

Far from solving the North Korean nuclear problem, South
Korea’s most immediate, pressing problem is to supplement defense systems that
can counter North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Furthermore,
the fact that THAAD upsets the deterrence balance between the U.S. and China is
not South Korea’s problem.  

Right now is not the time to fret over whether there will be
trade retaliation between China and South Korea or emotional outbursts directed
at one another. Right now, the thing that is needed most of all is mutual
understanding. Care and effort should be poured into mutual understanding
between South Korea and China, America and China, and South Korea and China.

The fact that China mentioned China-North Korea relations in
its emotional opposition to the U.S. and Korea’s implementation of THAAD could
give North Korea the mistaken impression that China has given up on its
consistent position supporting denuclearization of the peninsula. The truth is
that China, South Korea, and the U.S. all want to see denuclearization. But
THAAD might give North Korea the opportunity to seize nuclear status.

Although THAAD has prompted China to take a strongly
one-sided reaction, there have been a minority of voices calling for
modifications to the ambiguous aspects of China’s policy on the Korean
peninsula. With the installation of THAAD, the U.S. and Japan are clear
winners, and the security interests of North Korea and Russia stand a chance to
be improved. A handful of Chinese academics have calculated that South Korea
and China are the victims.   

The author, for his part, intends to focus critical
attention on the question: “What kind of direction will the North Korea-China
relationship take due to the installation of THAAD?” This seems more practical
than fixating on THAAD’s ramifications for South Korea-Sino ties.

The South Korea-China relationship has been fantastically
successful in terms of social exchanges and economic activity over the past 20
years. With regards to political diplomacy, the personal trust built up between
South Korean President Park Geun Hye and Chinese President Xi Jinping has
raised the trust level between the two countries in general. Therefore, the
installation of THAAD will inflict a short term bruise on the relationship, but
in the medium to long term, the possibility that this will evolve into a larger
conflict is remote.

This author sees the South Korea-China relationship as one
on the brink of an era of mature strategic cooperation. It is true that the
THAAD decision has caused deep doubts on the Chinese side. Rather than worrying
about how the THAAD installation will sever or terminate relations, we need to
be more concerned about how the strategic relationship between the two
countries will evolve as a result of the THAAD development.

China’s ambiguous approach to the peninsula is being put to
the test by the THAAD emplacement. Compared to South Korea, China has
been relatively loose on the matter of denuclearizing the peninsula. The
question is: will their increased seriousness on the matter actually bring them
closer to the South Korean position. 

The ferocity of China’s opposition to THAAD reveals to us
that peninsula issues such as denuclearization have become a hot issue of
elevated importance to China. It is up to South Korea to devise and propose
cooperative measures to China on these matters. To put it another way, China
has been intensely focused on issues such as Taiwan Strait affairs and
competing claims with Japan on the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands, but now that
Beijing’s attention has shifted over to the peninsula, there is a chance that
the path to solving to the North Korean nuclear problem might be hastened.
  

The most important element for all sides to focus on is
denuclearization. THAAD will not usher in the termination of friendly South
Korea-Sino relations. It actually represents a new beginning. In terms of
accomplishing the shared goal of denuclearization, THAAD represents a purely
defensive measure. But THAAD might also kick start a process in which China
changes its strategy on the peninsula. Dialogue between South Korea and China
can help both countries to devise and act on a more future oriented and
cooperative security policy.

It is best for South Korea to avoid involving itself in
diplomatic confrontations between America and China. Instead, it should devote
its political energy towards two outcomes on the peninsula: denuclearization
and peaceful reunification. At long last, the time is right for South Korea and
China to have a security dialogue about denuclearizing the peninsula. South
Korea should actively try to fulfill this goal. It’s time for China to change
from its ambiguous peninsula strategy to a more forward-oriented approach.

*Views expressed in Guest Columns do not necessarily reflect
those of Daily NK.