Party shift will further widen gulf between people and the state

By anointing himself with the new title of
Party chairman at the 7th Workers’ Party Congress, Kim Jong Un has formalized
the pivot of the regime’s core of power toward the Workers’ Party at the expense
of the military.

However, issues are likely to emerge, as
even Party members themselves are known to harbor distrust toward the Party,
second only to the distrust they earn from the general public. Kim Jong Un’s
plan to use the Party as a means to stabilize his leadership may therefore be
more problematic than first assumed.

The North Korean government frequently
proclaims to its populace that Party cadres “exist to serve the people”; but in
reality, cadres use their authority to amass personal wealth in the form of
continual bribes solicited from the public.

As was the case when this author lived in
North Korea, chronic malnutrition in a large proportion of the general public
does little to inspire generosity in these cadres. This was highlighted by a
burglary case in Jaeryong County, South Hwanghae Province back in 2010, in
which three hunger-stricken youths raided the storage unit of a Party
secretary.

The incident revealed that the cadre had 20
kg of beef, 30 carp of varying weights between 2 – 3.5kg, an array of expensive
delicacies, and dozens of sacks of sugar and flour that had been accumulated
illicitly. Fearing repercussions for his actions, the secretary chose not to
actively pursue the culprits behind the raid.

When rumors of the incident made their way
through the markets, most commended the “clever thieves” while denouncing the
cadre, and his broader ilk, for the perpetual injustices experienced by the
general public.

Party cadres are also renowned for their
hypocrisy, which is another source of derision for those languishing at the
bottom rungs of society. Perched at the apex of the corruption prevalent in
North Korean society, Party cadres continually peddle the Party principles to
tired ears, warning of punitive measures for acquiring or viewing
“anti-socialist” materials from South Korea, while keeping such materials for
personal use once they confiscate them from “deviants.”

As this author experienced, personally
witnessing and suffering at the hands of Party cadres over the years sows
disillusionment and anger within the general public toward Party officials.

One notable incident occurred in the fall of 2012, in which
a fire broke out at a state security official’s home in the Kanggu neighborhood
of Hyesan City, Ryanggang Province, claiming the lives of the agent’s wife and
16-year-old son.

The incident proved to be a case of arson
by a disgruntled resident seeking to exact revenge. This individual had set
fire to the house upon learning that the security official, who had been soliciting
bribes to turn a blind eye to the individual’s smuggling activities, was
hatching plans to report him to the authorities. The arsonist fled but was
apprehended two days later, following an intensive investigation by the state
security office. Unsurprisingly, rumors concerning the event spread rapidly.

Tension between residents and state
authorities has also become noticeable in the markets. Vendors are often said
to be seen arguing with agents cracking down on market activities, and in a
break from the past, Party officials and law enforcement cadres are now visibly
more wary of how they conduct themselves in public.

These shifts signal that without a
significant overhaul of the system, the chasm between cadres and the public is
set to widen, posing an increasing threat to the stability of the regime. The
leadership will eventually need to come to terms with the reality that nuclear
and missile tests, ‘70-Day Battles,’ and other forced mobilizations will
continue to have diminishing returns in a population exploited by the
authorities.