Kim Jong Un’s loyalty problem: Picking Party Congress reps

As North Korea prepares for so-called
elections to determine its representatives for the first Party Congress in 36
years, the Kim Jong Un regime is issuing threats via domestic and international
channels based on nuclear tests, fearpolitik, and missile launches. In the
midst of this, interest is mounting as to which representatives will be
selected by the North Korean regime to attend the upcoming Congress session.

After the 6th Party Congress convened over
three decades ago, the congress participants formed the backbone of the
regime’s vanguard, serving as the protectors of Kim family rule. For this
reason, an understanding of the participant list for the upcoming meeting can
provide hints on the future leadership direction of Kim Jong Un’s rule.

It is customary for representatives to be
chosen by municipal and county units who are then filtered through to the
provincial level. Following this process, the Central Party ultimately makes
the final selection. Most of the representatives are cadres at the city,
country, or provincial level, or their trusted associates. An individual’s
relationship to the cadres who create the final list is a determining factor
for selection, as they wield considerable influence over the process.

The list is then submitted for a higher
level of deliberation by the central authorities. The Korean Workers’ Party
[WPK] Organization and Guidance Department [OGD], in conjunction with the
Organization Departments of the corresponding county, city and provincial WPK
committees, evaluate each candidate’s work experience, service, party loyalty,
family background, perception by others, and reputation in excruciating detail.
If inconvenient facts about the candidate or his/her family’s past is
discovered (such as illegal behavior or party disloyalty), their name is
stricken from the list.

Judging from the list of participants at
the last Party Congress, the majority of attendees will be cadres who already
hold important positions, such as party secretaries, committee secretaries,
propaganda secretaries, etc. In addition, it is highly likely that regional
leaders at key posts will also make it on the list, such as Provincial
Department cadres and party members that oversee state-operated factories and
enterprises.

It is also likely that those who have
significantly contributed to Kim Jong Un’s pet projects will make an
appearance. This includes individuals who were involved in the construction of
‘Future Science Street’, those who were involved in the long range missile and
nuclear tests, and those who were instrumental in setting up North Korea’s
nuclear power plant.
 

Opinions are also emerging that Kim Jong Un
might use the opportunity to further accelerate the generational shift in
political power that has been implemented over the past four years through the
political purging and execution of high-ranking cadres. In order to firmly
establish the legitimacy and authority of Kim Jong Un, who took over five years
ago, it is also expected that he will appoint young leaders who have displayed
loyalty to him.

In relation to this, Asia Press, a North
Korean specialty news outlet based in Japan, reported that an inside source
from North Hamgyong Province stated that no cadres over 60 of age will be
permitted to attend the Party Congress.  

This would be the first time that at an age
limit has been placed on Party Congress representatives. However, it appears to
be an extension of a similar move carried out in 2012 when male party members
over the age of 60 and female party members over 55 were placed into the “Honor
Party Class,” which was akin to forced retirement.

Among North Korea analysts, there are some
who believe that by attempting to fill the domestic political scene with
support from the younger cohort, Kim Jong Un is displaying a poor understanding
of the political realities of his country. Firstly it will likely be difficult
to expect inexperienced leaders to be able to simply transition into higher
positions of authority without incident. Secondly, the evident general trend in
the country is that younger North Koreans have less loyalty for Kim Jong Un.

A former high-ranking cadre who defected
told the Daily NK on April 1, “Even Kim Jong Il stressed the importance of
unity of the old, middle aged, and the young. Mixing middle-aged and younger
workers together made for efficient teams. These younger cadres have been
sitting at their desk doing office work and haven’t had as much real world
experience making decisions, so this may actually end up hurting Kim Jong Un
more than it helps him.”

The younger generation grew up in the 1990s
and were heavily affected by the famine, and as such have a lower opinion of
the state. Following this, they were hit hard by the currency devaluation that
caused severe distress among the general population.

“That’s why, the younger generation does
not feel genuine loyalty to Kim Jong Un. You might even say that loyalty to the
Kim family has been evaporating from the end of Kim Jong Il’s reign and has
continued into Kim Jong Un’s reign. The people feel oppressed,” he said.
 

“In point of fact, we don’t know whether
Kim Jong Un is actually banning cadres over 60 years old from the Party
Congress. The cadres who currently constitute the Central Party are almost all
over 60. Without their participation, it can hardly be called a Party Congress.
I think that rumor does point to a trend that we can expect to see: more young
representatives than we’ve seen in the past. It tells us that, going forward,
Kim Jong Un is looking to cultivate loyalty among the younger generation.”