 Image: Korea Institute for National Unification [KINU] |
Following the closure of the Kaesong
Industrial Complex, it has been postulated that households personally harmed by
the event may harness their dissatisfaction with the regime and grow into a
larger resistance movement. As these people have lost their livelihoods quite
suddenly, there is a potential for their accumulated dissatisfaction with the
Party to explode.
In addition, as the price of natural
resources has been declining globally since 2013, export conditions have been
worsening for the North. Unlike previous rounds of both unilateral and
multilateral sanctions, which were largely ineffective, this round will affect
the local economies of North Korea, in turn adding to the mounting discontent
of the North Korean people with their system.
On February 25th, the Korea Development Institute [KDI] hosted the 12th Korea Institute for National Unification [KINU] Forum at Seoul’s Lotte Hotel, where experts postulated the closing
of Kaesong, together with tightened sanctions, would have a serious impact on
all households in the broader Kaesong area. “Groups affected socially and
economically by the sanctions may, for the first time, actually mobilize,”
predicted Lee Seok, a researcher with KDI.
He went on to explain that in the short
term, the Kaesong residents may feel animosity towards South Korea, but in the
mid-to-long term the fact that their economic interests and those of the North
Korean regime are different will become abundantly clear. “This is the first
time in history that the North Korean authorities have had to confront a
potential socio-political movement,” Lee noted.
Although the North Korean authorities may
think that Kaesong can be broken up into other areas or their unhappiness can
be appeased through increased resource distribution, in reality this will be nearly
impossible. Moreover, Lee added, “When sanctions targeting North Korea are
fully implemented, trade between North Korea and China will of course be
restricted, so we won’t be seeing ‘third party effects’ that could stem from an
arrangement such as China employing the 56,000 workers from Kaesong.” As a
result, the likelihood that South Korea’s closing of Kaesong Industrial Complex
will place a burden directly onto North Korea is high.
Kim Seok Jin, head of the North Korean
research center at the Unification Research Institute, said that North Korea’s
workers who are earning foreign currency, including miners, are in trouble as
the price of natural underground resources has fallen on the international
market. This has in turn affected their exports. Although North Korean workers
in Russia have been able to earn quite a bit of foreign currency, the fall of
the ruble after the turmoil in Ukraine has affected the value of their
earnings, meaning that North Korea is not pulling in as much foreign currency as
it did in the past. Mr. Kim also stated that this fresh round of sanctions will
negatively impact the local economies of North Korea.
Some at the forum also stated that in order
to succeed in reunifying the Korean Peninsula by efforts to change the North
Korean regime through international sanctions, South Korea must create a
supplemental “aggressive unification strategy.”
Professor Kim Seong Han from Korea
University pointed out that Kim Jong Un’s regime is less concerned with
national security [protecting the people] and more focused on ensuring his own
regime’s survival. “In order to stop Kim Jong Un’s game plan, we must threaten
the security of his regime through strong sanctions,” he emphasized.
The Professor also highlighted the fact
that in the future, policy towards North Korea must aim towards ‘Regime
Transformation’, either by positively reforming Kim Jong Un’s regime, or by
actively pursuing changes that would result in moderate leadership.
In a discussion over de-nuclearization,
Professor Kim offered the opinion that only when Kim Jong Un recognizes that
the nuclear weapons he believes are the only way to ensure the long-term
survival of his regime are, in fact, a noose tightening around his neck, will
North Korea be able to accept demands for denuclearization. He proposed the
following policies for South Korea’s government to pursue: ▲ Active deterrence
▲ Weaken support for the North Korean regime ▲ Destroy North Korea’s diplomatic
and military capabilities ▲ Following de-nuclearization, push for peaceful
cooperation.
Professor Kim particularly emphasized the
fact that weakening the North Korean regime is the most important task at hand.
“We must strengthen our systematic and overall psychological warfare against
the North, including radio broadcasts to North Korea and use of the
loudspeakers on the border.”
