An increasing number of countries now view North
Korea as a nuclear state. This is a result of North Korea’s growing nuclear
capabilities. To respond to this danger, some are calling for the redeployment
of US tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea. Today, we will be examining
possible responses to North Korea, and the necessity of redeploying tactical nuclear
weapons. With us today is Kim Hee Sang, the current director at the Research
Institute for National Security Affairs. He has also previously served as a senior
defense aide at the Blue House and as a lieutenant general for the ROK Reserve
Forces.
1. Recent reports state that North Korea is
now a nuclear state. What is your thought on these reports?
There are still many who doubt that North
Korea is as nuclear-capable as described by those reports. For instance, the US
does not think of North Korea as a threat to other countries until North Korea successfully
miniaturizes warheads, and a successful atmospheric entry for ICBMs can be
completed. Hence, the US views North Korea’s nuclear weapons as inadequate.
However, it’s a different story for South Korea. Although North Korea’s nuclear
weapons may not be as sophisticated as that of the US, they are still dangerous
enough to pose a mortal threat to South Korea.
Nevertheless, despite the danger
posed by North Korea, we have not officially recognized North Korea as a
nuclear state. The reason is that doing so will fundamentally change the nature
of our relationship with North Korea. Nonetheless, just because we don’t officially
recognize North Korea as a nuclear state doesn’t mean that we don’t need to
prepare against a possible nuclear attack; indeed, our preparations must be completed
on the premise that North Korea is a nuclear state.
2. After Kim came to power, North Korea has
conducted a third experiment of nuclear arms, and is focused on the simultaneous
growth of the economy and nuclear weapon technology. Just how sophisticated is North
Korea’s nuclear technology?
No one knows the exact level of
sophistication of North Korea nuclear technology. But most experts believe that
it has reached a very advanced level. When nuclear weapon technology reaches a
certain level of sophistication, the quantity of nuclear warheads becomes
meaningless as just one warhead becomes sufficiently dangerous, so that whether
North Korea possesses ten or a hundred warheads is qualitatively meaningless. The
correct question is whether North Korea possesses nuclear weaponry or not. The
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute released a report in last June
which listed North Korea as possessing six to eight warheads.
The US, China, and other countries have
recently stated that North Korea is a nuclear state, and recent reports estimate
that North Korea will possess between 75 and 200 warheads by 2020. What this
really means is that North Korea is quite good at producing nuclear weapons.
3. North Korea’s growing nuclear weaponry
capability is causing a corresponding level of anxiety. Who is North Korea’s
target for its nuclear arms, and is there a good chance that North Korea will
actually use them?
Some among us say
that North Korea will not target us because we are the same nation. I
visited the Institute of World Development in China 2007, and its director said
that the sole purpose of North Korea’s nuclear arms is to defend against the
US. He said that Kim Il Sung taught his followers not to attack South Korea,
which is the same nation. If so, then who is North Korea’s target? US? Japan? North
Korea knows all too well that an attack on those two countries will inevitably
lead to the total destruction of the Kim regime. Hence, the view that North
Korea won’t attack South Korea on the basis of pan-Koreanism is ridiculous. Do
you think that a dictator who starved millions of his own people would care more
about people of the same nation? The answer is clear that South Korea is the only
target. We can’t numerically calculate the probability of our being attacked,
but we must make preparations against North Korea on the belief that an attack
is always possible.
Whether North Korea will choose to use its
nuclear arms depends on the amount of deterrence that we can put up. If North
Korea believes that a nuclear attack will inescapably result in more harm to
them than to us, then there won’t be an incentive for them to use nuclear arms.
We have to impress them with the certain belief that a nuclear attack will
result in damage to them from which they can’t recover. Since deterrence is a
psychological concept, we have to make them believe that a nuclear attack will
inevitably result in the demise of the Kim regime.
4. What preparations has South Korea made
in response to the increasing threat of nuclear weapons? Does South Korea possess
sufficient deterrents against nuclear weapons?
The question is how much deterrence we can
put up. Our main defense right now is the kill chain, and the KAMD, but these
systems will be completed by 2020. In addition, when North Korea successfully
completes its SLBMs, then these systems will be ineffective. I don’t mean that
the kill chain or the KAMD will be a total waste of effort, but it won’t be a
perfect defense against the North Korea. If North Korea becomes officially recognized
as a nuclear state, a perfect defense will become impossible. The strongest
defense against North Korea at this present time is the US’ nuclear umbrella. Deterrence
is a psychological weapon, and the nuclear umbrella gives the impression that a
nuclear attack on South Korea will lead to equal retaliation. If the nuclear threat
was posed by China or Russia, then this would be a different story. However,
even the umbrella isn’t a perfect deterrence. Even if we self-developed nuclear
weapons, it would not be a perfect deterrence; it would certainly be another
deterrent, but perfect deterrence is perhaps impossible to achieve.
5. Some observers state that the
redeployment of US tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) on South Korean soil is
necessary to build a sufficient level of deterrence. Do you think the
redeployment is necessary?
Self-developing nuclear arms would not be a
perfect strategy against North Korea. On the other hand, to do so would be tantamount
to recognizing North Korea as a nuclear state. In that scenario, which country
would welcome a nuclear armed reunified Korea? To develop nuclear weapons would
not only be difficult but strategically unwise as well. As you said, there’s a
lot of talk about placing US TNWs on South Korea soil. At first, I also opposed
the re-deployment of US TNWs. Re-deployment would obviously have been a better
option than developing our own weapons, but it would validate or rationalize North
Korea’s nuclear arms. However, these arguments will soon become worthless as re-deployment
will become strategically useless with North Korea’s SLBMs becoming fully
functional.
I should add that with regards to North
Korea’s SLBM technology, there is a discrepancy between the commonly known SLBMs
and North Korea’s SLBMs. The common SLBM is a TNW, but with its own SLBMs, North
Korea will be able to attack from anywhere. A successful launch of SLBMs will
render the kill chain, KAMD, or even THAAD ineffective. During the Second World
War and the Cold War, the “balance of terror” prevented a full conflict between
the US and USSR; in Korea, creating this balance is now the priority. To do
this requires stationing US nuclear submarines near the Korean peninsula. However,
the submarines alone won’t be enough to create this balance especially when one
takes the current Kim’s irrationality into account. To achieve the balance
requires preparing the KAMD, THAAD, and other countermeasures on top of
everything else.
6. If the US decides to re-deploy nuclear
weapons on the Korean Peninsula, the repercussions will likely be enormous. Can
you elaborate on this?
In the case that it happens, it is obvious
that such a move will be opposed by Russia and met with intense resistance on
part of China. China is already strenuously opposing the introduction of THAAD,
saying that it represents a rupture in Korean-Chinese relations, and that it
will be tantamount to recognizing North Korea as a nuclear state. The pro-North
Korea factions among us will obviously oppose such a measure, and they will
perhaps be the biggest obstacle. It almost need not be said that North Korea will
do the same. North Korea will do what it has done by resorting to abusive
language, threats of destruction, and even a conventional attack as on Yeonpyeong
Island.
Japan probably won’t protest too much if US
clearly emphasizes that they will be in charge of the TNWs. But China is a different case. We must keep in
mind that during the 2013 US-China Summit, we were excited by the news that
China agreed to the denuclearization of North Korea. However, Xi Jinping soon pushed
the responsibility of denuclearization onto the Six Party Talks. To pass the
buck to the Talks, especially after it has been proven ineffective, shows that
China isn’t very keen on denuclearizing North Korea. Moreover, at the
Korea-China Summit, which took a month after the US-China Summit, China gave
emphasis to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula as a whole, not North
Korea only.
From South Korea’s perspective, China’s
behaviour is unwelcome. The Chinese government later stressed that it meant the
denuclearization of the peninsula was another way of saying denuclearizing North
Korea. However, a professor at Tsinghua University said that denuclearization also
meant excluding TNWs from South Korea soil. By turning to the Talks, China is
implicitly suggesting that we should ignore the issue of North Korea nuclear
arms, while on the other hand clearly opposing the placement of nuclear arms on
South Korea. Such maneuvering becomes more problematic in light of the recent
dispute over THAAD. THAAD is a defensive weapon. As long as China doesn’t
attack us directly, its installation poses no problem for China. However, for
China to disregard North Korea arms while opposing South Korea from installing
defensive countermeasures shows their motives all too well. Therefore, we must
clearly impress upon China that the failure to denuclearize North Korea,
especially in the light of SLBMs, will be threaten South Korea’s existence,
thereby making inevitable the re-deployment of US arms.
7. Even if South Korea calls for the US to re-deploy
nuclear arms on the peninsula, it is all for nought if the US decides against
it. Is there a necessary condition before the US will choose to re-deploy?
The first condition will be the level of
trust that the US has in Korea. There is the understanding that if the
deployment of TNWs takes place, then South Korea won’t self-develop nuclear
arms and the US won’t the TNWs to wield undue influence over US-Korean issues
that are non-military. Another condition is the safety of the arms. I was an
aide at the Ministry of National Defense in 1991. As the US was officially
withdrawing its TNWs from South Korea, I had a conversation with a senior
member of the US military about the Gwangju Uprising. Specifically, he was worried
that the weapons might be forcibly taken from the US in an extreme event. This
fear was the deciding factor which made the US withdraw its weapons after the
Cold War ended. At this time, to prevent North Korea from tipping the balance
of power in favor with nuclear weapons, South Korea entered into an agreement
with North Korea on the non-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula. The most
important question over re-deployment whether the US Congress will consent to
it. The South Korean government hasn’t given it serious consideration yet, and
any rumors on the contrary from the US are not trustworthy. However, those who
really determine policy are researchers at think tanks. A chief researcher told
us that preventing a nuclear domino in East Asia could realistically require
the deployment of TNWs on the Korean Peninsula.
Re-deployment will become especially
necessary if South Korea decides to produce its own nuclear arms. A senior
researcher at CSI believes that redeployment will be the strongest deterrent
against North Korea, and a sure means to reassure the South Korea public
against the North Korea nuclear threat. A joint report released last May by
CSI, CNAS, NIPP, and others is particularly interesting. It stated that
redeployment would become increasingly necessary after 2025 as a deterrent against
North Korea attacks. To prevent such an outcome, South Korea must strongly
emphasize the denuclearization of North Korea at the next Korea-Chinese summit.
We have to make them believe that unless North Korea is denuclearized, South
Korea might decide to develop its own nuclear weapons.
On today’s “Unification Table Talk,” we
evaluated possible responses to North Korea’s nuclear weapons with Kim Hee
Sang, the director of the Research Institute for National Security Affairs.
Thank you very much for your time.
