SK’s policy toward NK is as hazy as the North itself

It is often said North Korea is hard to
predict. It will lash out only to suddenly initiate dialogue. But when it comes
to sitting down at the table, it will then come up with all kinds of excuses
not to. This is why when it comes to dealing with North Korea, it is hard to
shake off the question: ‘What is North Korea really thinking?’

However, if we look at Seoul’s recent
policy towards the North, it would be no surprise if Pyongyang were thinking
the same thing. A simple look back on the past few months will highlight why
that would be the case. 

In the period leading up to the end of
April from when Seoul’s unification minister, Hong Yong Pyo, first took office
in March, there had been movements to start dialogue with the North. On April
28th, private fertilizer aid to North Korea was approved for the first time in
five years; and on May 1st, measures were announced to further expand inter-Korean
exchanges on the civilian level. On May 4th, for the first time in half a
decade, civilian groups were given the greenlight to establish contact in
preparation for the June 15 South-North joint declaration anniversary. This was
seen as the South’s will to improve relations following the conclusion of
Seoul-Washington joint annual military drills in April.

However, a few days later, movements
contradicting this sentiment began to emerge. Seoul’s National Intelligence
Service made public news of North Korea executing its defense minister, Hyon
Yong Chol. On May 27th, Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo’s chief negotiators of the
six-party nuclear talks met in the South, where they agreed to step up pressure
on Pyongyang. 

On June 3rd, in the presence of President Park Geun Hye, the
South test-fired a 500 km-range ballistic missile, which puts all of North
Korea in its target radius. From North Korea’s point of view, all this would
have been attempts to squeeze the North both on the political and military
fronts by intentionally unveiling information that could cause a stir within
the North.

Of course, NIS’ announcement about Hyon was
in response to rapidly spreading rumors; the agreement to step up pressure on
the North is not an issue simply of the South but one of international
cooperation; and the missile test also seems to have been conducted in order to
quell anxiety in the South originating from North Korea’s own test-firing of a
submarine-launched ballistic missile [SLBM] on May 9th. 

However, releasing news
about Hyon’s execution as a preemptive measure and making public the missile test
with the president attending were both moves that were out of sync with the
government’s previous attempts  to improve relations with the North. They
were all issues that could have been dealt with in a different nature had the
government placed more weight on actually improving inter-Korean relations.

NK conveys intentions through state
declaration, Seoul calls it “unjust”

In the midst of this all, North Korea
released a state declaration in time for June 15th. Although it included
existing arguments such as calling on Seoul to halt annual military drills with
Washington, it also said “there is no reason why the North and South cannot
hold talks,” conveying its underlying desire to open dialogue. On the same day,
the North also showed its willingness to repatriate two South Koreans who they
claim entered its territory illegally. This can be seen as Pyongyang’s way of
setting the bait, waiting to see if the South would bite. 

Seoul responded within a few hours through
a statement issued by the Ministry of Unification spokesman. It called on the
North to “stop putting forward unjust preconditions.” Although it also included
an offer to “broadly discuss issues of mutual interest,” the use of the word
“unjust” from Pyongyang’s perspective would have read as a negative response.
This move produced analysis that the South is closer to the stance of
“pressure” rather than “dialogue” when it comes to North Korea.

Two days later, the unification minister
held a briefing with reporters in which he “welcomed” the offer for talks from
the North, calling it moving “one step forward.” He explained the use of the
word “unjust” was not to reflect an aggressive stance. 

This came all too late. North Korea
announced on June 19th its withdrawal from the Gwangju Universiade sports
event, and on the 23th, it sentenced two South Koreans, Kim Kuk Gi and Choe
Chun Gil, to hard labor for life. This could be seen as a protest to the
opening of a UN field office in Seoul on North Korean human rights, but it can
also be considered a move of protest against Seoul’s unwillingness to talk. 

On the evening of June 23rd, Seoul’s
unification minister raised the possibility of opening talks with the North on
the issue of a prolonged drought that has drained the country. In a meeting
with reporters, Hong said Seoul is willing to offer support for the North on
damages it has seen from the drought. This seems like a desperate effort to
open up a channel of communication using the drought in the face of no signs of
inter-Korean relations improving. 

However, not long after, Seoul again seemed
to reverse its tracks. On the 26th, it announced it will impose financial
sanctions on seven countries including Taiwan and Syria for suspected arms
trade. This measure is more symbolic than practical, which is why it only acts
as a gesture of warning to the North. On one hand, Seoul signals it wants to
engage, but on the other it cuts off any such gestures. It is hard to
understand in which direction the government is trying to steer things when it
comes to South-North relations.

Need for pointman to control and coordinate
overarching approach towards NK

After encountering such confusing language
from the South, Pyongyang will no doubt be confused. It is hard enough to
produce results even when Seoul keeps its message consistent. With mixed
signals such as this, things that can be accomplished will fall apart.

The reason why there is such confusion is
because of the lack of a single figure who can oversee and coordinate policies
towards North Korea. The unification ministry is struggling to extend an offer
for dialogue, but it is not being helped by any other party. It could be argued
that the ministry with no question should be focusing on creating opportunities
for communication, but when it comes to North Korea, the government needs to
work in unison. As long as it continues to send mixed messages across the
border, there will not be much progress to expect in inter-Korean relations.

*Views expressed in Guest Columns are not necessarily those of Daily NK.